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“The economic problem of reconstruction is that of rebuilding the capital of society ... Reconstruction is
merely a special case of economic progress. If we are to understand its problems thoroughly, we must
examine what is meant by economic progress and try to discover how it comes about” (Kenneth E.
Boulding, The Economics of Peace, 1945, pp. 4, 73).
Overview : Increasingly, peace agreements and economic development programs reference the centrality of sound
economic policy and a stable macroeconomic framework in state-building efforts. But few practitioners have the
background to know what this means and to understand the relationship between their areas of responsibility and
the policies needed to attain macroeconomic stability. Even fewer feel able to contribute meaningfully to designing
and implementing strategies to attain and maintain this fundamental end state. This manual aims to serves as an
introductory guide to and reference document on macroeconomics. It is intended for noneconomists who may be
involved in peace negotiations and would benefit from a clearer understanding of the underlying macroeconomic
issues.
Purpose and scope of this manual
Without economics there is neither war nor peace. Economics is entangled front, back, and center with violence as well
as with its prevention or, at least, mitigation. Before war, economic grievances such as severe maldistribution of income
or income-earning opportunities can give rise to political upheavals. During war, economics both provides and destroys
resources. And after war, well-functioning production and exchange mechanisms need to be put back together again—or
else relapse into war is likely.
As aggressors or as victims, even robustly performing economies can fall prey to armed violence. Japan and
Germany and the eventually victorious powers in the Second World War (1939-1945) serve as but one set of examples.
Economic aspects related to labor, capital, trade, and finance can motivate, drive, prolong, and terminate violence. This
was as true of the U.S. American civil war (1861-1865) as of that in Mozambique (1976-1992). Interestingly, in the
Mozambican peace agreements the very word “economic” appears solely in conjunction with the phrase “economic and
social reintegration of demobilized soldiers.” No other reference to economics is made.  Yet economics is crucial, if only1
because one cannot fight nor live in peace without resources.
To prosecute war, warriors need to volunteer, be hired, or be conscripted and bullets need to be manufactured,
bought, and sold. Withdraw the fuel of war, and the guns must fall silent. Economics can be among the causes that
motivate armed violence in the first place, for instance over access to valuable natural resources. And when the guns do
fall silent economics is important because postwar—when communities and livelihoods need to be rebuilt—economics
co-determines the prospects for the success or failure of peace. It is widely acknowledged, for example, that the economic
terms and execution of the post-World War I peace treaty helped lay the foundations upon which World War II was
motivated and fought. In contrast, the post-World War II peace arrangements helped generate the economic “miracles”
of both Germany and Japan. The same, we now know, is true of armed violence in much of the developing world in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America: the design and execution of postwar economic policies help determine the success or
failure of peace. Not merely preventing relapse into war, the proper design and implementation of economic policies can
be among the primary instruments for preventing armed violence in the first place.
PURPOSE OF THE MANUAL. This is a practitioner’s manual on macroeconomic fundamentals as they touch on conflict-
affected states. Nowadays, violent interpersonal and collective conflict primarily concerns emerging and developing
economies and the manual therefore focuses on these even as it will bring to bear lessons learned from the cases of the
now-advanced economies. As to economics, we indeed stick to fundamentals although economists sometimes are hard
put to define, let alone agree, just what these are. The finance-driven world economic crisis of the late 2000s has
illustrated, after all, that economic theories and policies are less firmly set than it was once thought they were.
In each of the manual’s five chapters, key concepts and relationships are explained in lay-person’s terms, important
topics, issues, data, and metrics are presented, the roles and responsibilities of key institutions outlined, and policy
lessons and tips for violence prevention, mediation, peace agreements, and post-violence management provided. Each
chapter concludes with two illustrative case studies to highlight missteps as well as good practice. This
organization—theory, practice, policy, cases—should assist different kinds of practitioners in different ways. For
example, mediators and representatives of the bargaining sides will realize that peace negotiations must explicitly deal
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with postwar/post-violence economics, lest they raise the danger the relapse into war on account of missing, or faulty,
economics.
SCOPE OF THE MANUAL. This manual is no substitute for an economics textbook. There is no pretense at being
comprehensive; instead we select some topics that are germane to the issue of violence, especially large-scale collective
violence as in the cases of war and civil war. Chapter 1 provides illustrative information on violence and economic
performance, discusses the purpose of economics and the many facets of economic policy and economic politics, and
looks at some of the links between violence and (the lack of) economic development. Chapter 2 provides an overview
of economic growth theory and policy. Policymakers sometimes fail to appreciate that growth is a means to an end—the
betterment of life—not an end in itself.  The chapter discusses how economic performance may be measured, and what2
are some important economic institutions and their policies. Chapter 3 moves from long-term to short-term considerations
or, in the jargon of the profession, to macroeconomic stabilization theory and policy. In practice this means fiscal and
monetary policy, concerned for example with taxation and the setting of interest rates, and spill-over effects of these on
other policy and development goals. Chapter 4 turns from “closed” to “open” economics, that is, a consideration of
international trade and finance theory and policy. Chapter 5 concludes the manual, providing sets of general and
specific rules of thumb that peace negotiators and economic policy- and decisionmakers should find useful. It brings the
preceding chapters together and discusses them in regard to issues pertaining to the design of peace.
The manual concludes with endnotes, a list of references, a glossary, and various appendices.
Lesson 0.1: Without economics there is neither war nor peace.
Lesson 0.2: The design and execution of postwar economic policies help determine the success or failure of peace.
Lesson 0.3: The proper design and implementation of economic policies can be among the primary instruments
for preventing violence in the first place.
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Chapter 1: Violence and economic development
1.1 The economic cost of violence: a first impression
The World Health Organization groups violence into the rubrics of self-harm (including suicide), interpersonal
violence (e.g., violence between intimate partners and other forms of family violence, rape and sexual assault by
strangers, violence committed in institutional settings such as schools, prisons, and work places), and collective violence
(e.g., armed conflict between, among, and within states, violent political repression and genocide, violent acts of terror,
and organized crime) and speaks of an ecology of violence that progresses from (1) individual to (2) personal
relationship-related violence and on to (3) communal and large-scale, collective levels of violence (WHO, 2002).3
The economics of health and
crime are well-established fields
of study. Other economists and
quantitative political scientists
concentrate on collective forms of
violence such as intra- and
interstate war. In 2008, the United
N a t i o n s  D e v e l o p m e n t
Programme’s Bureau for Crisis
Prevention and Recovery (BCPR)
released a study from which
Figure 1.1 is taken. For a
selection of seven states, data on
pre- and postwar per capita value
of economic production, called
gross domestic product or GDP,
adjusted for inflation and
purchasing power differences,
w e r e  c o l le c te d .  ( F o r  a n
explanation of these terms, see
chap te r  2 .)  F o r  ease  o f
comparison, for the year in which
the respective wars ended GDP is
set equal to an index of 100,
indicated by the vertical dashed
line in the figure.  Start dates of4
war are indicated with an arrow
for each state. As may be seen,
prior to the start of war, per capita
GDP had grown in most of the
cases. With the start of war, GDP
collapsed. And with peace, GDP
started to grow once more. 
The three countries with
blueish lines (El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Nicaragua) have
experienced weak postwar growth
and hence are labeled as weak-
growth recovery (WGR) states,
whereas the others (Cambodia,
Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda),
indicated with reddish lines, are
Figure 1.1: GDP per capita in selected countries, pre- and postconflict.
Note: Arrows point to starting year of conflict, unless where conflict is ongoing
over the entire period covered (Cambodia, Guatemala), in which case the arrow
points to the first year of the series.
Source: UNDP (2008, p. 111, Figure 4.2).
Figure 1.2: Cumulative per capita GDP losses.
Brauer/Dunne: A Manual on Macroeconomic Fundamentals for Conflict-Affected States     D R A F T (v6) page 4
marked as strong-growth recovery (SGR) states. The UNDP study discusses why some states appear to recover more
strongly than others. But even though both Mozambique and Rwanda, for example, appear to have done relatively well
postwar, the macroeconomic policies underlying their economic recovery experiences were in fact rather different.
Rwanda bounced back strongly right after 1994 but since then its growth has been modest. In contrast, Mozambique
floundered for the initial postwar years before starting to grow strongly thereafter.
Note, in Figure 1.1, that Cambodia’s per capita income index equaled about 220 at the start of the war and that, 35
years later, the country still had not recovered to its former per capita income levels. Nicaragua’s high-point in per capita
GDP came 14 years before the end of the war, and 14 years after the end of the war, its income-level still is only one-half
of what it once was! For El Salvador, average income-levels have improved slightly, but the peace after the war ended
was worse than the war itself—more people were killed in the 10 years after the war than during the 12-year war.5
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, from which Figure 1.1 is taken, summarizes recent
studies on the economic cost of civil war. It reports that this cost lies somewhere between 1.7 and 3.3 percent of GDP
per country per conflict year prior to 1990 and averaging 12.3 percent of GDP post-1990, that is, in the post-Cold War
era (UNDP, 2008, p. 35). To show the cumulative effects of these losses, Figure 1.1 can be redrawn in stylized
fashion—as in Figure 1.2—where the curved, solid black line represents the fall and rise of average per capita GDP
during and after war and the dotted red line represents the potential GDP growth path had war not interfered.
Consequently, the area in-between the black and red lines indicate the cumulative GDP losses. In light of the number
of years covered—35-years in the case of the UNDP study—these losses are substantial (see section 1.4 for more detail).
There is no agreement among economists on how to compute the global cost of war, let alone the cost of all violence,
war-related or not. W hat is required is a computation of current cost, legacy cost, and spill-over cost that is
comprehensive and consistent.  The current cost is the direct and indirect cost of violence incurred in a given time period6
(say, a calendar year) and a given geographic space (say, within the borders of a region, country, or province); the legacy
cost would include the cost of past violence that carries into the present (e.g., reduced productivity on account of
permanent injury; continuous health care for the injured); and the spill-over cost would account for costs imposed on
bystanders (e.g., refugees from state A that impose a cost on state B). A complete survey of the various estimates found
in the literature does not exist. A partial survey of the economic cost of self-harm, interpersonal, and collective violence,
including civil wars and terrorism, was carried out by Brauer and Tepper-Marlin (2009). They conservatively conclude
that, if all violence had ceased, the 2007 value of world economic production, called gross world product—GWP, the
sum of GDP across all states—could have been 8.7 percent larger than it actually was. They distinguish between static
effects and dynamic effects. The former recognizes that cessation of violence makes, for instance, some security services
superfluous, thus shifting expenditure to other goods and services. This replacement or substitution effect does not
increase GDP; it merely reallocates spending from one sector of the economy to another: the economic pie does not grow.
However, being more secure about one’s person, family, and property liberates energies to undertake productive
investment that, in turn, increases GDP, and it is this effect of nonviolence that—they suggest—would have amounted
to an 8.7 percent gain in GWP in 2007.
Because violence is a continuous phenomenon, this cost of about 9 percent of GWP represents annually forfeited
economic output. In contrast, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), an important global financial institution, estimates
that the world economic crisis of 2009 amounted to a one-time world output loss of a mere 1.1 percent.  Granted, the7
world economic crisis would have been worse had it not been for extraordinary policy intervention worldwide. But that
is just the point: the ongoing, annual violence crisis is a much more severe economic problem than is the occasional
economic crisis and demands at least equally extraordinary policy attention and intervention.
1.2 Assets, income, and the bathtub theorem
PURPOSE OF ECONOM ICS. To survive and to reproduce into the next generation, all living matter must produce,
distribute, and consume. The details vary by species but the economy of nature is real enough and biologists routinely
apply economic thinking about (energetic) costs and (reproductive) benefits to the organisms they study. The human
species is endowed with the seemingly singular capacity to design systems of production, distribution, and consumption
that, in principle, permit continual betterment of our condition of life. These systems have individual and collective
elements to them. Private property rights for instance generally are collectively procured and secured via tax revenue
and expenditure on a suitable law and order apparatus. But among the signal achievements of the human economic
system is the invention and pervasive extent of trade. Whereas among nonhumans it tends to be the species that
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specializes, among humans it tends to be the individual within the species that specializes on acquiring a useful skill, the
product of which is bartered against the specialized products of other individuals.
THE THREE ECONOM IES. Because of the importance of trade, the exchange economy has long been the focus of the
economics profession. Any history of economic thought will discuss schools of thought such as mercantilists and
physiocrats, and schools associated with the names of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels,
and others whose works all are characterized, one way or another, by a discussion of aspects of exchange economics.
To exchange means that an agreement must be made as to the ratio at which goods and services are exchanged—is it one
or two apples for an orange? is it one or two hours of work for 15 dollars of money? This can create conflict because
the exchange ratio implies that values are assigned to each good or service with consequences that affect distribution and
consumption and hence material well-being. Much of the academic discipline of economics today is concerned with how
to press more product (output) from a given set of resources (input) or, which comes to the same thing, how to achieve
a given output with a minimum of inputs. Because trade is such an important component, economists study causes and
consequences of impediments to trade and how to efficiently overcome them. As a rule, peaceful economies are also
trading economies, and vice versa.  Inasmuch as war disrupts trade routes and destroys trade facilities such as roads and8
ports, restoring and promoting internal and external trade and the needed infrastructure will therefore be important for
postwar recovery. We discuss some aspects of infrastructure rebuilding later on in this chapter.
A second kind of economy is the grants economy. Parents distribute to children, people make donations to charities,
the government of one state makes aid available to that of another, and multilateral development banks provide loans
at concessional interest rates. In all instances, a grant of economic resources is made without an immediate, if any,
expectation of anything given in return.  No one has convincingly measured its size, but the formal and informal grants9
economy is probably huge. It is important to appreciate that grants transfer resources from one potential spender to
another (e.g., from parents to children). The grants economy is therefore embedded within the exchange economy. Even
though the general effectiveness of foreign aid has been questioned, there exists agreement in the scholarly literature that
to aid conflict-affected states, sustained postwar grants are necessary and effective (UNDP, 2008). We address this topic
in chapter 3 when discussing foreign-aid to conflict-affected states.
A third type of economy is the appropriation economy. This, too, is characterized by the absence of direct
exchange. But whereas the exchange and grants economies are founded, respectively, on voluntary mutual exchange and
on voluntary unilateral giving, the appropriation economy is based on involuntary taking, i.e., coercion. Taxation, for
example, is a form of coercion as resources are taken under threat of punishment for nonpayment of taxes. But an indirect
benefit is offered inasmuch as tax revenue is meant to be expended on public goods and services that benefit the taxpayer.
In contrast, robbery at the point of a gun is pure appropriation. Exchange encourages production; threat discourages
production. Brought to a point, one might say that exchange, grants, and appropriation economics are based, respectively,
on self-love, love, and fear.  The economy of fear plays a crucial role prior to, during, and even after war and crime.10
The salience of appropriation economics lies in the need to establish a credible and enforceable social contract within,
between, and among communities and societies.
PRODUCTION POSSIBILITIES.
We shall have occasion to return
to grants and appropriation
economics. For now we are in the
realm of exchange economics.
One useful visual representation
of the productive capacity of an
economy and its consumption
possibilities is given by what
economists call the Production
Possibilities Frontier, or PPF for
short. Simply put, all feasible
production within an economy is
grouped into one of two classes of
products. For example, the two
classes might be civilian goods (“butter”) and military goods (“guns”). Thus, in Figure 1.3a, if all of society’s resources
are used to produce only civilian goods and no military goods, then this is depicted along the vertical axis to the point
Figure 1.3a: Diversion. Figure 1.3b: Destruction.
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where the axis is met by the curved line, the PPF. Conversely, if only military goods are produced, then this is depicted
along the horizontal axis to the point where that axis is met by the curved line. In reality, most societies will produce a
combination of the two goods, such as at point A where some of society’s resources are employed to produce civilian
goods and the remainder is used to produce military goods.  Economists acknowledge that some production of security-11
related items (e.g., security fences and border guards) is necessary if only to prevent predation. Nonetheless, it is also
recognized that this must come at the expense of civilian production: thus, the move from point A to point B in Figure
1.3a implies a reduction in the production of civilian goods as measured on the vertical axis. Typically, this would be
the case during periods of heightened conflict or of war when military expenditure increases to shift resources toward
the production of military goods and services.
The productive capacity of an economy is indicated in Figure 1.3 by the distance along the vertical or horizontal
axis from the origin. The further along either axis the PPF intersects the respective axis, the more the economy is able
to produce of either military or nonmilitary goods. Thus, if war does break out and assets are damaged (humans injured
or killed and physical capital such as buildings, seaports, and equipment damaged or destroyed), the overall productive
capacity of society shrinks so that the PPF is depicted in Figure 1.3b as shifting inward, back toward the point of origin,
with the consequence that the highest production and consumption points attainable are smaller than before. This is a
simple, intuitive, and effective illustration of why gross domestic product—measured as the annual monetary value of
all production in an economy—declines in conflict-affected countries.
THE BATHTUB THEOREM . If consumption depends on production, then production in turn depends on the underlying
assets that make production possible in the first place. One way of seeing this point comes from the Bathtub Theorem.
It says that “the rate of accumulation is equal to the rate of production less the rate of consumption.”  Open a water12
faucet to fill a bathtub. The inflow of water represents “production;” the outflow through the drainpipe represents
“consumption.” If production is greater than consumption, water will accumulate in the bathtub and that is the amount
of “accumulation,” or savings. These savings are an asset (a stock of value, rather than a flow of value). In times of
crisis, when production fails, one has to consume part of the stock, like slaughtering one’s cattle or eating seeds needed
for the next sowing season. It is self-evident that the consumption of one’s (remaining) assets is not a viable postwar
reconstruction strategy. The only reconstruction strategy that is viable is one that emphasizes rebuilding the stock of
assets, that is, of production that exceeds consumption. In war, production for civilian use is reduced (a move from point
A to point B in Figure 1.3a), so that society needs to draw on its savings to maintain consumption at the accustomed
level.  Conversely, the task of postwar rebuilding lies in rebuilding the stock of assets. Somehow, the water faucet needs13
to be turned back on.
ASSETS VERSUS INCOM E. As the name suggests, and as will be explained in chapter 2, gross domestic product is a
measure of production and of the income this production generates. Income generation is obviously important for
individuals, families, communities, local governments, and whole countries. It contributes to one’s standard of living and
quality of life. But production, and hence income, is always based on and derived from some underlying base of assets.
A farmer cannot earn income unless the land is fertile and yields produce. A doctor can heal the better, the better supplied
is her surgery. And a cabinet-maker needs tools to ply his trade. Assets—or capital—are an important cause of
production and income; production and income are a consequence of assets. Assets refer to physical capital such as
machinery, equipment, and physical structures or facilities that one may have available to work with. There is the natural
capital of Earth, that is, raw materials that can go into production processes. (Some of these are renewable, others are
nonrenewable.) Assets also include peoples’s talents, ingenuity, skills, training, education, knowledge, and experience,
often referred to as human capital: of two craftsmen, the one working with a handloom likely will be less productive
and earn less income than the one working with a million-dollar carpet-weaving machine. The second worker may need
a considerable amount of formal education, or human capital, to understand, operate, and maintain the machinery.
Some scholars have proposed the still controversial notion of social capital on which there is neither agreed
definition nor measurement but which roughly refers to the economic value of the social networks humans build.
Certainly, in addition to communal physical assets such as roads, waterways, air- and seaports, and telecommunications
facilities, there are public services such as the bank notes that serve as money and law and order functions fulfilled by
government that enhance productivity. Thus, they too represent a stock of achievements that, once destroyed, can be
extremely difficult to rebuild and without which production and income-earning opportunities diminish. This also applies
to intangible social capital such as trust between and among members of a community. Trust, once broken, can be
impossible to rebuild and therefore lead to a complete stop in economic activity and trade.
The quantity and quality of these assets contributes to the productivity of the population and hence to their income.
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Thus, Kenneth Boulding—a renowned economist in his time—argues that “[e]ssentially, the economic problem of
reconstruction is that of rebuilding the capital of society.”  Of course, many poor communities have little to rebuild in14
the first place, so that the task lies as much in the building as in the rebuilding of the capital or asset base of society.
Regrettably, although perhaps necessitated by the urgency of the situation, policymakers tend to give priority to income
over asset building. A key observation here is that it is relatively easy to generate income by further depleting the
remaining assets. Called asset stripping, recourse to this scheme must be avoided. For example, to generate income, a
rural family may decide to slaughter their cattle to sell the meat, hide, and other useful parts. By depleting their assets,
income is generated but this leaves the family poorer, not richer. If it is a matter of survival, this is understandable, but
ultimately this is a strategy for death, not for economic progress.
1.3 The many facets of macroeconomic policy and politics
THE  OBJECTIVES OF M ACROECONOM ICS. Five major objectives of macroeconomic policy concern the achievement of (1)
low price inflation of commodities and assets; (2) low unemployment of available resources, especially labor but also
in regard to capital utilization; (3) smooth, rather than erratic, business cycles; (4) ecologically sustainable economic
growth;  and (5) economic policy coordination across political jurisdictions. The last item is addressed in chapter 4, on15
international trade and finance. Item four was partly addressed in the foregoing paragraphs, the main point being that
economic growth must be sustainable and cannot involve a continuous stripping of assets. Further details are discussed
in chapter 2. Item three is addressed in chapter 3. It discusses some tools with which to moderate and smooth business
cycles. Items one and two are self-evident objectives but measurement problems exist. Even in peacetime, many
developing economies find it difficult enough to provide adequate data collection and statistical services to measure, for
example, aspects of formal and informal labor markets (e.g., population growth, schooling rates, labor force participation,
child labor, and so on), prices of daily necessities and of financial assets (e.g., from food and energy costs to land,
property, and housing values), and movements of financial capital in and out of a country. Their interruption, or even
destruction, in war requires postwar emphasis on well-directed and well-focused capacity rebuilding efforts. Economic
theory usually simply assumes that institutions to provide the entire panoply of such measurements are fully functional.
In practice, this is not the case and becomes an important element of postwar reconstruction.
VARIETIES OF ECONOM IC PHILOSOPHIES AND POLICIES. Almost anything can become an economic policy. One school
of economics even holds that the best policy is to have only one policy, namely, to let the market work without any
government interference at all. All that government should do is to set a minimum of clear, generally applicable laws and
regulations—the ground rules—and enforce them. These might refer to property and contract law for example or to
regulations regarding fair advertising and competition. Thus, markets should not be unfettered but they should be free,
and market participants should be free to succeed, or to fail. Rather than government arbitrarily intervening in markets,
and necessarily mixing vested political interests with economic ones, the discipline of the market would teach buyers
and sellers to exercise the necessary care over their economic affairs. Indeed, it is not the presence of free markets, but
their very absence—markets that have been fiddled with by politics—that can cause severe economic and follow-on
social and political problems.
A policy is a set of rules, directions, or guidelines to be followed for a particular issue area. Ideally, policies are
coordinated and coherent so that the many agencies charged with implementing policy work toward a common goal. In
practice, policy is frequently not well coordinated, nor always well executed even if coordinated, and vested
interests—domestic and foreign—seek to influence policy to push their own agendas.
Economic growth policy is discussed in chapter 2. It focuses primarily on asset growth, production, and subsequent
income generation, less on distribution and consumption. Economic growth of, say, 4 percent per person per year might
be judged as “good,” even if virtually all of the wealth and income gains accrue to just a few people in the country. In
the end, however, growth policy will have to revolve around issues such as property rights, land reform, education policy,
even business regulation, trade, and tax policy inasmuch as these bear on the degree to which they help or hinder to
(re)build assets and generate income. International financial organizations (IFOs) or multilateral development banks
(MLDBs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) have often been seen to push a
particular version of growth policy, for instance, to liberalize business regulations, open markets to global competition,
and minimize government taxation and expenditure. Yet distributional issues cannot be divorced for long from growth
issues. Broad-based economic development policy, rather than mere economic growth policy, will need to look at issues
concerning urban versus rural development, health, education, and personal security, women, youth, the elderly, and
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other vulnerable populations, and so on. Still, growth helps to finance the development objectives and therefore cannot
be ignored.
Short-run deviations from long-run objectives are possible of course, if only because of unforeseen events such as
natural catastrophes (e.g., earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions), or manmade ones (e.g., wars in neighboring states,
criminalization of an economy), or sudden increases or decreases in world commodity prices that affect the value of
exports and imports. Economic authorities have relatively few tools available to them to deal with these events. Among
them are fiscal policy and monetary policy (chapter 3), that is, policies dealing with taxation, public expenditure, the
setting of interest rates, and of the value of one’s currency relative to those of one’s global trading partners (chapter 4).
WHAT IS AN APPROPRIATE M ACROECONOM IC FRAM EWORK? The
preceding paragraphs suggest that there can be disagreement over just
what would constitute an appropriate macroeconomic framework to
follow. Macroeconomics is a contested field, not only among
academics, but among policymakers who jostle for power in order to
implement their vision of how things economic should be handled.
Recognizing the necessity to deal with problems as they emerge,
macroeconomic stability involves a dual long-run objective, namely,
growth with development. Growth without development is dangerous;
development without growth is illusory. Figure 1.4 illustrates our view.
Short-run economic stabilization may be viewed in an instrumental
fashion: do what is necessary to do to prevent the economic ship from
capsizing. But if one is constantly stabilizing, it is perhaps because
one’s long-run compass setting continuously directs one into the
nearest economic storm. As to growth, it is important to appreciate that
asset depletion to generate current income—for example, excessive
reliance on mineral wealth exploitation—is not a recipe for long-run
development success. It also makes one overly vulnerable to
commodity price fluctuations on the world market, requiring overly frequent short-run adjustments so that one will find
it difficult to direct one’s efforts toward the ultimate objective, the development and betterment of human life.
The foregoing suggests that both a set of enabling policy conditions as well as a set of criteria are needed by which
to evaluate success or failure of policy conditions, economic stabilization, economic growth, and human development.
Enabling conditions—frequently destroyed in war—refer for example to well-functioning, transparent policymaking and
policy implementing institutions, to well-trained and accountable officials, and to a predictable regulatory framework.
Because economics is not an end in itself but an instrument directed toward a purpose, these criteria ultimately will have
to do with objectives such as secure lives, decent work, sufficiency of income, ecologically sustainable activity, even
human rights. In design and implementation, macroeconomic policies need to be evaluated—indeed, audited—according
to these larger goals.16
1.4 The violence and economic development nexus
On 8 September 2000, the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution, called the
United Nations Millennium Declaration.  A part of the17
resolution later coalesced into what is now widely known
and referred to as the Millennium Development Goals,
or MDGs. To be achieved by the year 2015, the goals
listed in Table 1.1. Sadly, even though the Millennium
Declaration resolution speaks clearly of peace, security,
and disarmament, the MDGs themselves are uninformed
about the impact of war and violence on poverty and the
other MDG goals. They reflect an appalling lack of
comprehension that so long as there is violence there will
be no development.
Figure 1.4: A macroeconomic framework.
Table 1.1: The Millennium Development Goals
1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2: Achieve universal primary education
3: Promote gender equality and empower women
4: Reduce child mortality
5: Improve maternal health
6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
7: Ensure environmental sustainability
8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development
Source: Extracted from UN (2009).
Brauer/Dunne: A Manual on Macroeconomic Fundamentals for Conflict-Affected States     D R A F T (v6) page 9
Only in August 2009 did the UNGA recognize that underlying virtually every one of the eight MDGs lies the
fundamental need to speak to violence:
“Although the linkage between armed violence and development is not explicit in the Millennium Development
Goals, they offer entry-points for development agencies to consider. Objectives such as reducing poverty, ensuring
maternal health and promoting education are all associated with effective armed violence prevention and reduction
initiatives. Nevertheless … there is no Millennium Development Goal that specifically deals with conflict, violence
and insecurity” (UN General Assembly, 5 August 2009, item #33, p. 11, A/64/228; emphasis added).
For an illustration, consider the case of Ethiopia. Using gross
domestic product data from the Penn World Tables project that
are adjusted for inflation, population growth, and for purchasing
power differences across countries, we note a steady rise in
GDP from 1950 to 1974. Measuring in so-called international
or purchasing power parity dollars (I$), Ethiopia’s GDP was
about I$649 in 1950 and about I$991 in 1974, an increase of
about 53 percent over 25 years or 2.12 percent per person per
year. In 1974, a violent revolution occurred; in 1977, a war was
started with Somalia over the Ogaden region; in the early 1980s
several massive famines occurred in part because of a brutally
repressive political regime that pursued hurtful economic
policies as well; in the early to mid-1990s, violently contested
elections took place; long-running secessionist movements in
Tigray and Eriteria resulted in more violence; Eritrea gained
independence in 1993, but a border war with Ethiopia broke out in 1998 that was only nominally settled in 2000.
In Figure 1.5, we see the economic result of this history of violence. Over the 30-year period from 1975 to 2004,
production per person completely stalled. Had Ethiopia continued to grow at its 1950-1974 rate—as indicated by the
linear trend line in the figure—average production should have reached I$1,400 in 2007 instead of the I$1,110 actually
achieved. The area between the trend line and the red GDP line denotes the size of the cumulated loss of production.
The case of Nicaragua is more stunning still (Figure 1.6).
Again measured in international dollars, it’s per capita
production grew from I$1,947 in 1950 to I$4,701 in 1977, or
about 5 percent per person per year, a significant achievement
despite what was known and acknowledged to be a repressive
political regime. A long-running rebel movement finally
gained traction in 1978 and came to power in 1979, provoking
an undeclared proxy war with the United States that involved
harbor mining, arms smuggling, and the clandestine support
of counter-revolutionaries by the U.S. administration against
the express wishes of the U.S. Congress.  An internal war
continued until multiparty elections were held in Nicaragua in
1990, resulting in the electoral defeat of the revolutionary
forces. Nonetheless, as evidenced in Figure 1.6, the economy
completely collapsed, with the result that production per
person in 2007 was only I$2,176—almost equal to the 1951
level of I$2,174—whereas the trend line projection suggests that average production should have reached about I$7,000
by 2007. In a word, in the nearly 60 years from 1950 to 2007, Nicaragua’s economy has not grown at all. The reason
for the continued economic collapse even after the 1990 multiparty elections have to do with the lack of supportive
political framework conditions (see chapter 5). For example, former president Arnoldo Alemán (1996-2001) was
convicted of embezzlement, money laundering, and corruption and sentenced to a 20-year prison term—this by his
presidential successor, Enrique Bolaños (2001-2006), of the same political party. Meanwhile, the former rebel leader,
Daniel Ortega, was reelected to the country’s presidency in 2006.
Figure 1.5: Population-, inflation-, and purchasing
power-adjusted GDP, Ethiopia, 1950-2007 (base year
= 2005).
Source: Penn World Table, v6.3.
Figure 1.6: Population-, inflation-, and purchasing
power-adjusted GDP, Nicaragua, 1950-2007 (base-
year = 2005).
Source: Penn World Table, v6.3.
Brauer/Dunne: A Manual on Macroeconomic Fundamentals for Conflict-Affected States     D R A F T (v6) page 10
We deal with the case of El Salvador and the outright post-civil war criminalization of its economy in one of the two
case studies that conclude this chapter. But one more figure here will be useful to highlight the effects of nonwar
homicide on an economy. This concerns the case of the Dominican Republic (Figure 1.7). Again, the base data on
population-, inflation-, and purchasing power adjusted GDP are taken from the Penn World Tables (v6.3). The blue line
in the figure shows steady production growth from I$1,831 in 1951 (the datum for 1950 is unavailable) to I$9,665 in
2007, or 7.5 percent production growth per person per year, an impressive achievement almost on par with India’s and
China’s recent economic growth records!
And yet, an aforementioned study by the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2007) estimated that
since 1975 growth could have been increased by an additional
1.7 percent per person each year if homicide rates in the
Dominican Republic could have been halved from over 16 per
100,000 people to the rate of Costa Rica (about 8 per 100,000
people). Using this information, the red line in Figure 1.7
plots the hypothetical, GDP levels that the Dominican
Republic might have achieved, with the result that by 2007
average production should have been on the order of I$16,000
instead of the about I$10,000 actually achieved.
The World Bank concludes—rightly—that “violence is
a major impediment to development.”  Violence prevention,18
or at least mitigation, and post-violence reconstruction of a
stable social contract are necessary conditions upon which
development goals can be built. To repeat an earlier point:
without peace there will be no development. By the same token, lack of development, or even the prospect or hope of
development, is a prime cause that gives rise to violence. A proper macroeconomic framework and policy orientation
will be one important ingredient in the policy mix needed to lower the incidence of violence.
1.5 Policy lessons and tips
Lesson 1.1: The violence crisis is a much more severe economic problem than is the occasional economic crisis.
Lesson 1.2: Avoid, prevent, or mitigate violent conflict. Heightened tensions and war always carry adverse
economic consequences. Postwar reconstruction is far more expensive than is prevention.
Lesson 1.3: (Re)build assets; do not deplete them. In postwar reconstruction, short-run necessity to address issues
regarding income generation, distribution, and consumption should never detract from focusing on
asset (re)building.
Lesson 1.4: As a rule, peaceful economies are also trading economies, and vice versa. Restoring and promoting
internal and external trade will therefore be important.
Lesson 1.5: Even though the general effectiveness of foreign aid has been questioned, there is agreement that to
aid conflict-affected states, sustained postwar grants are necessary and effective.
Lesson 1.6: One cannot manage that which is not measured. Decide on a sequence in which data collection and
data analysis services need to be reestablished.
Lesson 1.7: One cannot manage without managers. Capacity-(re)building of institutions and personnel to design
and implement proper economic policy is crucial.
Lesson 1.8: Consider the elements of the macroeconomic framework—enabling policy conditions, short-run
economic stabilization, long-run economic growth, and ultimate economic development and human
betterment—broadly and holistically. Do not lose sight of the purpose that economics is to serve:
growth without development is dangerous; development without growth is illusory.
Lesson 1.9: Lack of development affects levels of all forms of violence (self-harm, interpersonal, and collective
violence) and, vice versa, all forms of violence adversely affect development. An appropriate
macroeconomic framework and policy orientation can help prevent, or at least mitigate, violence.
Conversely, inappropriate (macro)economic policy can worsen violence.
Figure 1.7: Population-, inflation-, and purchasing
power-adjusted GDP, Dominican Republic, 1951-
2007 (base-year = 2005).
Source: Penn World Table, v6.3.
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1.6 Failure and success: two case studies
Failure: El Salvador
El Salvador fell into a prolonged civil war, lasting from 1979 to
1991. Tens of thousands of people died, many more fled. A rare
occurrence, the population count in the country decreased (as it
did in Cambodia during the worst excesses of the Khmer Rouge
regime). But since the end of the war, violence and insecurity in
El Salvador have not ceased. An initial spurt of recovery in
terms of real GDP per capita (measured in purchasing power
parity or international dollars, I$) proved short-lived (see Figure
1.8). A World Bank Country Brief refers to homicide levels of
55 per 100,000 people in 2006, a gang culture that impedes the
safety of schools, lowers property values, reduces social capital,
makes travel on public transportation to places of employment
unsafe, and projects an image of the country that undermines
attempts to attract foreign direct investment.
A 2005 UNDP study (in Spanish, and not well known
outside the country) concluded that the economic cost of violence and insecurity amounted to 11.5 percent of 2003 GDP.
Costs include those imposed on the medical sector, absenteeism and productivity losses in the workplace, and legal costs.
The losses are more than double what the state expends on the health and education sectors combined. From 1993 to
1997 homicide rates well exceeded 100 per 100,000 people and by the early 2000s dropped to a fairly consistent, but
still extraordinarily high, ratio of 60 per 100,000. (The WHO considers a rate above 10/100,000 epidemic.) As
elsewhere, homicidal violence primarily affects young males and differs by day of week and across regions within the
country (with homicide rates ranging in 2003 from 10.4 to 54.2 per 100,000 across the country’s 15 administrative
regions). The correlation between homicide rates and homicides committed by firearm is very high—a finding that holds
for other countries as well.
But ordinary homicide—premeditated or in sudden anger—is but one form of violence and, in 2003, accounted for
only 7.2 percent of reported cases of crime against persons or property. For example, vehicular homicide in El Salvador
is also among the very highest per 100,000 people in Latin America (and the world). And intrafamily and sexual violence
levels are very high as well. All this suggests that constructive (or at least nondestructive) social behavior has broken
down in the face of institutional and society-wide incapacities. A culture of impunity arises, and with it a culture of
insecurity and consequent failure in the ability to be economically active or productive. In a 2001 survey of business
obstacles in Latin America, for example, El Salvador received the most unfavorable scores on crime and organized crime
(which were also the highest of all 11 obstacles countries could be ranked on). Various surveys of small and large
businesses in the country suggest business closure or lack of investment on account of crime. Microenterprises were not
as affected, suggesting displacement of formal economic activity into the informal sector. Thus, the cumulative effects
of a culture of violence also reduce government tax revenue even as they increase public purse expenditure. 
Neither success nor failure yet: East Timor (Timor-Leste)
Following the withdrawal of Portugal from its colonial holdings around the world, East Timor (Timor-Leste) declared
its political independence in 1975. Within days, however, it was invaded by Indonesia. Over the next 25 years, tens of
thousands of East Timorese died during a brutal Indonesian occupation. Following the East Asian financial crisis of 1997,
which unseated the Suharto regime in Indonesia, a particularly atrocious spell of violence broke out in East Timor
(Timor-Leste) in conjunction with the renewed push for independence. Following an initial intervention by Australia,
a U.N. transitional administration governed the region from late 1999 to mid-2002, at which time full independence and
admission to the United Nations was won. Apart from one recurrence of violent mass upheaval, in 2006, the country has
been comparatively peaceful, albeit tense.
Economically, two extremes characterize East Timor. On the one hand, it concluded—although only by mid-
2005—highly contentious negotiations with Australia over the sharing of certain offshore petroleum and natural gas
deposits. (The negotiations were and are enwrapped with disputes over maritime boundaries involving Indonesia as well.)
Figure 1.8: Population, inflation, and purchasing
power adjusted GDP, El Salvador, 1950-2007 (base
year = 2005).
Source: Raw data from Penn World Table, v6.3.
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In order to proceed with exploiting the submarine resources, the ultimate settlement of the maritime boundary issues have
been set aside for the time being. On the other hand, the 1999 onset of the war resulted in extraordinary infrastructure
destruction. This means that alongside the provision of basic services regarding health, education, and personal safety,
the country’s primary need lies with infrastructure reconstruction. Initially, oil and gas revenues far exceeded what could
sensibly be expended. Following the Norwegian model, natural-resource rents are by law placed into a Petroleum Fund,
invested abroad. Withdrawals must go to support the state budget, and the government faces the challenge to limit itself
to sustainable fund withdrawals while building the physical and human capital infrastructure to (re)constitute private
sector activity.
Following the 1999 violence and subsequent years of political uncertainty, roads also were overused and
undermaintained to attend to damage caused by heavy-vehicle use and rainfall. By the late 2000s, access to all-weather
roads was available to only about half of the rural population. Poverty and health indicators are correlated with lack to
infrastructure in water, sanitation, immunization and health services, and to a large extent mediated through lack of or
shortcomings in physical access (road connections). Bad roads or no roads also limit the extend of market activity, such
as bringing produce to market. The geography of the country (mountainous, geological instability, heavy rain) makes
the building and maintaining of roads challenging and expensive. Almost the entirety (!) of the country’s road network
needs repair or rebuilding.
With regard to transportation infrastructure, East Timor represents neither success nor failure—yet. It has a clearly
identified need, and it is in the very fortunate position of having a ready, if volatile, source of revenue. The challenges
lie in public revenue and expenditure management generally and with infrastructure planning, prioritization, and
management specifically.
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Chapter 2: The long-run goal: investment, productivity, and economic growth
2.1 Theories of economic growth
Economic growth is welcome. On a per capita basis, the average person today is much better off than the average person
was even just 100 years ago. The spatial distribution of that success, however, is unbalanced, with very large numbers
of people in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and East-Central Europe in particular still being poor. Theories of economic
growth have to explain not only growth over time but the spatial pattern of growth as well, both across and within
countries. The theories should identify the underlying causes that generate growth, and it would be helpful if these causes
proved to be endgoneous rather than exogenous. Endogenous means that the causes are working from within the
economic system and may be amenable to policy intervention; exogenous means that a cause has been identified but that
it is beyond the ability of policymakers to manipulate. For example, new technology that increases labor productivity
would be regarded as exogenous so long as the mechanism by which it comes about remains unclear. But if a mechanism
were identified as having to do for instance with easy access to financial capital, secure property rights, and proper
incentive systems that encourage inventors and business people to risk time and (borrowed) financial capital in exchange
for keeping the profits that inventions might yield, then these identified factors might be endogenous to the economic
system and potentially amenable to policy intervention.
To move beyond subsistence, a surplus—a “survival-plus” economy—needs to be generated and sustained that
permits some people in society to take leave of working for mere survival and to devote the freed-up time to experiment,
innovate, and implement. Growth theory propounded by economists in the 1700s and 1800s emphasized the formation
and growth of capital, of efficiencies to be gained from specialization in production, and they demonstrated the growth
advantages of unimpeded trade within and across political jurisdictions. Although its distributional aspects are sometimes
questioned, to this day free trade remains an important doctrine in economics. In terms of capital, classic growth theory
suggested that any surplus used for improvement of and increase in physical capital would bring some further surplus
but that, in time, population growth would catch up and consume this surplus so that the population would revert to
subsistence levels of existence. In this theory, sustained economic per capita growth was not possible.
With the advent of the industrial revolution and sustained economic growth in the United Kingdom, Western Europe,
and North America, it became clear that this theory was inadequate. But it was not until the early to mid-1900s that new
growth theories were formulated. Two in particular emphasized the role of technological change and of the role of
entrepreneurs in fomenting such change. Joseph Schumpeter introduced the now famous phrase of creative destruction,
meaning that in pursuit of profit opportunities, entrepreneurs in a competitive economy will try to bring to market
innovative products and processes that on the one hand destroy competing lines of business but that, on the other hand,
are so revolutionary as to move the entire economic system forward.  In the energy and transportation sectors for19
example, water-driven machines were replaced by fossil-fuel powered machines, later supplemented with the ability to
transmit electricity generated from fossil fuel over long distances. Likewise, the horse and wagon replaced the hand-
carrying of goods, and canals and barges, transoceanic shipping, railroads, highways and the automobile, and modern
air travel all challenged and transformed prior forms of transportation.
Schumpeter’s story was plausible but it was also narrative and analytically intractable. Entrepreneurship, innovation,
and investment are good and well but not amenable to direct policy intervention. In contrast, Robert Solow constructed
a mathematical representation or model of a hypothetical economy in which labor, capital, output, growth, investment,
technological change, and savings to finance investment are key variables. The mathematical exercise resulted in three
predictions, namely, first, that an increasing amount of capital per worker (the capital/labor ratio) generates growth
because more capital makes workers more productive; second, that countries with an initially small capital/labor ratio
would grow faster than those with already large amounts of capital per worker because each additional unit of capital
produces a higher return when starting from low levels than when starting from high levels; and third, that because of
diminishing returns to ever more capital, economies will eventually reach a steady state where the simple addition of
more capital generates no more additional growth. To overcome the steady state, the key idea is that an economy not only
needs more capital (e.g., more of the same old typewriters) but better capital (e.g, computerized word processors rather
than typewriters), that is, the continuous embedding of technological change in the machines and work processes
available for humans to operate with. Importantly, the model is silent on just where this technological change comes
from. Technological change is exogenous to the model.
Solow’s model also predicted that poor countries should converge onto the living standards of rich countries.
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Evidently, this has not happened and
economic growth theory needed to take
yet another turn to explain the real-world
observations.  In the 1980s and 1990s,20
Paul Romer, Robert Lucas, and Robert
Barro were among those formulating
endogenous growth theory. In addition
to creating mathematical representations
where technological change comes about
from within the model (endogenous), the
definition of capital was expanded to
include human capital. This is important
because, unlike physical capital with its
feature of diminishing returns, it is
believed that human capital exhibits
increasing returns, meaning that each additional year of knowledge, education, skill, and experience will bring higher
returns than does each prior year. The applied work focuses, in part, on systematically identifying the institutional
conditions needed within states to allow innovation, education, and physical and human capital to flourish—aspects
neglected by earlier theorists. Among these, free trade, a minimal regulatory system, sound money, good law and
order—especially secure property rights— corruption-free government, and other factors are mentioned, that is, a
panoply of good governance that together provide framework conditions that permit private parties to explore
Schumpeterian opportunities to better their lives.
Evidently, violence disrupts trade and diverts economic resources into unproductive channels. Moreover, it destroys
capital and the cultural and economic institutions necessary for good policymaking and implementation, necessary also
for enhancing the endogenous factors of economic growth.
2.2 Measuring economic performance
Before pursuing the topic of growth-enhancing investment, violence, and economic growth, a few things need to be
understood about measuring economic activity.
MEASURING THE ECONOM Y PROPERLY . The most common measure of economic activity is gross domestic product,
or GDP. It is measured as the money value of all final goods and services produced during a certain time period, usually
one calendar year, times their market prices. Of course, much economic activity goes unmeasured, e.g., agricultural
production for home-consumption or activity in illegal markets that for obvious reasons is neither reported nor taxed.
Moreover, much activity is counted whose contribution to well-being may be questioned. For instance, a woman is raped
or suffers domestic abuse and requires medical treatment. Because the treatment results in expenditure and income
streams (a payment for medical service received by the attending medical personnel), it is counted as increasing GDP.
It would have been better for GDP not to rise.  Much the same may be said about military and security-related21
expenditure that create income for personnel and for proprietors and shareholders of security-related companies but that,
in the end, merely serve to protect ourselves from ourselves. GDP may rise, but no intrinsic contribution to well-being
is made.22
All economic numbers must be adjusted for population growth and output price inflation. For example, assume that
GDP amounts to USD10,000 in year 1 (see Table 2.1), and suppose that GDP grows by five percent from year 1 to year
2, that is, to USD10,500, and then by five percent again in each of the following years. The resulting numbers are
referred to as nominal GDP in recognition that they are a mixture of quantities produced and the prices at which the
quantities are valued. The price level in year 1 is 100 (think of this as an average price across all goods produced).
Assume that prices grow by two percent each year relative to each prior year. Thus, the price level in year 2 is two
percent higher than the price level in year 1, and that of year 5 is two percent higher than that of year 4. Finally, assume
that population grows by one percent each year, for instance from 100 in year 1 to 101 in year 2.
To calculate inflation-adjusted or real GDP, divide any year’s nominal GDP by the price level and multiply by 100.
Apart from a small rounding error, in year 5 for instance we get (12,155.1/108.2)*100 = 11,229.4, so that the economy
has grown by about 12.3 percent as the real GDP column indicates: 11,229 in year 5 is 12.3 percent larger than the
Table 2.1: Adjusting GDP growth
Year Nominal Price Population Real Real GDP
GDP level GDP per person
1 10,000.0 100.0 100.0 10,000.0 100.0
2 10,500.0 102.0 101.0 10,294.1 101.9
3 11,025.0 104.0 102.0 10,596.9 103.9
4 11,576.3 106.1 103.0 10,908.6 105.9
5 12,155.1 108.2 104.1 11,229.4 107.9
Note: All numbers are rounded to one decimal place.
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10,000 from which the economy started in year 1. (The word “real” means in terms of the monetary value of the number
of goods produced, rather than in terms of their prices.)
But by year 5 the population also has grown, in this case by over 4 percent, so that a further adjustment is necessary.
This is shown in the last column of Table 2.1. Divide 11,229.4 by 104.1 to get 107.9. Real GDP per person now equals
107.9, a 7.9 percent increase relative to year 1. (107.9 in year 5 is 7.91 percent larger than the 100 in year 1.) Not bad,
but a far cry from the about 21.6 percent suggested by nominal GDP growth alone. (12,155.1 in year 1 is about 21.6
percent larger than the 10,000 in year 1.) Only the real GDP and the real GDP per capita numbers are comparable to each
other, with the latter one being the preferred measure.
As indicated in chapter 1, when comparing countries using different currencies one more adjustment need be made.
Suppose, for example, that the size of the German economy per person were a hypothetical EUR10,000 and that the size
of the U.S. economy per person were an equally hypothetical USD10,000. Further suppose that the euro and dollar
exchange on a one-for-one basis (EUR1.0/USD1.0). Thus, translated into U.S. dollars, the value of production per person
in Germany would be USD10,000. But if the exchange rate changes, say to EUR1.1/USD1.0, then the size of the German
economy—measured in U.S. dollars—would appear to be only EUR10,000/EUR1.1 = USD9,091, or about 10 percent
smaller.  The problem lies not with a shrinking German economy, as may be mistakenly thought, but with a fluctuation23
in the market exchange rate between the two currencies. To bypass this and other problems with cross-country
comparisons, researchers have developed a measure called international dollars (I$), or purchasing power parity
dollars (ppp-dollars). Thus, when making comparison within a country, GDP and other economic numbers should be
adjusted for inflation and population changes, and when comparing across countries, all numbers should additionally
be converted to international dollars as well.
Another problem—a big one—is that the monetary size, let alone the growth, of an economy is difficult to measure
if a state is bereft of labor and institutional resources to properly do the counting of goods and services produced, and
of their prices. Moreover, in some states the informal economy—genuine economic activity that is neither counted nor
taxed—is very large. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) refers to figures reported by Prof.
Friedrich Schneider (University of Linz, Austria) according to which the six Central American states (Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Panama) have shadow economies averaging about half again of
reported GDP, and the International Labor Office (ILO) reports that the share of informal-sector employment in these
countries is well above 50 percent of total employment. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, official employment stayed steady
at 600,000 people between 1998 to 2005, while informal employment rose from about 200,000 to about 500,000. In
addition, UNDP speaks of the rise of a “criminal peace economy.”  This would include, but not be limited to, illegal24
economic activity such as trade in narcotics, arms smuggling, human trafficking, or trade in endangered species.
Measurement problems also bedevil other important variables such as investment and international trade and finance (see
chapter 4).
2.3 The effect of violence on long-term economic growth
NATIONAL INCOME ACCOUNTING. Because one cannot earn what someone
else has not expended, it must be true that when all of an economy’s
expenditure is added up it must equal all of that economy’s income derived
from production as well. Thus, equation (1) in Table 2.2 shows that the
expenditures that result in income (Y) are made by private households on
domestic consumption (C), by firms on domestic investment in equipment
(I), and by government on various public services (G). In addition, when
a country exports goods (X), it earns income from foreigners so that
foreigners’ spending results in revenue streams that must be added to
national income. Conversely, when households or firms import (M) goods
from abroad, the resulting expenditure leads to income that accrues to the
other countries and must therefore be subtracted from the home country as
it does not add to domestic income.
Equation (2) captures the idea that domestic income (Y) can be used
in only three ways: after paying taxes (T), the resulting after-tax or disposable income finances either consumption (C)
or savings (S). Equations (1) and (2) are equal to each other because both are written in terms of national income, Y,
Table 2.2: National income
accounting
(1) C+I+G+(X-M) = Y
(2) Y = C+S+T
(3) C+I+G+(X-M) = C+S+T
(4)      I+G+(X-M) =      S+T
(5) I = S       + (T-G) - (X-M)
(6) (I-S) =             (T-G) - (X-M)
(7) (X-M) = (S-I) + (T-G)
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derived from and expended on what has been produced. Thus, the next
equation simply repeats the left-hand side of the first equation and the
right-hand side of the second one. Because consumption (C) appears on
both sides of equation (3), its effect cancels out in terms of national income
accounting. We are left with equation (4) which, when rearranged in three
different ways, forms the basis for three very important insights. To
illustrate these insights, it will be useful to associate each of the variables
with hypothetical numbers (see Table 2.3) and to insert them into equations
(5), (6), and (7), respectively. For equation (5), the numbers assume that
government expenditure (G) equals government tax collection (T) so that
there is neither a government budget surplus (T>G) nor a budget deficit
(T<G). Equation (5) then tells us how private domestic investment (I) is
financed. There are three sources: private domestic saving (S),
government sector saving (T-G), and foreign sector saving (X-M). The
first two, private and government saving [S+(T-G)], are also known as
national saving. Since the government sector shows neither a budget
surplus nor a budget deficit, no government sector savings are generated
that could be recycled toward investment, but neither does the government
sector absorb savings from the private sector to finance a government
budget deficit.
For equation (5), Table 2.3 displays three scenarios (S1, S2, S3), each of which assumes that investment equals 30.
Scenario 1 (S1) assumes that private sector saving equals 40. The excess of savings over investment must go somewhere.
Because it does not finance a government deficit (since T=G, so that T-G=0), the funds must be related to activity in the
foreign sector, in particular to the excess of exports (funds flowing into the economy) over imports (funds flowing out).
But the funds flowing into a country on account of exports are foreign currency earnings, and the only way to use them
is to return them as investments in the countries from which the currencies are earned. Domestic investment will be
unaffected. In scenario 2, part of the former saving of 40 is employed to finance higher import levels. Now, the
government and the foreign sectors both are balanced, and private domestic investment is fully financed from private
domestic saving. Finally, in scenario 3, the shortfall of private domestic saving of 20 to finance private domestic
investment of 30 is made up by the foreign sector. Here the excess of imports over exports means that funds are leaving
the country but the only place where foreigners who earn these funds can reinvestment them is in the country from which
they come. These will be private domestic investments, but the ownership of the assets bought belongs to foreigners.
(Also see the balance of payments discussion in chapter 4.)
The three scenarios for equation (6) highlight another aspect of national income accounting. In S1, everything is
balanced. But in S2, there is a government budget deficit (T<G = -10). Since the private domestic saving and investment
sector is in balance, the government budget deficit must be financed from abroad. In this case, the excess of imports over
exports results in foreigners holding funds that they lend back to the government of the originating country. And in S3,
the government budget surplus implies just the opposite, namely that there must be a trade surplus as well. Think of the
three elements of the equation (private sector; government sector; foreign sector) as a three-sided balloon filled with air.
When one squeezes the balloon at one end, and the second end is closed off, then the air must move to the third end.
Finally, examine the three scenarios regarding equation (7). In each, we assume that the foreign sector is balanced.
In S1, this is because both the domestic sector and the government sector each are balanced as well. In S2, the
government budget surplus of 10 now can be used to finance the excess of domestic investment over the availability of
private sector saving. And in S3, a government budget deficit now absorbs a portion of private sector saving so that less
is left over to finance private domestic investment.
Conflict-affected states generally suffer from three simultaneous problems. First, because of war and/or violence
domestic production is falling so that tax revenue falls even as there is more need for government expenditure. This
results in falling government budget surpluses or, more realistically, rising deficits (T<G). Second, exports tend to fall
off and reduced local production needs to be “made up” by imports. Thus, the foreign sector becomes imbalanced
(X<M). In terms of equation (5), we might have the following situations:
I = S + (T-G) - (X-M)
Table 2.3: Hypothetical national
income accounting numbers
(5) I = S + (T-G) - (X-M)
S1: 30 = 40 + (30-30) - (30-20)
S2: 30 = 30 + (30-30) - (30-30)
S3: 30 = 20 + (30-30) - (20-30)
(6) (I-S) = (T-G) - (X-M)
S1: (30-30) = (30-30) - (30-30)
S2: (30-30) = (30-40) - (30-40)
S3: (30-30) = (30-20) - (30-20)
(7) (X-M) = (S-I) + (T-G)
S1: (30-30) = (30-30) + (30-30)
S2: (30-30) = (30-40) + (30-20)
S3: (30-30) = (30-20) + (30-40)
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S1: 30 = 30 + (30-40) - (20-30)
S2: 20 = 20 + (30-40) - (20-30)
S3: 10 = 10 + (30-40) - (20-30),
where in S1 the outflow of funds from excess
imports is used by foreigners to finance the
government budget deficit. But because there is
war or other types of violence, private sector
activity falls. Therefore incomes fall, and the
remaining income must be used to finance
household consumption, so that less is available
for private sector saving to finance private
sector investment—as in S2. Put differently,
who wants to invest in an economy beset by
war? If government instead of borrowing from
abroad dips into private domestic sector
savings—as in S3—then private domestic
investment falls even more. This, then, amounts
to the third problem conflict-affected states
face: in addition to budget and trade deficits,
private domestic investment is falling.
COM POUNDING AND THE RULE OF 70. One
important fact of growth pertains to its
compounding effects. For example, one dollar
invested at an annual interest rate of one percent
per year will become I$1.01 a year later.
Analogously, an economy of the size of I$1.00
that grows at one percent per year will have
attained the size of I$1.01 a year later. The
Rule of 70 is a handy guide that approximates
how long it will take an economy to double in
size, given a percentage growth rate. Thus, if the growth rate is 2 percent, an economy will double in about 70/2=35 years
(the exact number of years is 36). Similarly, if an economy grows at 3 percent each year, then it will double in 70/3 or
about 23 years, a saving of 12 years. Seemingly small differences in growth rates accumulate rapidly to substantial
differences in average living standards. Some East Asian economies recently have grown by 8 percent per year, so that
their economies can double in size in about 9 years’ time.
The effect of compounding in conflict-affected states may be illustrated with Figures 2.1 and 2.2. In the first figure,
each of two countries starts in 1980 at a GDP level of 100, and each then grows at 2 percent per year. But from 1985
to 1989, country 2 suffers a five-year long war with an annual 2 percent GDP decline, whereas country 1 continues to
grow at 2 percent per year. From 1990 onward, both countries again grow at 2 percent annually. Using the scale on the
right-hand side, the bottom line in Figure 2.1 shows that the diverging growth between the two countries in the five-year
war period amounts to about 22 percentage points. But because of compounding, this is not a one-off effect limited to
the war period. Instead, the difference keeps growing so that by the end of one generation—25 years postwar—country
1’s GDP stands at 200, double its starting point, whereas country 2’s GDP stands at only 163.7, a 36.3 point difference.
(And note that using the Rule of 70, country 1’s GDP should indeed have doubled over the entire period from 1980 to
2015, that is, 70/2=35 years.)
Figure 2.2 shows the cumulative GDP losses for country 2 relative to country 1. When both countries grow at 2
percent per year during their respective peace times, the five-year war interruption amounts, by 2015, to eight times the
starting GDP (the cumulative loss is 809.1). For country 2 to catch up to country 1 within 25 years postwar, by 2015,
it would have to grow at a rate of 2.8 percent per year, that is, 40 percent faster (2.8/2.0=0.4 or 40 percent) than country
1. Still, Figure 2.2 shows that by the time country 2 does catch up, its cumulative GDP loss during the catchup time is
very nearly four times the starting GDP. Either way, the annual and the cumulative losses are tremendous.25
Figure 2.1: Diverging growth paths of war and nonwar economies.
Figure 2.2: Cumulative war losses.
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HOW  COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE PERTURBS THE ECONOM IC SYSTEM . In chapter 1, the importance of productivity-
enhancing investment for long-term economic growth and well-being of the population was emphasized. Investment
referred not only to private and public physical capital (roads, machinery, and the like) but also to human, cultural, and
institutional capital such as levels of education, the degree of trust among citizens, and the extent of well-working
property rights, contract enforcement, stable money, and so on. The preceding sections show how vulnerable is
investment in war and highlighted the cumulative, long-term, effects of falling GDP as a result of falling investment as
a result of violence.
But more than investment is at stake. Interpersonal and collective violence can perturb the economic system in a
variety of mutually reinforcing ways. Starting with the supply-side, war often is associated with spikes in input prices.
Needed raw materials may be harder to get; suppliers charge higher prices to obtain and to transport them; electricity
and other public utility services may be disrupted and therefore disrupt other production as well; laborers and farm
workers may be drafted into armies, become victims, or refugees, so that it is more difficult to find qualified, efficient
workers. New investment to make agricultural or industrial production more efficient is not undertaken for fear that the
investment will be destroyed in war; and maintenance on existing equipment may be deferred, leading to earlier
breakdown of the machinery. On the whole, average production costs rise. Economic growth falls, employment falls, and
unemployment rises. The size of the effect depends on the intensity, duration, and spatial reach of the violence.
On the demand-side of the economy, all of the five components of aggregate demand—which is what equation (1)
captures—can be adversely affected. Demand for consumption falls as people individually try to save monetary resources
in anticipation of becoming unemployed or in expectation of a long drawn-out war. Firms will be reluctant to invest when
war may destroy the investment. Moreover, why invest when consumers are expected not to buy? Exports can falter as
transportation routes, especially air- and seaports and border-crossing points are blocked. Imports cannot continue
unabated, so that people need to seek recourse to higher-priced domestically produced goods, driving up the cost of
living. And war affects government tax revenue which falls when economic activity falls or when economic activity shifts
from the formal, taxed sector into the informal, untaxed one. Thus, the government spending component of aggregate
demand also may fall. To compensate, government can try to borrow, increase its debt load, and inject spending,
especially military-related spending, into the economy to prop it up. But replacement of private by public economic
activity is not a viable long-run economic strategy. While individual people may do well out of war, entire economies
do not. In a word, violence creates a vicious cycle that continually depresses the economy as illustrated by the numbers
and simulations provided in chapter 1 and thus far in chapter 2.
2.4 Institutions and policies
THREE SOCIETIES. Any community consists of three societies. Commercial, civil, and political society (or economics,
culture, and politics) form a three-legged stool. Overlaps notwithstanding, commercial society allocates resources via
markets; civil society allocates resources via moral suasion; and political society allocates resources via power.  Most26
adults are engaged in all three societies simultaneously: they participate in economic life as producers and consumers;
they are engaged in civic activities from neighborhood football clubs to membership in international nongovernmental
organizations; and they participate one way or another in public life as well, if only as occasional voters.
A well-functioning society is also a well-balanced
one. Shorten, or remove, any one leg of the stool, and the
community will wobble, or falter. Commercial society
running rampant without moral checks from civil society
and regulatory checks from political society is just as
much a recipe for disaster as politics that lets neither
commerce nor civil society bloom. All three societies
operate both in the domestic and in the transnational
sphere (Figure 2.3). Local business has its counterpart in
transnational business, local NGOs in increasingly
prominent transnational NGOs, and the local public
sector in international organizations such as the United
Nations at the global level or the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union, the
National Transnational
Civil local NGOs; global NGOs;
society football clubs religious org’s
Commercial local business; TNCs; Intern’l
society business assoc. Chamber of Com.
Political political parties; UN; IMF;  
society public sector ASEAN
Figure 2.3: Examples of institutions.
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African Union, and the like at the continental levels.
Each of these actors has its own concerns and objectives, and each seeks to influence the others. As far as economics
and economic growth are concerned, one may say that commercial society drives it, that political society provides
framework conditions to direct and manage it, and that civil society checks on the quality of the economy, for instance
through insistence on subjecting growth to environmental objectives or by demands for equitable growth.
More conventionally, institutions and policies are thought of only from the viewpoint of political society, national
and transnational. Thus, at the national level, ministries of economics, finance, trade, labor, industry, education, and
similar bodies are charged with the implementation of policies set by their political masters. At the transnational level,
the most prominent are the United Nations and its specialized agencies. A sampling of those dealing with economic
policy include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labor Office (ILO), the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and various Economic (and Economic and Social) Commissions for
Africa, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific, and Western Asia. (For the United Nations
organizational chart, see Appendix B.)27
As far as national ministries are concerned, the primary message is that all of them—regardless of their specific
subject-matter charge and expertise—must be directed to act in coordinated fashion toward the goal of rebuilding
society’s capital. In a manner of speaking, all of them are state investment agencies, investing in education, in
infrastructure, in the productivity of the labor force, and so on. The commerce, labor, immigration, and finance ministries
for instance might need to work jointly on repatriating physical, human, and financial capital that may have fled during
war. Returning the diaspora home can be an important way of rekindling economic growth for all. Private charities should
be welcomed inasmuch as their work fits into an overall conception of rebuilding, maintaining, and securing for example
the health status and physical well-being of the population. States blessed with natural resource wealth need credible
ways of putting aside a portion of the earnings to build endowments that return dividends over the long-term. Sometimes
referred to as sovereign wealth funds, states such as Kuwait and Singapore (one natural-resource rich, the other not) have
had such funds for many years.
AID , REM ITTANCES, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTM ENT, AND TRADE. As a matter of empirical fact, it is useful to compare
the size of certain financial flows to each other. Thus, official development assistance (ODA) reached about USD100
billion in 2006.  In contrast, workers’ remittances back to their home countries amounted to USD300 billion in 2006.28 29
Foreign direct investment reached over USD1,000 billion.  (And truly opening up global markets for free trade would30
probably make for even larger numbers. ) It follows that when conflict-affected states think about capital rebuilding the31
emphasis must not be put on foreign aid, but on reconstituting and sustaining private sector activity. While foreign aid
can play an important postwar role, in the end it reflects—like military intervention—third-party state interests. As such
foreign aid has been, certainly in the past, capricious, haphazard, and short-term from the point of view of the recipient
states. It is only very recently that the academic community at least has argued that aid ought to be nonpolitical,
predictable, and long-lasting, on the order of ten years postwar.
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. The phrase international financial institutions (IFIs) refers
in the main to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group (WBG) at the global level but also to
regional development banks, that is, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ABD), the
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The
IMF is primarily engaged with short-term lending in support of macroeconomic stabilization, whereas the others are
engaged in long-term lending for physical infrastructure (re)building and social service provision.
Due to their financial heft, undoubtedly the most important U.N.-related agencies in regard to economic policy are
the IMF and the WBG. The latter consists of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRB), the
International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (CSID). Importantly, the IMF and the
WBG are autonomous organizations, each constituted by international treaty to which states accede when they choose
to become members. On its web site, the IMF describes itself as “... an organization of 186 countries, working to foster
global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and
sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world.” In practice, three areas dominate the IMF’s day-to-
day work. First, economic surveillance monitors members’ economic and financial developments and provides policy
advice aimed at crisis prevention. Second, the IMF provides short-term lending to countries with balance of payments
problems in support of policies aimed at correcting the underlying difficulties (see chapters 3 and 4). And third, it
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provides technical assistance and training. The IBRD and IDA (the World Bank) describe their work as providing “...
low-interest loans, interest-free credits, and grants to developing countries for a wide array of purposes that include
investments in education, health, public administration, infrastructure, financial and private sector development,
agriculture, and environmental and natural resource management.”32
Thus, the World Bank works in support of long-term asset (re)building and economic growth—after all, it was
founded in 1944 and the name refers to reconstruction and development—whereas the IMF works in support of short-
term economic stabilization. However, the crux of the matter lies in what these institutions do in day-to-day practice when
a member state seeks assistance. Both institutions have been criticized for pushing inappropriate, even harmful, policy
on member states in need. At one time, the World Bank for example indulged on financing a number of large dams for
hydro power-generation. While energy and economic growth are related on a nearly one-to-one basis—more power, more
growth—the construction of dams sometimes caused displacement of vulnerable populations from ancestral lands and
led to environmental damage as well. Negotiating infrastructure loans with central government politicians and bureaucrats
to generate electric power to be transmitted to far-away cities while leaving local populations uprooted, displaced, and
unattended betrayed notions of economic development that rightly were criticized by civil society. From time to time,
the World Bank therefore saw itself compelled to acknowledge errors and to change policy and practice. In the late
1990s, the Bank was, however, in the lead when it came to promote research on the economics of armed conflict and to
translate findings into practical assistance.
2.5 Policy lessons and tips
Lesson 2.1: Economic growth is necessary and welcome. Always adjust economic growth measures for population
growth, output price inflation, and purchasing power differences. Growth compounds quickly. Do not
forgo even small growth differentials.
Lesson 2.2: A generally agreed-upon theory of how to make growth happen does not exist. There is agreement that
the state is to set investment-enhancing framework conditions, define intervention points, and provide
for adequate institutional capacity to implement policy but otherwise leave the business of growth to
the private sector.
Lesson 2.3: No precise yardstick regarding a long-term economic growth rate to aim at exists. Prewar experiences,
the remaining capital stock—and plans for rebuilding it—the record of similarly affected states, and
those of neighboring states, may provide guidance as to a growth rate one can reasonably expect to
obtain. Undershooting forfeits advances in living standards and overshooting can plunge a society
(back) into war.
Lesson 2.4: Violence affects both the supply- and the demand-side of an economy. Addressing only one side or,
worse, only one aspect of one side, will be insufficient. The economic cost of violence is dramatically
large and, over time, accumulates into very large numbers. Certainly one of the very best long-term
investments a society can make is to reduce, prevent, and mitigate violence in all its forms.
Lesson 2.5: A well-functioning society is also a well-balanced one. The function of economic growth cannot be
handed to political society alone. Commercial and civil society are necessary to drive growth and to
check on its quality. Transparency, openness, and accountability are important elements in this.
Lesson 2.6: As institutions, both the World Bank and the IMF have sometimes been late to recognize and
acknowledge case-specific circumstances that would have required deviation from their standard
policy recommendations. It is now agreed that the pursuit of economic growth in the absence of
poverty and violence reduction strategies can be self-defeating. It is also agreed that good governance
(i.e., the avoidance of obvious economic mismanagement), especially capable policy planning, design,
implementation, execution, and follow-through, are important prerequisites for growth.
2.6 Failure and success: two case studies
Failure: Germany post-World War I
Success: Germany post-World War II [Northern Ireland?]
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Chapter 3: Dealing with turbulence: macroeconomic stabilization
“It is important for governments to encourage private investors to make investments that are irreversible and
this is likely to require the rebuilding of civil society with concern for investment-sensitive reforms, such as
control of inflation, proper valuation of the exchange rate, restraint in revenue collection, and the
reestablishment of transport infrastructure” (Dunne, 2006, p. 40).
Chapters 1 and 2 dealt with the importance of investment and capital rebuilding. If there are no assets, there will be no
income. If assets decline, incomes decline. If assets rise, so do the prospects of income. In a word, without a ship, one
cannot sail.
Having a ship does not, however, guarantee trouble-free sailing. This chapter thus deals with macroeconomic
turbulence, economic statecraft in the short-term. But in considering the short-term, one must bear in mind that the short-
and long-term are connected. Continuing with the sailing metaphor, stabilization must aim at the proper port of
destination and one must be willing to take necessary detours. Steering the boat into the nearest storm is not helpful. For
example, adopting economic regulations and policies that fail to reassure private investors or threaten to dispossess them
is like dismantling the ship on the way to the storm. Moreover, it is important to realize that the bigger the ship, the more
comfortable and safe will be the journey. Sheer size—an ocean liner, rather than a dugout—provides intrinsic stability.
Thus, asset building must continue.
Investment-sensitive reform must reassure not just investors, but in equal measure workers and society-at-large.
Reform must be conflict-sensitive as well, in particular to the danger of violence renewal. It is no use—as scholarship
and the main international financial institutions now agree—to grow the economy at the risk of recreating the conditions
that gave rise to violence in the first place. Slow and steady is better than fast and risky. Thus, as important as economic
growth is, overheating the economy and recreating social friction is not the proper prescription. Diverting some resources
to build outriggers— peace-building investments, recreation of the social contract, and reconstruction of the framework
conditions that undergird social stability—may at first be more important than enlarging the dugout. Thus, UNDP states
the current consensus view as follows: “[M]acroeconomic policies must give priority to minimizing conflict risk, even
as they promote growth. This may mean tolerating moderate inflation and budget deficits” (UNDP, 2008, p. xxiii).
The purpose of macroeconomic stabilization is to moderate erratic movements in the business cycle. Its main tools
are fiscal and monetary policy. [The latter includes foreign-exchange rate policy (see chapter 4).] However, the purpose
of fiscal and monetary policy is not macroeconomic stabilization! Instead, the purpose of fiscal policy pertains to the
management of public finances, that is, to collect taxes and to disburse revenue. By setting and changing tax rates and
disbursement objectives certain social and economic goals can be fulfilled such as income redistribution or, for that
matter, macroeconomic stabilization. Likewise, the purpose of monetary policy is to maintain the internal and external
purchasing power of a state’s currency but in setting monetary policy, rules, and regulations, again, other social and
economic goals can be reached. Thus, macroeconomic stabilization is not the primary purpose of fiscal or monetary
policy. Instead, stabilization is an add-on feature, and only a few states have the relative luxury to employ fiscal and
monetary policy in this manner. In most states, and especially in conflict-affected ones, chaotic fiscal and monetary policy
contribute to macroeconomic instability and themselves need to be stabilized in the first place, that is, regularized, made
less capricious, and be handled in a more competent manner. Above all, this requires political credibility and technical
capacity building.
Bearing the prior paragraphs in mind, the chapter begins with a presentation of a useful heuristic device, called the
aggregate demand/aggregate supply framework, or the AD/AS model (section 3.1) The framework has the advantage
that a single visual representation pulls together virtually all relevant demand- and supply-side variables, considers all
actors (private and public), integrates domestic and foreign sectors, and simultaneously considers the short- and the long-
term. Although economists do not agree on this framework as an explanatory device, they do agree on it as a heuristic
device, the point of departure for agreement and disagreement, of refinements and extensions, and the model in contrast
to which alternative representations of economies are constructed, and therefore the point of departure for policy debates
and recommendations. It is a framework well worth studying. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 then consider elements of fiscal and
monetary policy within the AD/AS framework. As before, sections 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 deal with institutions and policies,
policy lessons and tips, and two case studies.
3.1 A macroeconomic framework
Brauer/Dunne: A Manual on Macroeconomic Fundamentals for Conflict-Affected States     D R A F T (v6) page 22
Instead of experiencing a decline of 5 percent in GDP in one year and a rise of 6 percent the next year, all segments of
society uniformly prefer that large swings in amplitude in the business cycle be avoided. For example, households like
to possess some confidence that they will have continuous employment and continuous income rather than being
employed one year and unemployed the next. Similarly, businesses prefer a stable economic environment and stable
consumer incomes. This greatly facilitates planning and reduces risk, especially for large-scale, costly investments.
Policymakers also prefer a stable economic environment because it provides surety about the likely size of public sector
revenue inflows and expenditure outflows. In addition, a country’s trade partners prefer stability because when an
economy plunges into recession it usually buys less from its overseas partners, hurting them in the process. Also, a
country experiencing an up-and-down economy may be tempted to manipulate the value of its currency’s exchange rate
and this, too, can hurt its trading partners. In a word, the good news is that everyone agrees on the goal of securing a
stable macroeconomic environment. The disagreements are over the details, mechanics, and effective implementation
and timing, not over the goal itself.
THE SHORT-RUN AD/AS FRAMEWORK.
Figure 3.1 is a visual representation of an
economy. It reflects not so much a
particular theory as that it serves as an
accounting framework and heuristic device
that includes a large number of relevant
variables in a single visual image, hence its
pedagogical value. On the vertical axis, one
denotes inflation (in percentage terms) of
the goods and services an economy
produces. On the first horizontal axis,
economic growth is measured by GDP
growth, also in percentage terms. GDP
stands for gross domestic product—the
monetary value of all production in a given
state and time period, usually one
year—and because somebody must be
doing the producing, one can use a second
horizontal axis to measure employment (as
a percentage of the labor force). When the
employment axis is run the other way, from
right to left, one obtains a sense of the size
of unemployment (also measured as a percentage of the labor force).
The upward-sloping line in the figure is called the short-run aggregate supply, or SRAS. To see why this line is
upward-sloping, consider, first, the black SRAS line and assume at the economy is operating at a point where output price
inflation is 3 percent and GDP growth is 3 percent also (with an implied 95 percent employment rate and a 5 percent
unemployment rate). Second, suppliers of goods and services are in business to earn profit (p), that is, total revenue (TR)
output outputminus total cost (TC). TR, in turn, is the combination of the prices received times the units of output sold (P  x Q ).
inputLikewise, TC is the combination of prices paid times the units of input needed, such as raw materials and labor (P
inputx Q ). Third, the argument now proceeds on the assumption—to be relaxed shortly—that the prices of inputs are
constant (unchanged). If for some reason the output prices should increase, firms notice an extra profit opportunity
because costs (with constant input prices) are by assumption not rising as fast as revenue (with rising output prices). A
firm will therefore want to produce larger quantities of output. In a word, higher output prices (an upward-movement
on the vertical axis) induce firms to produce more output (an outward-movement on the horizontal axis). In combination,
these two movements make the supply-line upward-sloping.
If one makes the opposite assumption about prices, profits would be threatened. For example, if output prices rise
by 3 percent and input prices rise by 5 percent, then production becomes more expensive, profits decline, and producers
will want to produce less than before. This is visually represented in Figure 3.1 by a shift of the entire black SRAS line
to the left (from the black to the red line). Because less is produced, one can read off the horizontal axes that GDP growth
is now only 2 percent, employment falls from 95 percent to 94 percent, and unemployment correspondingly rises from
Figure 3.1: The short-run AD/AS framework.
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5 percent to 6 percent of the labor force.
Input prices or production costs can rise for
example on account of higher regulatory
compliance costs, higher raw material
costs, higher labor costs, or higher
transportation costs. Of course, input prices
can also fall, especially when improved
technology lowers production costs per unit
produced. In that case, the change in short-
run aggregate supply would be represented
by shifting the black SRAS line to the right
instead of shifting it to the left.
FEEDBACK EFFECT. An economy never
stands still. Any change anywhere in the
system affects participants and leads them
to change their behavior which, in turn,
affects the system. Thus, in the case of
initially constant output price inflation (at
3 percent) and rising input price inflation
(Figure 3.1), the reduction in production on
account of falling profit opportunities
means that the existing demand for goods
and services cannot be satisfied as well as
before. Consequently, buyers compete for
reduced supply and push output prices up
a bit, which in turn stimulates supply a little
bit as well (see the switch, in Figure 3.2,
from the red to the blue situation). Thus,
when the dynamics have worked
themselves out, the economy ends up with
output price inflation running at about 3.5
percent, and with GDP growth at about 2.5
percent, employment at 94.5 percent, and
unemployment at 5.5 percent.
AGGREGATE DEM AND . If short-run
supply is primarily a function of profit
opportunities and the various revenue and
cost factors that affect them, then
aggregate demand consists of the
summation of demand by various
categories of buyers. In the figures
aggregate demand (AD) is written as an
equation, namely AD = C+I+G+(X-M),
which is the same equation as used in chapter 2 for national income accounting. C stands for consumption by private
households, I for investment by firms, G for government spending at the federal, provincial, district, or municipal levels,
and (X-M) for the net value of exports and imports. The value of exports is added because it represents demand from
overseas for domestically produced goods. Similarly, the value of imports is subtracted because it reflects demand that
is realized in another economy. The AD-line is downward-sloping because the lower is output price inflation, the higher
is the incentive to make purchases at home, and vice versa.
If any component on the right-hand side of the AD equation rises in value then the left-hand side must rise in value
also, thus reflecting more aggregate demand for goods and services. This is shown in Figure 3.3 by shifting the black
AD-line outward toward the right along the GDP growth axis to become the blue AD-line. As a consequence of a larger
Figure 3.2: Feedback effect from the supply-side to the demand-side of
an economy.
Figure 3.3: Aggregate demand shift. (The feedback effect on the
supply-side is already reflected in the figure.)
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amount of demand relative to available supplies, output prices will eventually rise as demanders compete for access to
the supplies. This signals profit opportunities. More production will be forthcoming and therefore also more employment,
and less unemployment, as indicated in the Figure.
JUST TEN VARIABLES. This macroeconomic framework involves just 10 variables: (1) output prices; (2) input prices;
(3) quantities used and produced (inputs and outputs); (4) GDP; (5) employment; (6) unemployment; (7) consumption;
(8) investment; (9) public sector expenditure; and (10) the net value of exports and imports. Astonishingly, absolutely
anything that can possibly happen in the world will be reflected in one or more of these variables which then affect the
economic system. For example, if a threat of war induces people to consume less and save more, this would lower
consumption and therefore drag aggregate demand leftward along the GDP growth axis. The reduced demand implies
less production, hence reduced growth, reduced employment, increased unemployment, but also a reduction in output
price inflation as producers eventually lower prices to attract the remaining shoppers (or do not raise prices as much as
otherwise they might). Reduced consumption of course means more savings. This means that excess supplies of loanable
funds should drive down interest rates and, in turn, should encourage investment. But even at low interest rates, firms
will hesitate to borrow if they, too, fear the onset of war. Government can make up for slacking aggregate demand by
borrowing and stimulating the economy through war-related production but consumption generally falls much more
quickly than government can react to pick up the slack, so that an economic slowdown or an outright economic recession
is likely. (And of course, preparing for war is not the preferred way of stabilizing an economy.)
MACROECONOM IC OBJECTIVES. As a heuristic device the AD/AS framework serves as a simple, convenient, and
handy tool to quickly inform one about causes, pressures, dynamics, and consequences in the macroeconomic system
as a whole. And it possesses another very useful feature: in a single visual representation of the economy, it captures all
five of the macroeconomic objectives (section 1.3). On the vertical axis, it captures information about the goal of low
output price inflation; on the horizontal axis, it captures information about (sustainable) GDP and the long-term objective
of GDP growth, as well as about employment and unemployment (which can be interpreted to reflect both labor and
capital resources). The back-and-forth movement of the economic system along the horizontal axes captures information
about business cycles and whether they are smooth or erratic. Even the need for global economic policy coordination
across state jurisdictions is captured as imports from and export to other states’ depend, in part, on economic conditions
and policy in those states (see chapter 4).
POSTCONFLICT RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION (STABILIZATION AND GROWTH). Economies possess an inherent
constraint on the supply side below which the economy’s productive capacity is underutilized and above which it is
strained. That is to say that under normal circumstances, it is expected that an economy grows, net of output price
inflation, say by 3 percent per year—its inherent long-term capacity for economic growth. Thus, when there is a demand
failure that moves aggregate demand leftward or a supply shock that moves aggregate supply leftward so that the
economy operates at only 2 percent growth per year, then in the absence of compensatory demand from the public sector,
the extra unemployment of labor and capital resources this implies will eventually compel workers to accept lower wages
(or lower wage increases), thus increasing profit opportunities and shifting aggregate supply back to its starting position.
Growth of 3 percent per year is restored. Alternatively, if in the judgment of authorities the adjustment process during
which unemployed resources lie idle takes too long, government can try to artificially stimulate the economy by
increasing government expenditure. In terms of growth, employment, and unemployment, the economy would revert back
to its normal long-run inherent capacity, but at the cost of an up-tick in output price inflation caused by the artificial
stimulation of the economy. On the whole, an automatic, private sector supply-side correction is preferred over an
artificial, public sector intervention. In violence-torn economies of course the private sector is hesitant to invest and
understandably waits for the public sector (that is, society-at-large, through representative government at the local,
regional, and national level) to act first. This creates a two-sided pressure: in periods of slack private economic activity,
tax revenues are low while the call for public sector spending is high. Consequently, fiscal deficits and accumulated
public sector debt are likely to increase. This is fine so long as borrowing from abroad is possible and not unduly
onerous. Whether debt becomes onerous depends, in part, on the conduct of deficit spending, that is, whether it actually
succeeds to bring the private sector fully back into the economy, in which case tax revenue grows and public expenditure
needs decline in some degree so that the debt load can be carried and paid off in time (see section 3.2).
LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN . Economists are hard put to define the long-run growth capacity at which to aim an
economy. Shall policymakers aim at annual economic growth of 2 or 3 or some other percentage? In practice, economists
tend to use an average growth rate derived from the economy’s record of past decades and they stipulate that average
to be the economy’s inherent annual growth limit at which to aim. For war-torn countries, especially those emerging from
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decades of armed violence, this yardstick is evidently false. Depending on the remaining capital stock, the growth
rebound may at first be very large before settling onto the inherent long-run growth potential of the country. From Figure
1.1 and others in chapter 1, it is apparent that both the experiences of economic collapse during war as well as the
experience of growth after war exhibit a wide degree of variation.
Not having a yardstick does not make the idea of having a yardstick false. Rather, the problem is that without a goal
of economic growth to aim at, policymakers may be too timid and be content with, say, 2 percent, when 3 percent can
safely be achieved, or they may aim at 3 percent growth when the economy’s inherent growth limit lies at only 2 percent.
Danger lies on either side of the dividing line of the inherent but unknown long-term growth capacity: constantly
overstimulating an economy in pursuit of an objective that it cannot deliver will, in time, cause pressures to build
up—particularly inflationary pressures—that can altogether derail an economy and plunge society back into war; but an
economy that grows slower than it safely could forgoes employment and output growth needed to finance the rebuilding
of assets and that, too, threatens the stability of peace.
3.2 Fiscal policy
PURPOSE. Fiscal policy concerns how public sector revenue is raised and how that revenue is spent. Fiscal policy is not
a crisis management tool. Instead, its primary function is to promote orderly development and society’s well-being, that
is, growth and continual betterment, usually through a two-pronged approach. One is to provide enabling environments
or framework conditions that stimulate the private sector; the other is to provide economic security for those population
segments that cannot manage on their own. Although sometimes necessary, to spend fiscal resources on macroeconomic
stabilization is a costly distraction from its primary purposes.  The analogy to chapter 2 is straightforward: just as it is33
preferable to build, rather than strip, assets in order to derive income, it is preferable to avoid directing resources to
emergencies if these can be prevented in the first place.
REVENUE. Governments can raise funds from many sources, from income and profit taxes levied on persons and
businesses, to import and export taxes, to taxing tourists and taxing products such as cigarettes, to raising revenue from
selling natural resource wealth directly such as petroleum export revenues (natural resource rents) or obtaining revenue
from granting natural resource exploitation licenses to domestic and foreign firms. Governments also charge fees for
public services, from driver’s license and passport fees to entry fees at national parks. In addition, revenue can be raised
at the national, provincial, and district or municipal levels. Moreover, governments can raise funds by issuing currency
(seignorage), by depleting foreign-exchange reserves, and by borrowing domestically or abroad either through private
sector financial institutions or from bi- or multilateral lenders. And governments can receive outright grants, for example
in the form of development or military aid. The fiscal policy aspect enters by making all these revenue sources consistent,
coherent, and viable, and to orchestrate their overall effect such that maximum economic advantages for the economy
at large are secured. Many developing states rely for a major portion of their revenue on natural resource rents. This
means that a particular sector of the economy carries a disproportional revenue burden, but often endowing it with
disproportional political influence as well, while other sectors contribute proportionally less to the public purse.
Similarly, public expenditure policy affects particular sectors, such as education, agriculture, or transportation
infrastructure more than others so that macroeconomic goals are entwined with sectoral and regional goals.
THE TAX SYSTEM . Economists list five criteria to characterize a good tax system. First, low costs of administration
and compliance, that is, administrative simplicity. Second, the system should be flexible to adapt quickly to changing
economic and political circumstances. Third, the tax system should be transparent and amount to political accountability
and responsibility. Fourth, it should be perceived as generally fair across income groups. And fifth, the tax system should
enhance economic efficiency. An efficient tax system means that it should not distort economic efforts. For instance,
excessive income tax rates lead to tax avoidance (people perform less taxable work) or tax evasion (not declaring
income). Perception of excessive taxes on capital can lead to inefficiencies in the capital markets. By the same token,
undertaxing undesirable economic activities, or even subsidizing them, encourages them to continue unabated. For
instance, adverse environmental effects of automobile traffic can be mitigated by appropriate taxation. Likewise, outright
subsidization of certain product categories like fuel—or food, for that matter—distorts the economic system. As
mentioned, in the larger interest of the protection of vulnerable populations, of social peace, this might be politically
necessary but at the danger of creating powerful political and economic vested interests on both the supply and demand
sides.
As regards fairness, the tax system should display horizontal and vertical equity. Horizontal equity means that
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persons who are equal in every respect should be treated equally in taxation as well. Vertical equity means that those
capable of paying more taxes, should pay more. This leaves the political problem of determining the income brackets
and the tax-rates for those brackets. Some economists argue that because income is the result of a person’s contribution
to society, it should not be taxed at all. Instead, consumption should be taxed through a sales or value-added tax. This
has the beneficial side-effects of encouraging saving and of providing a pool of loanable funds for investment and future
economic growth. This would also greatly simplify the tax system and reduce the administrative cost of tax collection
and limit opportunities for corruption in the tax system. As mentioned, to protect certain populations from hardship, a
state can elect to exempt some consumption categories from taxation, e.g., food and medicines.
These ideal-type specifications of course do not come about overnight. Especially in war-torn societies, rebuilding
a well-functioning tax administration will take years. Some states therefore focus revenue-raising efforts on easily taxed
“victims,” such as the export sectors. Needless to say, the unequal burden of taxation induces tax evasion efforts and,
with it, carries very real dangers of subverting the state apparatus through corruption. The practical difficulties of
rebuilding and taping a broad, society-wide tax-base should not be underestimated. Dedicated, long-term training and
capacity rebuilding grants may need to be offered of conflict-affected states.
DEBT. Many developing and emerging economies, especially those in postwar situations, find that resource needs
far outstrip resource availability. The resulting budget deficits have led governments to artificially inflate the economy
by printing overmuch money (section 3.3) and/or to take on an unsustainable domestic or external debt burdens. To be
sure, if economic growth generates sufficient revenue to service the debt, it may be sustained indefinitely. (Just like
private companies can carry perpetual debt, so can governments.) But unsustainable debt must be lowered.  This can34
be done in three ways. First, receive outright debt forgiveness (grants).  Second, increase public revenue and dedicate35
the extra resources to increase debt service (interest and payoff of debt principals). And third, decrease public
expenditure and use the saved funds to service the debt. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, there is now
widespread agreement that public expenditure cuts must detract neither from sensible spending that enhances the
framework conditions for growth nor from poverty alleviation. If debt is taken on it must be focused on uses with the
highest long-term social return. The composition of public expenditure may be more important than its level.
In this regard, it is worth noting that few countries’ public sector accounting systems measure annual deficits and
accumulated debt properly. The conceptually correct way, for private households and businesses as for the public sector,
is not to focus on revenue minus expenditure streams but on assets minus liabilities, that is, net worth. For example,
when a debt-financed seaport is built, the liability the debt poses is balanced by the asset of the port. The port generates
revenues on its own. In addition, by stimulating economic growth it also contributes to higher tax revenue. Thus, the debt
can be serviced and paid off. In practice, however, most states’ budgets include a debt service line item that is delinked
from the underlying assets so that it is impossible to assess whether the assets repay their cost. In conflict-affected states,
especially in war-torn states, assets such as seaports frequently suffer loss of business days and physical destruction so
that the delay in debt repayment or the inability to repay the debt at all should be counted as part of the cost of war.
Fiscal policy as a tool of macroeconomic stabilization requires that government has the flexibility and wherewithal
either to issue discretionary spending or to forgo tax revenue to leave more spending power in private sector hands.
This would prop up an economy during recession.  In practice, developing nations, especially conflict-affected ones,36
rarely have discretionary funds at their disposal, nor the leisure to forgo tax revenue, hence the overwhelming need to
draw on funds from global sources. In the past, these have added to unsustainable debt levels so that in recent years very-
low interest rate loans, debt relief, debt forgiveness, and outright grants have become more prominent in the fiscal affairs
of conflict-affected states. This suggests a bifurcated approach to fiscal policy: design, implement, and adhere to sound
fiscal management practice for its own sake and top up the remaining need from overseas in a nonburdening manner with
the long-run goal—perhaps over 10 or 20 years’ time—of achieving sufficient economic growth from within to gradually
crowd out and graduate from overseas assistance.
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE POLICY AND MANAGEM ENT. Public expenditure policy needs to achieve three goals: (1) overall
fiscal discipline, (2) constant reevaluation of spending priorities within the revenue constraint, and (3) operational
efficiency.
“The interdependence of [these] three levels is one of the most powerful findings of both practice and theory. The
pursuit of aggregate fiscal discipline is often done in such a way as to undermine both level 2 and 3
performance—arbitrarily reordering priorities and devastating service delivery and operational performance more
generally. Similarly, a lack of discipline and budgetary realism in making strategic policy choices leads to a
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mismatch between policies and resources, resulting in inadequate funding for
operations. More positively, fiscal stability creates an environment that encourages
sound level 2 and 3 performance. In turn, sound performance at these levels feeds
back into fiscal stability.”37
The World Bank lists a range of criteria for budget and financial management.
Being general principles, they apply to conflict-affected states as to any other state.
They are comprehensiveness and decisionmaking discipline so that for instance not
only current but also capital expenditures are properly budgeted; flexibility that
avoids making implementation overly tight and strategy overly loose; legitimacy so
that those with power to change policy during implementation had the opportunity
to participate in policy formulation; predictability of the short-, medium-, and long-
term time paths of expenditure flows; contestability, honesty, and information, so that
accurate and timely information can be used in politically and technically unbiased
ways to contribute to expenditure review and evaluation and potential policy changes;
and transparency for decisionmakers and the public and accountability by decisionmakers, decision implementors, and
users of public funds.38
FOREIGN AID . A consensus has developed that advises against peak amounts of aid being delivered immediately after
the end of war when the absorptive capacity of the postwar state is still limited. Instead, capacity-rebuilding needs to be
offered and aid needs to peak perhaps 3 to 5 years postwar when the institutional capacity to absorb aid has been rebuilt.
For instance, IMF authors of a book on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) say that “we found that too often
international aid to postconflict countries seems to taper off shortly after a peace agreement is reached, whereas, in fact,
appropriate and prolonged aid is needed to consolidate peace and avoid a reemergence of conflict.”  As regards aid39
sequencing, immediate support for social recovery turns out to be more important and effective than support for
reconstruction and stabilization. The reason is that neglect of addressing pressing social priorities can lead to resentment
that restarts war. As mentioned, the ultimate aim must be reconstitution and rebuilding of assets. The intermediate aim
must be stabilization but the immediate aim must simply be to assist damaged populations—and fiscal policy and fiscal
aid must accommodate this sequencing and balancing. In practice, this will involve parallel and somewhat overlapping
tracks of aid (see Figure 3.4).
A 2002 paper finds that “while both humanitarian and reconstruction aid are welfare-enhancing, humanitarian aid
reduces long-run capital accumulation and growth. Reconstruction aid, on the other hand, may increase the long-run
capital stock and, if carefully designed, avoid the pitfalls of the Dutch disease”.  This, too, suggests that aid needs to40
be purposeful and delivered in stages. Reconstruction aid includes aid for intangibles, especially institution-building,
reestablishment of the legal and regulatory system and judicial and supervisory agencies, the tax system and tax
administration, and rebuilding of regional trade links. In addition to humanitarian and reconstruction aid, general
government budget support aid may be necessary on a continuous basis as well to rebuild, strengthen, and support
ongoing government policy and administrative work. Further, the IMF’s work on the DRC in the early 2000s provides
an interesting case of a clear recognition of the connections between economics and politics and that aid design
(circumstances, objectives, size, time profile, and composition) must take these connections into account:
“Three main phases—stabilization, reconstruction, and development—were defined and later included in the
country’s poverty reduction strategy. The stabilization phase sought to remove the most severe distortions and break
the vicious cycle of hyperinflation and declining value of the currency. Priority had to be given to paying the wages
of civil servants and the military on time to defuse social tension and rebuild confidence in the public administration.
In parallel, with the help of the World Bank, the administrative capacity of key ministries, including the finance
ministry and the central bank, had to be buttressed. Replacing lost administrative capacity is a lengthy process
because many civil servants were killed during the war. It takes time to train replacements, which underscores the
importance of prolonging foreign aid. At the same time, the foundations of a level playing field for the private sector
were put in place.”41
The latter included sequencing of aid to restructure high-impact economic sectors, in the case of the DRC mining,
forestry, and transportation. Thus, how aid is timed, sequenced, and spent is sometimes as important as the issue of
Figure 3.4: Postwar aid.
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creating absorptive capacity per se.
SPILLOVERS. Another finding of recent research—dramatic
enough to have led to almost immediate aid policy changes—is
that wars create spillover effects that can adversely affect
neighboring states to such a degree that they, too, need fiscal
assistance, as much as do war-host states.  An example may be42
seen in Figure 3.5. It shows, in blue color, real population-,
inflation-, and purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita from
1950-1980 for Costa Rica, as well as a linear projection to
2007.  In red, the actual record for 1981-2007 is shown. A lost43
decade of the 1980s—when Costa Rica’s neighbors, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, were
embroiled in civil war—starkly manifests itself in the gap
between the projected and the actual outcome. After the peace
agreements of the early 1990s, brokered by Costa Rica’s
president Oscar Arias, the country’s former growth resumed (in
accelerated fashion). Still, based on the 1950 to 1980 data, by
2007 per capita production still had not reached its projected level. Thus, like its warring neighbors, Costa Rica suffered
at least a 30-year economic penalty even though it has not been at war itself.
The research literature has shown that the knock-on or spillover effects can be greater in neighboring countries than
in the war-host state. The reasons for this are many-fold and involve for instance the need to deal with sometimes millions
of refugees, interruption of trade routes and markets, environmental stresses, lost tourist revenues, and higher security
expenses in connection with securing border regions and safeguard refugee encampments, all of which carry fiscal
consequences.
3.3 Monetary policy
Monetary policy deals with the internal and external value of a state’s currency (that is, inflation and the currency’s
foreign exchange value), the determination of interest rates, and the regulation and supervision of a country’s banking
system. The primary institution is the central bank, and its primary tool consists of influencing the amount of money (the
money supply) available in the economy to carry out economic transactions. Although the two are like Siamese twins
that cannot easily be separated, in this section we deal primarily (but briefly) with some domestic aspects of monetary
policy and address (more extensively) foreign-exchange related issues, such as exchange-rate mechanisms and regimes,
currency valuation, and other matters in chapter 4.
MONETARY POLICY M ECHANICS. To appreciate some of the pitfalls of monetary policy in postwar situations, it helps
first to understand the textbook purposes and mechanics of monetary policy. They work as follows. Assume that a
commercial bank has made a loan to a private firm. The firm gets the funds and the bank gets a signed contract in which
the firm promises to repay the loan. This contract, or note, can be sold to the central bank (with the firm now owing the
funds to the central bank), and the central bank pays the commercial bank for the note by printing money. The
commercial bank can take these new funds and loan them out to yet another customer. By buying notes from commercial
banks, the central bank thereby injects additional funds into the economy. Likewise, governments can finance budget
deficits by borrowing via the domestic financial markets, that is, via commercial banks. The central bank can purchase
these notes, again injecting additional funds into the economy. (In practice, central banks tend to purchase government
debt, not commercial debt.) The more debt the central bank purchases, the more potential funds are available to
commercial banks to loan out. Since commercial banks are for-profit enterprises, a large supply of loanable funds leads
them to compete for borrowing customers by lowering the interest rate on loans. So long as the demand for currency
(money demand) needed to carry out daily economic transactions is steady, the central bank’s injection of money supply
will lead to lower interest rates and provide an incentive to private households and commercial enterprises to borrow
more money. Of course, the point of borrowing is to spent the borrowed funds—and thus economic activity and
employment is stimulated via the aggregate demand side of an economy. Importantly, if the funds are borrowed by firms
to finance investment to increase their productivity and to expand their businesses, then the supply-side of an economy
is also affected. The combined effect is that employment and economic growth increase (more demand) while inflation
Figure 3.5: Population-, inflation-, and purchasing
power-adjusted GDP, Costa Rica, 1950-2007 (base
year = 2005).
Source: Penn World Table, v6.3.
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is held in check through growth in productivity-enhancing (cost-lowering) physical investment.
Evidently, this mechanism requires a well-functioning private financial market and a nearly flawless interface
between and among public policy formulation, policy implementation, and a smooth and well-predictable private sector
response. In postwar economies, frequently all three of these are lacking and much of the initial financing of development
and growth objectives will have to come from official overseas sources.
THE LONG- AND SHORT-TERM , AGAIN . It is important to understand that monetary policy may stimulate and support
economic growth in the short-term but that monetary policy is absolutely no substitute for an independent long-term
growth policy. To see this, we need to introduce—as in chapter 3—an accounting equation. It is
(1) P x Q / M x V,
where, on the left-hand side, P stands for the price level in an economy and Y stands for inflation-adjusted, or real GDP.44
Together, they amount to an economy’s nominal GDP (see section 2.2). On the right-hand side, M stands for the money
supply and V for velocity, or the turnover-rate of money. Rounding liberally for convenience, in 2008 the nominal
GDP—the value of goods and services produced—in the United States was approximately USD14 trillion. But the
amount of money (cash, and funds available in checking and saving accounts, and the like) to purchase these goods and
services was only USD7 trillion. It follows that every dollars must have been used twice. That makes sense because when
a person uses his or her paycheck money to purchases groceries, the store deposits the funds and reissues them via
paychecks to its employees who, in turn, conduct purchases of their own. Thus, every available dollar is used several
times over. It turns out that while the turnover-rate of money (V) has values that differ from country to country, within
a country it is relatively stable from year to year. For practical purposes, V may be considered constant (let us write this
as V*).
Given V*, equation (1) can now be rewritten in two informative ways where in each case a second variable also is
assumed constant. Each equation is followed by a made-up numerical example and a change in the example.
(2) P* / (M x V*) / Q | Example: 1* / (5 x 2*) / 10 | Change: 1* / (10 x 2*) / 20
(3) Q* / (M x V*) / P | Example: 10* / (5 x 2*) / 1 | Change: 10* / (10 x 2*) / 2
Thus, in equation (2), if an economy’s price level were to remain stable (P*, that is, no inflation), and if the amount of
money (M) were to double from 5 to 10, then it must be true that real GDP (Q) also doubles (from Q=10 to Q=20). This
is to say that in the very short-term, before suppliers notice that there is more “money chasing goods,” an extra injection
of money into the economy can stimulate GDP. But it was said earlier that an economy’s inherent long-term capacity
for growth is limited so that in the long-term GDP (or annual GDP growth) is constant, as in equation (3). Thus, with
Q* and V*, it must be true that a doubling of money (from M=5 to M=10) results in a doubling of the price level (from
P=1 to P=2). In other words, printing and injecting money into the economy will, over time, not lead to more production
but to more inflation. Just like a lubricant alone does not make an engine run, money alone does not make an economy
grow.  This is the reason why policymakers like to keep money creation under tight control. (See the case study on45
Zimbabwe in section 3.6.) In the long-term, it is productive capacity, not fiscal nor monetary policies, that improves
peoples’ lives. This buttresses, once more, the need to conduct stabilization policy firmly within the objectives of long-
term growth policy.
DYSFUNCTIONALITIES. The collapse of money and, with it, of monetary policy in violence economies is easily shown
by the number of states in which citizens have adopted alternative currencies during and after war. Timor L’este (East
Timor) uses the U.S. dollar as its official currency. So does El Salvador. After 2003, Iraq used euros and dollars, before
eventually reissuing a new dinar. Issuing a new currency after violence is popular: the German Reichsmark became the
Deutsche Mark after World War II. Both Argentina and Brazil reissued and reissued their currencies under various names
around the times of their respective military dictatorships and the years thereafter as both tried to recreate stable, credible
currencies and financial markets. Kosovo used the Deutsche Mark before switching (with Germany) to the euro. The euro
also is used by Montenegro and other follow-on states to the former Yugoslavia, regardless of whether or not these states
acceded to the European Union. Zimbabweans use a whole slew of substitute currencies, including the Botswana pula,
the British pound, the euro, the U.S. dollar, and the South African rand—anything but the Zimbabwean dollar. The main
reason for currency substitution is that war and inflation tend to go together, debasing the store-of-value function of
money. In Zimbabwe, by the third quarter of 2008, inflation was running at an annual rate of over 500 billion percent.46
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(For details, see the first case study in section 3.6.) The country’s private financial sector collapsed. In essence, a parallel
“public” monetary system, privately managed, has emerged. Neither a functioning bank-to-customer nor a functioning
bank-to-bank (interbank) market exists. In a word, violence can undermine the policy assumptions that underlie ordinary
monetary purposes and mechanics.
In criminalized economies, including but not only those such as Afghanistan or Colombia that are associated with
the trade in illegal narcotics, very large sums of money travel through informal channels, circumventing formal private
financial institutions and staying outside the reach of public policy influence.
RECONSTITUTION AND COORDINATION . Whereas postwar fiscal policy might require rebuilding of the physical and
administrative apparatus of state ministries and provincial offices, including capacity building of trained personnel, the
institutional rebuilding of monetary policy needs a smaller staff and physical facilities. The issues monetary policymakers
need to deal with are, however, extremely important and involve, among others, the following: rebuilding the central
bank; regaining domestic credibility; reestablishing the internal and external banking and payment systems; rebuilding
systems for bank supervision; restarting the provision of credit, especially of access to loans by micro-businesses and
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); reining in the high inflation that ordinarily accompanies periods of violent
conflict; and dealing with the consequent currency depreciation on foreign-exchange markets. Unlike normally
functioning advanced economies, where fiscal and monetary policy are judiciously kept apart to provide for independent
policy judgment and policy implementation, in postwar emerging and developing economies, monetary policy should
be closely coordinated with fiscal policy and follow politically set objectives of employment and growth and only later
on transition into an independent role. Thus, monetary policy might initially be more forgiving in its goal of reducing
inflation so as to support employment and growth objectives and aim at a phased-in reduction of inflation over an agreed-
upon, but credible, time frame.47
3.4 Institutions and policies
Many domestic institutions and their purposes and policies have already been mentioned (e.g., the central bank; tax
administration). Thus this short section focuses on two important international institutions, the IMF and World Bank
(with additional comments in chapter 4). Following the first worldwide oil-price shock in 1973/4, many developing and
emerging economies suffered from two problems: internally, drastic economic mismanagement and, externally, a difficult
foreign trade, foreign debt, and foreign-exchange rate environment. The IMF provides short-term balance of payment-
related financial assistance on condition that economic policy in the recipient state change in particular ways. This
conditionality—required, in part, to ensure that states can repay funds borrowed from other member states—has been
subject to much criticism. In brief, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, the IMF loaned funds on concessional terms
to particularly needy, low-income member states. This was handled through a lending facility known as the Trust Fund.
This fund was replaced in March 1986 by a Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), followed by an Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in December 1987. In September 1996, the ESAF was made a permanent, rather than
temporary, lending instrument, and in November 1999, ESAF, in turn, was replaced by the IMF’s Poverty Reduction
and Growth Facility (PRGF).
Short-term macroeconomic stabilization can be associated with great economic pain. In the past, Structural
Adjustment Programs, or SAPs, were usually carried out via central government budget cuts and raising tax or other
revenue, with the aim of reducing budget deficits, and thus the need for borrowing or money printing, that is, inflation.
SAPs included demands to properly value the local currency on the foreign exchange market and to improve
macroeconomic policies so that private investors felt confident to again sink money into a country. The criticism that
these measures may reduce economic growth and increase poverty may be simultaneously correct (at a short time-scale)
and incorrect (at a longer time-scale over which the IMF tends to evaluate success or failure). While refuting wholesale,
undifferentiated criticism, the IMF has from time to time acknowledged adverse effects of its mandated policies. By the
late 1990s, one consequence of this acknowledgment was that central governments not only leave social expenditure on
education and health care untouched but in fact increase such spending. In some cases, this clause was written into the
conditionality agreement. Even so, in specific cases the poor still suffered, and the IMF next agreed to work more closely
with the World Bank and civil society to better protect particularly vulnerable populations, in a word to integrate short-
term adjustment policies more deliberately with the goal of doing no harm to the most vulnerable populations, hence the
introduction of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).
The PRGF, in turn, is scheduled to be replaced with an Extended Credit Facility (ECG), a new lending window that
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“will be in line with the objectives of a country’s own poverty reduction strategy.”  Thus, the evolution of IMF programs48
has gone through three stages, from imposing IMF conditions on poor states that had little choice but to accept them,
to lending conditions that reflected World Bank and civil society concerns especially in regard to poverty reduction to,
in future, conditions being led by the affected countries’ own views. In this, the IMF nonetheless puts emphasis on (1)
widespread public participation and “ownership” of poverty reduction strategies in the affected states, (2) is flexible
about how states achieve poverty reduction and growth objectives so long as macroeconomic stability is not threatened,
and (3) highlights good governance (public resource management, transparency, and accountability).
3.5 Policy lessons and tips
Lesson 3.1: In considering the short-term, one must bear in mind that the short- and long-term are connected; that
the long-term provides the primary policy objective; that the short-term is the handmaiden of the long-
term.
Lesson 3.2: There does exist a useful heuristic device—the AD/AS framework—with which some causes and
consequences of changes in aggregate demand, aggregate supply, and economic policy can be traced,
at least to an approximation.
Lesson 3.3: Everyone agrees on the goal of securing a stable macroeconomic environment. The disagreements are
over the detail, mechanics, and sequencing, not over the goal itself.
Lesson 3.4: The purpose of fiscal and monetary policy is not crisis management. To prevent macroeconomic
instability in the first place is better than to use costly fiscal and monetary resources for stabilization.
Economically inappropriate macroeconomic policy can be as damaging as war.
Lesson 3.5: A good tax system is simple, flexible, transparent, fair, and enhances economic efficiency. A good
expenditure system is disciplined, operationally efficient, and routinely reevaluates spending priorities
within the revenue constraint.
Lesson 3.6: Postwar aid should be offered over the long-term (up to 10 years), not short-term (1 or 2 years).
Lesson 3.7: The ultimate aim must be the reconstitution and rebuilding of assets. The intermediate aim must be
macroeconomic stabilization. The immediate aim must be to assist hurting populations. Policy must
accommodate this sequencing, overlapping, and balancing of aid.
Lesson 3.8: Neighbors of war-affected countries may also need help.
Lesson 3.9: Money accommodates economic growth; it does not, by itself, make an economy grow.
Lesson 3.10: Violence can create devastating dysfunctionalities regarding the formulation and conduct of fiscal and
monetary policy. If these are not addressed, it is unlikely that conflict-affected societies can be
reconstituted into functioning entities.
Lesson 3.11: Albeit sometimes slowly, international financial institutions do learn. However, not all conflict-
affected states are atypical in all respects. In seeking and providing policy advice and technical
support, both sides should be pragmatic; neither side should be dogmatic.
3.6 Failure and success: two case studies
Failure: Zimbabwe
Figure 3.6 compares population-, inflation-, and purchasing-power adjusted average economic output of Botswana and
Zimbabwe. Abbreviated BWA and ZIM, respectively, Botswana became an independent state in 1966, and Zimbabwe
followed in 1980. Except for a rough patch in the early to mid-1990s—when South Africa abandoned apartheid—the
figure shows Botswana’s average economic output per person growing by a factor of 11.2, from I$839 in 1960 to I$9,404
in 2007. For Zimbabwe, average economic output per person has fallen by 30 percent, from I$2,673 in 1960 to I$1,894
in 2007.
In terms of annual economic growth rates, Zimbabwe achieved the remarkable feat of negative growth in nine of
the past ten years! By late 2008, inflation was said to be running at over 500 quintillion percent. Even for economists
that is a big number, a quintillion being a one followed by 18 zeroes. (Numbers run from million to billion to trillion to
quadrillion to quintillion.) In January 2009, the central bank introduced a Z$100 trillion banknote. With independence
in 1980, Robert Mugabe took power, repressed white and rival black opponents alike, engaged in murderous campaigns,
and got himself involved in the DR Congo’s bloody war (1998-2002). For Zimbabwe, it has been a downhill ride ever
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since.
As for other southern African countries, the prevalence of
HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe is high. Average life expectancy has
plummeted all across the region and both Botswana’s and
Zimbabwe’s figures are now under 40 years of age (although
Botswana’s life expectancy at birth is nearing 60 years of age
again). But in addition, Zimbabweans have fled in droves; not
only the white farmers that once made Zimbabwe the
breadbasket of the region, but blacks are leaving by the tens
of thousands as well, often to Botswana.
Botswana’s economy in based on minerals—diamonds of
course, but also copper, nickel, and before long platinum.
Exports account for half of GDP (non-diamond exports for 20
percentage points, diamonds for 30 percentage points).
Encouragingly, non-mineral GDP growth is higher than that
of mineral-based GDP growth so that the economy is
diversifying. Inflation, in the five to ten percent range over the
past few years, is relatively modest. The government’s fiscal
position (government income, expenditure, and debt) is
admired throughout the world, and the banking system is
considered sound. Private investment in the economy is high,
as are the country’s foreign exchange reserves (to cover import needs). In fact, Botswana’s is nearly as well off, on
average, as is Chile in South America, and the World Bank considers it an upper-middle income country. Unemployment
and poverty rates, however, are high, as is inequality of income distribution.
In contrast, Zimbabwe is an utterly collapsed state. Virtually no one does business in Zimbabwean dollars anymore;
the economy—or what is left of it—is run by recourse to substitute currencies, especially the South African rand (ZAR)
and the U.S. dollar (USD). For all practical purposes, private banking has ceased, government debt is sky-high, foreign
exchange reserves are near zero. There is no functioning protection of private property rights, the rule of law is absent,
and no one invests in the country. Two-thirds of its people are in poverty, nearly half the population is undernourished,
infant mortality is rising, as is maternal mortality upon giving birth. Total government revenue collapsed from USD942
million in 2005 to an estimated USD133 million in 2008, about what some Wall Street bankers still made in 2008 as well.
The reasons for the difference in economic performance are easy to discern: Zimbabwe does not have a functioning
political system; Botswana does. Even if, as until recently in Japan, one party tends to win all the national elections, they
are nonetheless freely contested. When they come, the post-Mugabe years could also be disastrous of course but perhaps
the example of Botswana will inspire the desire to imitate. After
all, Zimbabwe is equally well-endowed with natural resource
wealth.
Success: Chile
From 1973 to 1990, Chile went through a period of military
dictatorship. As may be seen in Figure 3.7, per capita GDP,
adjusted for inflation and measured in international dollars (I$)
grew throughout the 1950s and 1960s, stalled in the early 1970s
and continued to plummet in performance during the early years
of the Pinochet dictatorship. A period of renewed growth was
followed by another collapse in the early-1980s. Thereafter, a
period of sustained, rapid growth ensued that, by now, has led
Chile to be the most well-off country in South America. It is the
sub-continent’s only member of OECD.
In terms of fiscal and monetary policy, Chile is widely
regarded as a success case. It follows sound—and consistent—
macroeconomic policies with transparency, predictability, and
Figure 3.6: Population-, inflation-, and purchasing
power-adjusted GDP, Botswana and Zimbabwe (base
year = 2005).
Source: Raw data from Penn World Table, v6.3.
Figure 3.7: Population-, inflation-, and purchasing
power-adjusted GDP, Chile, 1951-2007 (base year =
2005).
Source: Raw data from Penn World Table, v6.3. 
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credibility. In some regards, Chile is a world leader in economic policy innovation. Begun during the dictatorship, these
policies have been continued through several democratically elected administrations. With few exceptions, state
enterprises have been privatized, by far the largest exception being CODELCO , the copper mining giant. The retirement
or pension plan fund has been privatized, and international trade has been fostered through numerous free trade
agreements. Chile has seen recurrent government budget surpluses that, for example, permitted the country to respond
to the 2008/9 world economic crisis which had badly affected its export-dependent economy with a domestic stimulus
program that will not unduly burden the country’s medium-term position. In fact, since 2001 Chile has adhered to an
explicit “structural fiscal rule,” codified into law in 2006, that requires the government to run a small annual budget
surplus over the business cycle. In this way, surpluses are accumulated during times of an expanding economy, to be used
to prop up falling domestic demand during contraction, as in 2009.
Foreign direct investment is high, albeit focused on the extractive and utilities fields and often in the form of
acquisitions of existing assets rather than the financing of new capital formation. Despite continuous, rapid growth,
population-wide educational achievements are lacking, and income inequality and poverty rates still are high. The
country will need to manage a transition to a more broad-based and inclusive social and economic policy framework.
As regards monetary policy, the central bank is independent, the currency floats freely on the world market, and
interest policy is handled flexibly in light of economy-wide needs. There are no restrictions on foreign investors bringing
funds in or repatriating profits. Consumer inflation is targeting at around 3 percent and generally held there (apart from
exceptional periods, such as the 2008/9 crisis). All in all, Chile has made good policy choices, combined with consistent
implementation.
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Chapter 4: The global economy: international trade and finance
Section 4.1 deals with the accounting mechanics of recording the value of trade and financial flows. Other sections deal
with some of the relevant international trade and finance institutions, policies, and issues (4.2 to 4.5). Section 4.6
concludes the chapter with two case studies.
4.1 The balance of payments
Ordinarily divided into two parts—the current account and the financial and capital account—the balance of
payments (BoP) is an accounting framework that states use to track the monetary value of the import and export of goods
and services as well as to track the corresponding financial flows. In essence, the BoP is a giant checkbook recording
debit and credit entries for outgoing and incoming payments. It is best to learn about the mechanics by looking at an
example. Thus Table 4.1 reports BoP data for El Salvador for 2005. It is important to bear in mind that because it is the
payments balance for El Salvador, all monetary entries are in terms of its currency. But as noted in chapter 3, El Salvador
happens to have adopted the U.S. dollar as its own currency. Thus, the BoP entries are in U.S. dollars.
The merchandise entry in line 1.1 in
Table 4.1 records the dollar value of the
inflow and outflow of tangible, physical
goods into and out of El Salvador. When
exports leave the country, corresponding
payments flow into the country. Thus,
foreign purchasers of El Salvadorean
goods first have to demand dollars on the
foreign exchange market and the dollars
thus acquired then flow into El Salvador.
This is treated as a credit item in its
“checkbook,” hence the plus sign.
Conversely, when El Salvador imports
machine tools from Germany, dollars
flow out of El Salvador to the foreign
exchange markets to be converted into
euros to pay the suppliers. Thus, the BoP
treats this as a debit entry, with a minus
sign (dollar outflow) attached. As may be
seen in Table 4.1, for 2005 there was a
USD3 billion net outflow related to
merchandise trade.
Trade in intangible items is referred to as services and are recorded in line 1.2. For example, the dollar value of
insurance and transportation services bought abroad by Salvadorean firms is recorded here. Likewise, services for tourists
(who bring in dollars) would be recorded in this line item. In 2005, the net effect of service trade amounted to minus
USD82 million, the payments for which are dollar outflows (negative sign in the BoP). Firms and people in El Salvador
also make short-term overseas loans (of less than one year maturity) and take up such loans. The interest received (+ sign)
or paid (- sign) is recorded as income (line 1.3). For 2005, the net effect was -USD571 million. The positive and negative
entries for unilateral transfers also are netted out already. These resulted in a net inflow of dollars of USD2,865 million
in 2005 (about 17 percent of GDP that year), mostly from Salvadoreans who work abroad and sent money back home
to their families. Since the transaction takes place without a direct counter-transaction, the term unilateral (one-sided)
transfer is used.
When all the pluses and minuses in the current account are summed up, the net result for 2005 was an outflow of
dollars of USD894 million—as seen in the last numerical column of the Table—or about USD3.4 million per working
day.
Foreign recipients must recycle this overhang of dollars in some way. Some quantity of dollars is used for the illegal
trade, of narcotics for example, and dollars are also employed to conduct trade in the world energy markets but for the
Table 4.1: Balance of Payments, El Salvador, 2005 (USD millions)
Item Credit/exports Debit/imports Balance
USD-inflow (+) USD-outflow (-)
USD-demand USD-supply
1. Current account -893
1.1 Merchandise +3,429 -6,534
1.2 Services (net) -     82
1.3 Income (net) -   571
1.4 Unilateral transfers (net) +2,865
2. Financial and capital account +947
2.1 Capital transfers (net) +     94
2.2 Public sector (net) +   329
2.3 Private sector (net) +   470
2.4 Change in net reserves (- = increase) +     59
2.5 Other -       5
3. Statistical discrepancy -      54 -  54
4. Balance [should be zero] +7,246 -7,246 ±   0
Source: Adapted from IMF (2009b); adjusted for rounding errors.
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German producer selling machine tools to El Salvador there really are only two options. The first option is to keep the
earned dollars and invest them in El Salvador, for example to build up a local distribution network, so that the outflow
and inflow of dollars, even though separately recorded, cancels out. The second option is to sell the earned dollars (for
euros) to whoever wants to buy them. The potential buyers include commercial and central banks. Thus, the ownership
of the dollars is transferred from one party to another. But it does not make much sense for a commercial or a central
bank just to buy dollars and hold them. The purpose is to invest them, and the only sensible place to invest them is in
or via the financial markets where the funds come from and where they can earn interest. In the end, therefore, the money
the machine tool producer earns flows back to El Salvador (albeit with a change in ownership).49
The financial and capital account records the net flow-back of dollars via private and official channels. In 2005, this
amounted to USD947 million. Relative to the current account, the discrepancy in line 3 is USD54 million—often called
errors and omissions—so that in line 4 all the various plus and minus signs sum to zero. By definition, the balance of
payments must always sum to zero. (In spite of media and political usage to the contrary, there is no such thing as a
balance of payments surplus or deficit. There can be a current account surplus or deficit, and these must be balanced by
corresponding, canceling flows in the financial and capital account.) Economists are not worried about the existence of
a statistical discrepancy so long as it is (1) sometimes positive and sometimes negative over the years (suggesting random
fluctuations) and (2) small relative to the sum total of currency inflows and outflows. For 2005, in El Salvador the sum
of inflows and outflows amounted to about USD14,5000 million, so that the error of USD54 million is very small indeed.
As to some of the specific items in the finance and capital account (line 2), the public sector entry for example
largely reflects foreign aid inflows (grants). The private sector entry reflects inflows of dollars when foreign companies
buy up companies in El Salvador (in the commercial banking sector for example). The change in net reserves refers to
foreign exchange holdings of the central bank. When it sells dollars to acquire, say, euros, dollars flow out (minus sign)
but the central bank’s holdings of euros increase. Thus—counter-intuitive but entirely logical within the BoP
framework—an increase in holdings of foreign currency is reflected with a minus sign. Conversely, a decrease of foreign
currency holdings is reflected with a plus sign, as was the case in 2005.
As regards war, civil war, and crime, balance of payments effects can show up in a variety of accounts and sub-
accounts. Needless to say, with porous borders and cash, much legal and illegal activity will simply not be captured in
the accounting at all. The importance of remittances and foreign aid, both important consequences of the country’s 1979-
1991 civil war, was already hinted at. We take up some of the violence-related issues pertaining to trade and finance as
reflected in the BoP in the next two sections.
4.2 Violence and international trade
THE BENEFITS OF TRADE. No one doubts the importance of trade within countries. For example, crossing political borders
when trade takes place between the states of New York and California in the United States raises no economic problem
at all. Likewise, the existence of nation-state political borders between the United States and Canada and between the
United States and Mexico raises no economic problems. So long as trade is voluntary, it is mutually beneficial. (If it were
not mutually beneficial, people would not trade voluntarily.) Although its benefits are not necessarily shared equally
between trading parties, and although some economic actors may select from a larger range of trading options than other
economic agents, it is nonetheless true that from the bazaars of Asia to the village markets of Africa and the roadside
stalls of Latin America, people intuitively understand the benefits of trade. Trade—local and long-distance—is as old
as humanity. To enhance their own productivity, most people use their labor power to specialize in only one or at most
a very few economic activities in which they produce a surplus, to be traded against the surpluses that others produce.
Today, virtually no one is entirely self-sufficient anymore. Both for those who have attained a modern, high standard of
living, as well as for those who aspire to it, incessant, extensive, and dense trade is a universal necessity.
DETERM INANTS OF TRADE. Prior to the invention of modern national borders—an invention barely 200 years old;
modern European borders for example were made firm not even 150 years ago and, with the development of the
European Union, are already breaking down again—the borders that mattered were primarily geographical, not political.
What mattered were benefits and costs, in particular production, communication, and transportation costs. Geography
bestows production cost advantages and disadvantages with regard to the distribution of natural resources and of land-,
freshwater-, and sea-dependent production possibilities (e.g., agronomy, aquiculture, raw material extraction, oceanic
fishing, and sea-based raw materials). Put simply, it is unwise to try to produce tropical fruit north of the Arctic Circle
or grow lettuce in the Sahel. In addition, geography helps determine transportation costs. It is no surprise that immediate
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neighbors trade at higher volumes with each other than they do with more distant partners, where distance includes
considerations of topography (mountainous regions being more costly to leave and reach than flat terrain). Globalization
is about spatial reach, and thus primarily a function of communication and transportation costs (along with rule of law
to enforce property and contracts).
Emerging and developing economies still rely on trade in raw materials and agricultural products and increasingly
also on remittances from migrant workers (e.g., Filipino nurses, Bangladeshi oil-field workers, or Mexican farmhands).
As a rule, too, conflict-affected states will need to rebuild and develop their infrastructure capacity, especially roads and
sea- and airports, to facilitate internal and external trade, and revamp their institutional capacity to knowledgeably,
effectively, and efficiently reintegrate into the world trading system and deal with a host of issues, including tariffs and
customs, special economic zones, overmuch dependency on sectors such as mining, and terms of trade.
Statistics from the World Trade Organization (WTO) reveal two important facts. One is that international
merchandise trade is dominated by neighborhood effects (intra-regional trade) and this, in turn, is highly correlated to
transport infrastructure. The other is that world trade in manufactured items has grown much faster than trade in fuels
and mining products which, in turn, have grown slightly faster than trade in agricultural products.  Both these facts speak50
against infrastructure-poor, skill-poor, landlocked, conflict-affected states. Transportation services, especially tourism,
have also grown hugely. And tourism, itself, is one of the largest industries in the world. For obvious reasons, dangerous
locations attract little such trade even if the infrastructure is in place to host overseas visitors. Thus, transportation and
safety go together, and it is probably no accident that terror organizations for example strike tourist-related targets so
frequently (e.g., New York, London, Madrid, Bali, Egypt).
A  NATURAL RESOURCE “CURSE”? In a 2008 report, the African Development Bank (AfDB) distinguished between
(1) risk factors that may predispose a community or state to experience large-scale violence and (2) triggers that may
release latent violence. The risk factors are the presence of natural resources; low income; low economic growth; ethnic
antagonisms; neighborhood effects and external instigation of armed conflict; geography and large populations; a youth
bulge, especially proportionally very large numbers of men between 15 to 29 years of age; political repression and
corruption; competition for scarce resources; inequality; religious extremism; flawed or incomplete transition to
democracy; high military expenditure and large armies; diasporas; colonialism and superpower rivalries; and the
existence of previous conflicts.  Triggers include the attainment of political independence or statehood, regime change,51
and military coups; elections; neighboring conflicts; and other dramatic events. By themselves, none of these guarantee
the outbreak of violence of course. For instance, Botswana is blessed with the presence of natural resource-wealth
without having experienced large-scale violence in spite of achieving statehood, holding contested elections, and having
large, violence-prone neighbors (Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe). Instead, the risk factors and triggers are
extracted from comparative, cross-country statistical work but with the now firm (and always firm) understanding that
the local historical context and the quality of policy- and decisionmaking matters.
Nonetheless, in specific cases, the availability of high-value, stationary natural resources has encouraged capture,
especially when, for example with the end of the Cold War, external financing for contesting parties dried up. As pointed
out in chapter 1, the relevant equation is simple: no money, no war. When external financing fails (e.g., state sponsorship,
diaspora financing), internal sources need to be accessed. This includes illegal harvesting of tropical timbers, diamond
and other mining, or illicitly raising and selling crops with narcotic properties. Crime networks that trade in banned
substances (e.g., chlorofluorocarbons) or endangered species, that engage in arms smuggling, money laundering, and
human trafficking are probably very large in monetary terms. While in traditional state-on-state war, armed violence has
disrupted trade and the benefits of trade,  in the post-Cold War era, consumers in advanced economies are complicit52
in violence in so far as the financing of organized crime and collective violence depends on global distribution and
consumption networks and trade opportunities.  Efforts by global nongovernmental organizations to create voluntary53
regulatory frameworks, most famously the instigation by the London-based group Global Witness of what became the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), to impede the trade in conflict goods themselves are liable to be taken
hostage to vested interests. Thus, it has been argued that KPCS has evolved into a producer and distributor cartel where
violence-prone states such as India, Indonesia, Israel, and Zimbabwe were and are members in good standing, while a
reformed, post-Charles Taylor Liberia for many years was not.54
TRADE IM PEDIM ENTS. Establishing, or reestablishing, welfare-enhancing legitimate trade is important. Constructing,
reconstructing, and upgrading trade-related physical infrastructure, streamlining border- and customs procedures,
reducing or eliminating im/export taxes, pursuing trade opportunities especially with immediate neighbors to generate
regional trade multiplier effects is crucial for economic growth within and across political jurisdictions. But global trade
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is biased against economically developing states. As mentioned previously, compared to official development assistance
(ODA) of about USD100 billion in 2006,  global workers’ remittances of USD300 billion in 2006  and foreign direct55 56
investments of over USD1,000 billion  are very large. Truly opening global markets probably would have an even larger57
impact. Dollar values of trade distortion policies are extremely complex to compute. But for a sample of 22 advanced
economies, for 1998 to 2002, the value of trade distorting subsidies alone was estimated at 1.5 percent of their GDPs.
Agricultural producer support estimates (PSEs) amounted to USD280 billion in 2004 for the OECD countries—three
times the value of ODA—and estimates for the average level of United States’ agricultural subsidies between 1995 and
2001 run between USD14 billion to USD66 billion. EU-15 agricultural subsidies run into the tens of billions of euros
as well.  If these were eliminated, the benefits would not accrue solely to developing states—let alone solely to postwar58
developing states—but a substantial portion would benefit them. In a word, the value of trade impediments is much
higher than the value of aid made available to postwar states. The blame for the substantial risk of war-renewal on
account of lack of economic growth (between 25 and 50 percent) thus lies in part with the protectionist policies of
advanced economies.  Inasmuch as peace negotiations among conflicting parties in emerging and developing states59
frequently involve participation by advanced economies, raising the issue of negotiating unrestrained access to global
markets may be helpful.
4.3 Violence and international finance
As for the previous sections, this section begins with some of the mechanics of international finance before moving to
dysfunctionalities and problems related to conflict-affected states.
EXCHANGE RATES. Like food and drink, household goods, and other ordinary items, most currencies can be bought
and sold on markets. The main economic purpose of trading currency is to facilitate the exchange of trade and services
across currency boundaries. For example, a French tourist traveling to South Africa will need to supply euros in exchange
for rand, the South African currency. Thus, the supply of euros (EUR) increases; simultaneously, so does the demand
for rand (ZAR). If the original exchange rate was ZAR12/EUR1 (or, taking the inverse, EUR0.083/ZAR1), then the extra
supply of euros drives down its price so that its value drops. Now South Africans have to pay, say, only ZAR10/EUR1.0.
Conversely, Europeans have to pay more euros per rand: EUR0.1/ZAR1.0. From South Africa’s view, the consequence
of the extra French tourist is that European goods become cheaper (one euro worth of European products now costs
South Africa only 10 rand, instead of 12). Relative to each other, the euro depreciates in value as the rand appreciates.
The complementary effect is that South African products become more expensive for Europeans, so that South African
firms have a harder time selling products for export.60
In terms of the macroeconomic framework introduced in chapter 3, an appreciating currency diminishes exports (X)
and encourages imports (M), so that the net effect of (X-M) results in a smaller trade surplus (or a larger trade deficit)
which, in turn, leads to declining aggregate demand and therefore to reduced economic growth and declining
employment. Of course, one needs to keep in mind that the extra French tourist stimulates the local economy through
demand for local accommodation, food, transportation, and so on. In essence, currency appreciation or depreciation
fosters a restructuring of the domestic economy, a tradeoff in other words between and among economic sectors that
stand to gain or to lose from currency fluctuations.
As a rule, most countries, however, favor a strong or high-value, appreciating currency. The reasons for this are at
least two-fold. First, if South Africa can access European goods for ZAR10/EUR1 then that is obviously cheaper than
to pay ZAR12 per euro’s worth of European product. Cheaper imports evidently benefit South African consumers and
importers of intermediate goods needed for production of goods and services and this tends to put a lid on consumer and
producer price inflation. But cheaper imports potentially also threaten domestic producers’ markets. The second reason
why a high-value or appreciating currency can be desirable is because it will then compel domestic producers to become
more efficient to defend (or regain) their domestic market despite import threats. A government that artificially cheapens
its currency in effect subsidizes local producers, giving them the message that production efficiencies are not desired.
To deal with short-term exigencies this may be politically (and even economically) acceptable, but not as a long- or even
medium-term strategy. After all, economic growth—an important message of chapters 1, 2, and 3—depends on growing
investment and growing productivity. To undermine this process is self-defeating.
EXCHANGE RATE REGIM ES. The currency appreciation/depreciation mechanism just described requires that two
currency regions maintain a flexible exchange rate regime toward each other whereby a currency’s value is determined
primarily by the market rather than by monetary authorities. These authorities—the central bank but sometimes the
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ministry of finance or another government agency—can participate in the selling and buying of currencies and thus
influence the market but this tends to be done to deal only with unusually large movements in currency values. Currency
market intervention can also be done on a routine basis—called a managed float—in order to transition a particular
currency from one exchange rate position to another more smoothly than the private market might do. In the extreme,
governments can appear as buyers or sellers of their own currency with such regularity that in effect a fixed exchange
rate regime results (at least within a narrow, desired band).  This amounts to an implicit price control and, despite61
notable exceptions—e.g., Denmark and Venezuela—is primarily used by fairly small island economies.
In the popular press, the impression is often given that flexible exchange rates are, somehow, “good,” and fixed
exchange rates are “bad.” This can be true, but so can the opposite: a flexible exchange rate regime can promote
instability, just as a fixed exchange rate regime can fulfill macroeconomic stabilization functions. Much depends on the
specific circumstances of the case. For example, if the government of a war-torn or postwar state (or any state, for that
matter) decides to peg its currency to the euro or another widely traded, stable currency (e.g., Kosovo, Timor L’este, El
Salvador) it hands monetary policy to the country whose currency it adopts. For example, if a large amount of aid
denominated in euros is made available, it would be exchanged at a fixed rate and spent domestically. Adopting a foreign
currency as one’s own or stipulating a fixed-exchange rate thus amounts to the same thing: for all practical purposes, a
currency union is created. The domestic currency cannot appreciate and neither undermine export prospects nor
artificially cheapen imports. A credible fixed exchange rate policy provides a guarantee to foreign investors that private
monies put into the country can be extracted again at an a priori known rate. Nonetheless, exchange rates that fail to keep
pace with the changing conditions of the underlying economies themselves can become a source of macroeconomic
instability. For example, after World War II, a system of fixed exchange rates was agreed among the world’s major
economies, and while successful for the period of reconstruction, the system collapsed spectacularly in 1971. Europe
and Japan had recovered from the war and had rebuilt their economies. As their productivity improved—and as
productivity improved at different rates within Europe—more competitive product pricing on the world market became
possible. Adherence to a fixed exchange rate system under these conditions became unduly burdensome. It was like
saying that an hour’s worth of work must always be exchanged for the same hourly compensation, regardless of the
worker’s productivity.
COLONIAL-ERA CURRENCY UNIONS. The currencies of 12 states of the former French colonial empire in Central and
West Africa are still tied to France (through the Central African CFA franc, XAF, and the West African CFA franc,
XOF), which were fixed to the former French franc and now are fixed to the euro.  Created in 1945, post-World War62
II, the CFA has been devalued repeatedly, either relative to the French franc, or with the French franc against other
currencies. Nonetheless, it has been argued that on the whole the CFA value was set so high as to subsidize European
imports for African urban elites and penalize agro-export dependent farmers who lost market share and employment and
income opportunities when importers switched to have their needs supplied from farmers elsewhere in the world. It is
unrealistic to believe, for example, that Côte d’Ivoire or Cameroon—major cacao producers—can effectively compete
with Ghana or Nigeria (or Brazil or Indonesia, for that matter, to round out the list of the world’s top-six producers) when
their exchange rates cannot adjust. In effect, the CFA countries should produce and sell more cacao but an artificially
high CFA value induces importers to demand and purchase more from non-CFA countries. Thus, production structures
are distorted all around the world.  The connection to lack of employment and economic growth—and therefore to the63
lack of peace—becomes evident.
FOREIGN CAPITAL FLOW S. Among other things, a flexible exchange rate regime implies that large amounts of foreign
aid, including wages and salaries of aid workers, and remittances of migrants’ overseas earnings increases the demand
for the local currency, leading to its appreciation and making it more difficult for a conflict-affected state to export
products to earn the foreign exchange required to purchase needed imports, even as it makes it cheaper to import
products that compete with local production and hence with local employment and economic growth. The consequent
slack in domestic aggregate demand reduces price pressures and tends to hold inflation down, an important, welcome
side-effect. But as the primary need is to rebuild productive economic activity, governments often resort to debt-financed
government projects. The combined effect can be the crowding out of private by publicly-financed economic activity,
large government budget deficits, and balance of payment difficulties. Fear of such an unsustainable economic strategy
was the very reason for the IMF’s erstwhile harsh, mandated policies of bringing government finances under
control—through spending cuts—even if this damaged the achievement of domestic social objectives, production,
employment, and growth. This sort of painful structural adjustment can encourage eventual foreign direct investment
(FDI) but if this takes too long to take effect, the social pain can lead to resumption of violent conflict. It is worth
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observing that in the immediate postwar period, the likelihood of large private capital inflows is low at any rate, as
potential investors wait to see how policy and the economic environment develop. What inflows there are will most likely
be speculative money that can increase the exchange rate but create little productive capacity. Longer-term investment
prospects are influenced by making profitable investments, which is influenced by the probabilities of social and political
peace. For the IMF to drive an overly harsh bargain to compel macroeconomic stability at the risk of relapse into armed
conflict will not attract investors. As mentioned (section 2.3), the IMF recognized this point by the late 1990s and now
is more discriminating in its policy recommendations and the design of its aid packages.
CHOOSING A REGIM E. No one exchange rate regime is always appropriate; the choice of regime must be based on
observant pragmatism, not on dogmatic adherence to a rule. In practice, different conflict-affected states have chosen
different avenues, from dollarization (i.e., the adoption of another state’s currency), to dual-currency systems, to flexible
rates, to interventionist managed floats. The presence or absence of currency black markets usually is a good indicator
of whether undue policy is followed. Likewise, large speculative currency flows—betting for or against a particular
currency—can indicate that policy adjustments may be needed.
V IOLENCE AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL M ARKETS. Beyond these general mechanics and considerations, there are two
specific causal connections between violence and exchange rate movements. One causal link goes from exchange rate
fluctuations to violence; the other goes in the opposition direction. Perhaps the best-known case is that of the 1997 East
Asian financial crisis where vast speculative currency movements destabilized entire economies, especially in Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea. In short, suppose that the exchange rate of the Thai baht (THB)
to the U.S. dollar (USD) is THB10/USD1 and also that currency speculators expect that the rate will change to
THB20/USD1. A dollar bought by selling ten baht can thus be sold again for twenty baht—if the speculatory expectation
comes true. Of course, if very many speculators start selling baht to snap up dollars cheaply, then the very act of
concerted baht-selling drives it down in value. The expectation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, and the baht collapses.
(If the expectations turn out to be wrong, it is the speculators who lose money. There is a real business risk involved.)
The problem lies not so much in currency depreciation or appreciation per se, but in the rapidity of the changes. Thus,
a speculatory attack that drives the baht down in value increases for example the cost of needed imports. While the
depreciation should correspondingly make tourist visits and exports cheaper, economies do not adjust that quickly to
reallocate labor and production resources on the turn of a dime. To deal with the extraordinary harm that can be done
by the divergence between the physical economy and the financial economy, governments sometimes try to countermand
currency movements. In the case of the Thai baht for instance this meant to meet the speculative selling of baht by
buying them—with dollars from the central bank’s foreign currency holdings. But this meant that these holdings—needed
to pay for imports—were being depleted. When the coffers are depleted, the currency defense has to be abandoned and
the currency and, with it, the domestic economy collapses.
One question is then why speculators attack a currency in the first place. Why do they form expectations about a
currency, one way or another? In the case of Thailand the view developed that the country had taken on too much  real-
estate related, U.S. dollar-denominated debt. At the time, the actual exchange was a fixed rate of THB25/USD1. In the
belief that this fixed rate could not be maintained, speculators sold baht and bought dollars. The speculators were correct:
the Thai government did not—could not—defend its currency indefinitely as it ran down its nearly USD50 billion dollar
reserves. The currency was floated and eventually dropped to less than half its pre-crisis value, to THB56/USD1. (It has
recovered since.) The IMF poured in billions of dollars in loans to the Thai government, putting “real money on the
table” to play against the speculators which then left the currency alone because, in principle, the IMF pockets are very
deep and the stakes can be raised. Speculators are not in business to lose money. But the damage was done. With the
collapse of its dollar-pegged currency in July 1997, a vast financial and economic collapse followed, unleashing political
tensions—and here is the connection of the potential for violence—that have not subsided to this day. The Thai
government collapsed, a new constitution—although long in preparation—was introduced in October 1997, but then
abrogated during a military coup in 2006.
In Malaysia, a vast economic crisis ensued within days of the Thai currency crisis. This resulted in a nasty political
struggle over economic policy differences between Malaysia’s ruler and its finance minister, a struggle also not settled
to this day. While massive violence fortunately did not occur in the case of Thailand, nor in the case of Malaysia, the
related currency collapse in Indonesia was directly associated with the end of the Suharto regime in 1998 and the
beginning of the violent secession of Timor L’este (East Timor) in 1999 and the atrocious civil war that followed there
and elsewhere, for example, in Aceh.
The opposite causation—from violence and war to currency collapse—has already been noted on several occasions,
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for example, in Zimbabwe but also in Germany following the failure to reconstitute its economy post-World War I. Even
for the less spectacularly catastrophic cases of the post-WW II U.S. wars in Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Iraq
and Afghanistan, the value of its currency—and with it, the economic effects via foreign trade on the domestic
economy—appears to suffers regularly with the onset and conduct of war.  Financial historians point to the development64
of the domestic and global bond market as intricately linked to the need to finance war.  To finance war-related65
spending, governments can cut nonwar spending or print money, which is inflationary. Neither option is attractive and,
in quick-thinking democracies at least, voters will not like either of these routes of action. Alternatively, governments
can sell war bonds, borrowing money domestically. Voters gamble, in essence betting their savings that their government
will win the war and eventually be able to repay the borrowed funds with interest. War bonds are financial votes of
confidence, or lack thereof. But governments can also raise bond money from abroad. In the case of the United States
and its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s, this money largely—and ironically—comes from China. The
mechanism is that the United States is running a very large trade deficit with China, and the dollars that China thus earns
are plowed back into the U.S. financial markets from which the U.S. government borrows to plug its gaping federal
government budget deficit. Much of China’s dollar reserves are held in sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). If China were
to decide to sell off its massive dollar-holdings, the U.S. currency would be equally massively devalued. This danger is
countered only by China’s self-interested desire not to undermine the value of these holdings. Like private business
speculators, there is no reason why it would want to lose money. But even an orderly unloading of dollars, a shift by
China into currency holdings other than U.S. dollars, would still put downward pressure on the dollar—and upward
pressure on the currencies into which China would substitute.
4.4 Institutions and policies
A brief overview of IMF and World Bank policy history was provided in chapter 3; aid policy was addressed in chapter
3 as well. Here, the focus is placed on a sampling of global trade and finance institutions, public and private (formal and
informal), and their relation to conflict potential or conflict resolution. Formed in 1995 and headquartered in Geneva,
Switzerland, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international organization composed of member states that have
signed and ratified various legally binding agreements regarding their conduct in the international trade of goods and
services and the protection of intellectual property rights. The WTO administers extant trade agreements, serves as a
forum for trade negotiations, operates a well-used dispute settlement mechanism (over 300 cases in its first 10 years of
existence), reviews members’ trade policies, and provides technical assistance and support to emerging and developing
economies. By mid-July 2008, 153 states were members; about 30 more were negotiating accession. On its web site, the
WTO makes explicit reference to negotiation and peaceful dispute resolution to reduce the risk of “military conflict.”66
To promote trade while extricating themselves from their own overly complex laws, rules, and regulations, many
states have set up special economic zones (SEZs), or export processing or free trade zones (EPZs; FTZs). These amount
to economic experiments and are location or product or industry specific. Forms of governance range from fully public
to fully private and any mix in-between. Shenzhen, in China, and Subic Bay, in the Philippines, are prominent examples.
Many countries have multiple such zones, India in particular. Inasmuch as the establishment of an SEZ requires the
acquisition of special physical sites and the construction of appropriate transportation and other infrastructure, conflict,
including violent conflict, with local communities can emerge. A recent prominent case involved Tata Motors of India
which had planned to locate a production facility for its Nano automobile in the Singur SEZ. Disputes over land
acquisition, population displacement, fair land compensation, and other issues led Tata to abandon the project in late
2008 and to locate elsewhere in India.
A very different kind of institution is for example the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an attempt
to bring transparency and accountability to the billions of dollars generated in the global trade of raw materials extracted
from Earth. This stemmed, in part, from a publish-what-you-pay campaign that sought to compel companies to publish
the sums paid to states for natural resource extraction (natural resource rents) so that government usage of these funds
could be tracked and corruption and fund mismanagement be reduced. This has led to related follow-on efforts, for
instance the development of a Natural Resource Charter—“a set of economic principles for governments and societies
on how to use the opportunities created by natural resources effectively for development”—which involves Ernesto
Zedillo, former president of Mexico and now an economics professor at Yale University, Michael Spence, an economics
Nobel laureate and professor at Stanford University, and Paul Collier, an economist at Oxford University and former
Director of Development Research at the World Bank.
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On the financial side, the Bank for International Settlement (BIS), headquartered in Basel, Switzerland, serves as
a bank for central banks. Formed in 1930, it describes itself as “the world’s oldest international financial organisation.”
Its original function was to collect, administer, and distribute reparation payments imposed on Germany with the Treaty
of Versailles following World War I. Since then, BIS has evolved into a statistics gathering, research, and policy
deliberation, advice, and coordination venue for central bankers. Nonetheless, because severe disarray in global financial
markets can lead to political and military conflict, and vice versa, BIS’s work is never very far from considerations of
the link or links between violence and economy. A search of the BIS web site for keywords such as war, crime, and
violence yields many references to research papers and, even more so, to policy speeches. A 2007 BIS working paper
shows the drastic, permanent economic dislocation caused by financial crises, wars, and civil wars.  Its authors find that67
the failure of emerging and developing economies to catch up with (or to converge to) advanced economies can be
wholly explained by the frequency and severity of such crises. The policy implication clearly relates to crisis prevention
or, at least, avoidance.
In the wake of the finance-induced global economic crisis of 2009, researchers and policymakers seek to reform the
global financial architecture—in part, in conjunction with the BIS—and, with it, to broaden global macroeconomic and
financial policy coordination. In the mid-1970s, at the invitation of the then-president of France, an informal gathering
of the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, soon joined by Canada,
evolved into an annual G7 economic policy coordination meeting. Later this was joined by Russia, the EU, and
representatives of international financial institutions. But in September 2009, at the Pittsburgh meeting, this was opened
up to the G20, a group that includes Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and others. It had become
clear enough that the economic heft of the G7 had shrunk in relative terms and that policy coordination required talk
among an expanded set of participants.
Because billions of people still have no access to banking services, informal financial networks are in fact extensive
(e.g., hawala). Because they are informal, they can and have been abused to move illicitly gained funds or funds intended
for illicit purposes. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), established as one outcome of the 1989 G7 meeting, is
an intergovernmental body, headquartered in Paris, “whose purpose is the development and promotion of national and
international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.” It has produced nearly 50 “recommendations”
that effectively serve as performance standards for its over 30 state members. Among other work, FATF published in
April 2009 an anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) Evaluations and Assessments
Handbook for Countries and Assessors. Assessment teams visit members and evaluate and assess compliance with the
FATF standards. The resulting reports are publicly available on the FATF web site.
Although FATF deals in part with informal and illegal money flows, many of its recommendations pertain to local,
national, and supranational laws, rules, and effective enforcement regarding commercial banking, and certainly the very
large global financial firms have directly and indirectly participated and cooperated in the formulation of FATF’s work.
In regard to global trade and financials flows, however, one of the challenges concerns how to deal with Fortune 500-
type, truly globe-spanning giant corporations that each employ hundreds of thousands and even millions of people in
virtually every state on Earth and the sum of whose intra-firm activity accounts for a large fraction of global trade and
financial flows. Complicity in, or at least insensitivity to, human rights abuses is both alleged and sometimes documented,
both for wholly private corporations as well as for state-run companies (e.g., Chinese companies in Africa). But on the
whole, companies and their suppliers, employees, and customers are victims of violence much more than they are
perpetrators. They much prefer to deal with single, universal standards, rather than with a multiplicity of standard setters,
standards, and costly audits. Indeed, businesses speak of audit fatigue as they try to comply with numerous mandatory
and voluntary standards, some local, some national, some global, issued by different agencies and authorities. In this
regard, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), in London, for example issues International Financial
Reporting Standard (IFRS). The objective of the body is to create global standards, globally followed and globally
enforced. Yet much of the business world is approaching the topics of peace and security solely from a risk- and liability
management perspective, rather than from a more engaged and forward-looking violence prevention and avoidance
perspective. Thus, the documented risk of civil war relapse for instance should encourage both peace negotiators and
the major corporations or councils of corporations such as a national Chambers of Commerce to talk with each other
before any peace deal is signed.
4.5 Policy lessons and tips
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Lesson 4.1: The effects of war, civil war, and crime do affect a country’s balance of payments, the value of its
currency, and its trade position, and therefore inflation, employment, and economic growth.
Lesson 4.2: Voluntary trade is mutually beneficial. This is as true within borders as across borders.
Lesson 4.3: Statistics from the World Trade Organization reveal two important facts. One is that international
merchandise trade is dominated by neighborhood effects (intra-regional trade) and this, in turn, is
highly correlated to transport infrastructure. The other is that world trade in manufactured items has
grown much faster than trade in fuels and mining products which, in turn, have grown slightly faster
than trade in agricultural products. Both facts speak against infrastructure-poor, skill-poor, landlocked,
conflict-affected states. Hence, shortcomings in these areas need to be rectified quickly.
Lesson 4.4: There is no natural resource curse per se. Nonetheless, failure to diversify can create undue, fragile
natural resource dependency and can also serve as a focal point of violent conflict to finance war.
Lesson 4.5: Foreign aid is small relative to workers’ remittances and foreign direct investment. Freeing global
trade from protectionism would release far more “aid” to conflict-affected states than does official
development assistance.
Lesson 4.6: There is no one right foreign exchange regime. But proper currency management is important to guard
against black currency markets or speculative currency attacks that can plunge states into episodes of
severe violence. Conversely, war adversely affects currency values and economic performance.
Lesson 4.7: The connections between violence and currencies, and currencies and violence are surprisingly
deep—from colonial-era currency unions to currency speculation and war bonds—and can carry both
decades-long lasting economic decline and bondage as well as explode with a suddenness and rapidity
against which there is virtually no defense other than foresight and preventive anticipation.
Lesson 4.8: Very many public, private, and public-private global organizations exist in the field of international
trade and finance. With the exception of the IMF and the World Bank, they have not, on the whole,
directly engaged with the topic of interpersonal and collective violence. They should be.
4.6 Failure and success: two case studies
Failure: Fiji
For nearly one hundred years, from 1874 until 1970, the United
Kingdom was Fiji’s colonial overlord. To work Fijian sugar
fields, Britain moved contract labor from another one of their
colonies, India, to Fiji. (By the early 2000s, over 40 percent of
the population was of Indian descent.) This planted the seeds of
post-independence ethnic-based strife on the islands. Two coups
in 1987 unseated recently elected ethnic-Indian dominated
governments. Subsequently, tens of thousands of Fijians of
Indian heritage emigrated, leaving the economy short of skilled
labor resources, adversely affecting labor productivity. The
political uncertainties resulting from the 1987 coups were not
settled until 1997. During this time period military expenditure
absorbed at times well over ten percent of the annual
government budget. Then, in 2000, another coup occurred,
which resulted in international economic and political penalties,
including the erection of trade barriers for this export-dependent
state. Exchange-rate (and price) controls further discouraged
trade and foreign direct investment as well. In 2005, unrest
arose again, resulting in yet another coup d’etat in 2006. Today,
uncertainties remain with regard to land-tenure and other issues and the political situation is ultimately unresolved. (The
coups periods are indicated with the three dashed vertical lines in Figure 1.)
Fiji’s economy is natural-resource based, mostly tourism, fisheries, forest products, commercial
agriculture—especially the export-dependent sugar cane sector—and some mining, notably of gold deposits. The
economy declined for about 10 years prior to the 1987 coups and is generally subject to sharp swings in performance
Figure 4.1: Population-, inflation-, and purchasing
power-adjusted GDP (base year = 2005); Fiji 1960-
2007; Vietnam: 1970-2007.
Source: Raw data from Penn World Table v6.3.
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(see Figure 1). Declining sugar prices, despite subsidies offered by the European Union, drastic fluctuations in tourist
revenues even when that sector is shored up with periodic currency devaluations aimed at the Australian and New
Zealand tourist markets, low and declining foreign direct investment, and continuous skilled labor emigration due to the
political stand-offs are the main factors explaining Fiji’s uninspiring economic performance in the 2000s. Neither the
fiscal nor monetary policy stance of the current government is sustainable. Annual budget deficits and cumulative debt
are very high and a much needed structural reform and diversification of the economy has not happened. Debasing the
currency to attract tourists and foster relatively low value-added exports instead of seeking currency stability and
investment in human and public and private physical capital to increase productivity has proved to be an inappropriate
and inadequate economic strategy.
Success: Vietnam
Vietnam, in contrast, has been much more economically stable and successful. The second Indochina war ended in 1976.
However, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978 and was itself briefly invaded by China in 1979, so that the war periods
(indicated by the shaded area in the Figure) did not end until that year. War of course had lasted for over a century, going
back to the 1860s to 1880s, when the country became a French plantation colony. Independence struggles, World Wars
I and II, and two follow-on wars lasted until 1976. By then, millions of people were injured or dead or, as for Fiji, had
left the country which led to a further depletion of skilled labor resources.
By 1980, when Vietnam’s wars had ended, political, economic, and cultural reunification proved difficult and led
to few economic advances. Fiji’s per capita GDP (I$5,000) was about five times as large as Vietnam’s (I$1,000). But
by 2007, the I$4,000 gap had been cut in half to about I$2,000. In 1986, Vietnam’s leadership—as in China
beforehand—approved the introduction of a socialist-oriented version of free market economics. Importantly, not only
did structural reform per se take place, but it took place in the context of economic diversification across agriculture,
industry, and services, making the country less vulnerable to shocks in any one sector. The end of the Cold War and
subsequent boom in globalization added its own, fortunate impetus. Coffee cultivation and exports grew, as did the
production and export of cashews, rice, black pepper, and other agricultural products. Even so, foreign direct investment
in low-skill manufacturing as well as in high-skill, high-technology fields has proved very attractive, sustained, and
successful, so that the share of agriculture in GDP has declined and that of industry has increased. Rural labor resources
migrate to urban centers where industrial development has been able to absorb them, at least in economic terms. More
recently, offshore oil exploration has commenced. Thus, even though heavily dependent on international trade and
finance, Vietnam has done much better in this regard than has Fiji.
Importantly, the 1997 East Asian financial crisis that devastated Indonesia, Thailand, and other states in the region
had little effect on Vietnam’s economy. Undoubtedly, as with the pre-democratic regimes in Hong Kong, Singapore,
South Korea, and Taiwan in the 1970s, political stability combined with an economic opening-up is a key factor
explaining the attraction of private business interests to Vietnam. Interestingly, across a range of global rankings, such
as competitiveness, human development, ease of doing business, economic freedom, perception of corruption, and other
indices, Vietnam does not rank high. This suggests that its economy is riding along a narrow channel of politically
facilitated trade opportunities that may not take an independent and sustainable hold. For example, by late 2007, about
40 percent of GDP was generated through state-owned enterprises (SOEs). While Vietnam’s leaders have done an
admirable job of controlled economic growth aimed at securing economic and social stability, as we have advised in this
Manual, a potential downside is that of inadvertently maneuvering into an economic corner where policy flexibility is
restricted to a set of unpalatable options.
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Chapter 5: Designing and promoting peace
“The end of war does not necessarily imply economic security, and there are risks. First, problems of micro
insecurity, with armed inhabitants desensitized to violence ... Second, macro insecurity, the considerable risk
that war will be resumed ... A third type of risk is the fiscal shocks resulting from the war to peace transition.”
(Dunne, 2006, p. 40).
“... of conflicts that have ended since 1989, those that ended in peace agreements have a considerably lower
rate of [war] recurrence (14 percent) than the overall rate of 47 percent. Conflicts that ended in outright victory
for one side had a recurrence rate of 45 percent, and all of those with an ambiguous ending recurred. This is
consistent with other findings which show that peace accords supported by the United Nations and generous
development assistance produce better outcomes than military victories alone” (UNDP, 2008, p. 17).
The estimates vary but war recurrence—or war after war—is common. On the order of one-fifth to one-half of all
concluded recent civil wars restart within a few years’ time. Recidivism is high. Risk factors for war recurrence that need
to be addressed in the design of peace include “low per capita income, weak economic growth, the presence of
socioeconomic horizontal inequalities and abundant high-value natural resources ... [even more so] in the presence of
high unemployment, especially among youth.” For example, horizontal inequality—inequality among culturally distinct
groups rather than within them—depends on “how inclusive the post-conflict political system is; whether or not conflict
itself has remedied such inequalities, as in the case of successful ethno-regional secession; whether or not previously
excluded or marginalized groups or regions have gained more equitable economic and political standing from peace
agreements and their implementation; whether prior injustices associated with real and perceived discrimination against
an aggrieved group are satisfactorily addressed; [and] how the dynamics of inter-group relations are affected by the
conditions of post-conflict peacebuilding and development.” Peace treaties therefore should do more than pay homage
to the free market and make reference to a sound, stable, public sector-enabled macroeconomic framework. These things
themselves need to be placed within a higher-order level of principles of institutional or treaty design, as addressed in
sections 5.1 and 5.2. Third-party intervention via diplomatic, military, or foreign aid channels is not always for the better:
third-parties have vested interests. How these interests are related to the higher-level design principles is briefly discussed
in section 5.3. As for the other chapters, the remaining three sections—5.4, 5.5, and 5.6—conclude the chapter with brief
considerations on institutions and policies, policy lessons and tips, and two brief case studies.68
5.1 The economics of design
Some fields of economics deal with societal institutions, their design, and their mechanics.  These have been employed69
for example to design revenue-maximizing auctions by which a government allocates portions of the electromagnetic
spectrum for use to competing cell phone and radio and TV-broadcast companies. Another example comes from thinking
about the design of default options. For instance, in the U.S. American retirement system most employees whose
companies offer retirement contribution benefits (defined contributions) have to opt into the retirement contribution
benefit plan. If they do, a portion of their bi-weekly or monthly income is placed into tax-advantaged stock, bond, real-
estate, or other funds of their choosing, as is an additional amount provided by the employer. If a specific employee does
not opt in, the paycheck is not reduced either. Neither does the employer contribute. As it turns out, under the opt in
requirement a surprisingly large percentage of employees fail to do so. As a consequence, they forgo the steady
accumulation of retirement savings, they forgo tax advantages, and they forgo contributions from their employers as well.
If, however, the design is changed so that employees must opt out, most employees again fail to do so. Simple inertia
or default options appear to explain people’s choice behavior: if they are not already in the retirement plan, they do not
do anything to join; conversely, if they are in the plan, they do nothing to leave it.70
In a similar way, one challenge of peace economics is to understand both peace failures and peace successes from
a design or structural perspective—what in the field of industrial organization is referred to as the structure, behavior,
performance triplet (or rules, strategies, and outcomes)—and to invent new mechanisms by which to arrive at the desired
outcome of stable peace within and between societies. Structure refers to the incentive system that produces choice
behavior in such a way that the system as a whole moves toward the desired outcome. For the retirement example, a
simple switch from opt-in to opt-out contract provisions changes choices (in this case through default behavior) and gets
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the desired outcome of more people saving for their retirement years.
Put this way, it becomes clear just why people, firms, parties, or vested interests in general jostle either to massage
the rules or to sidestep them altogether, and why influence-seeking, lobbying, bribery, and corruption (rent-seeking) are
so widespread. There is a powerfully compelling logic in the chain which, read backward, says that epiphenomena or
social outcomes are generated by aggregations of individual behaviors and that these, in turn, stem from the ground rules.
To understand that which is or to design that which is to be (peace, for instance), one must turn to the crux of the matter
and literally create or modify the rules under which choices are made. The difficulty lies not in understanding behavior
per se—natural and legal persons respond to incentives—but in understanding which rules and which combination of
rules lead to which behavioral responses by large numbers of interacting, self-interested parties and with which ultimate
outcomes. The difficulty lies in complexity, especially of social systems where experimentation is difficult or impossible
to carry out.
It may be argued that the history of humankind itself amounts to a set of giant natural experiments, that certain
lessons have been learned from politically, culturally, and economically successful societies emerging from these natural
experiments, and that these lessons amalgamate today into cries for democracy, the rule of law, and free markets
economics.  Even so, these are outcomes, and the quality of these outcomes varies across societies. The question is what71
are the structural differences that, in one case, produce high quality, long-lasting, and stable peace and, in the other case,
do not?  In a way, what we are searching for is a kind of market regulation, a setting-down of mutually agreed,72
enforceable rules by which society lives, a reconstruction of a social contract.
5.2 The economics of designing peace
From systems control theory, three requirements are known. There must be agreement on goals, there must be ways to
measure goal compliance or deviation, and there must exist a correction mechanism, resulting in another triplet: goals,
feedback, enforcement. It is also known that such a system can fail in various ways (e.g., there is no agreement on goals,
or there are no timely measurements, or resources are insufficient to undertake corrective action). Further, it is known
what types of institutions are necessary to prevent system failure (namely, those that foster goal agreement, those that
provide measurement, etc.) The problem lies in how to construct these institutions in the first place so that they fulfill
their intended function. In principle, private markets provide these institutions but it turns out that peacemaking and
peacekeeping are subject to severe market failure so that one needs to think about the construction of collective
institutions to deliver peace services. Evidently, these too can fail.
However, a number of rules of thumb-like design principles that should be followed in building such institutions are
available.  If followed, they should explain the successful making and keeping of peace. Conversely, their violation or73
absence should explain the continuance or recurrence of war. The principles should be viewed as a mutually reinforcing
package. Applying selected principles will diminish the prospects for peace.
THE PRINCIPLE OF CHANGING PAYOFFS. To induce people toward cooperate action, one must minimize incentives
to defect and maximize incentives to cooperate. A number of wars have been unnecessarily prolonged because the
incentives to defect from peace negotiations were large. For example, in Angola, UNITA’s ability to mine and sell raw
diamonds created cash flow. Similarly, the Angolan government’s ability to extract and sell crude oil kept it well-
financed. Both sides were flush with money and had no financial reason to settle. (This is in contrast to the Mozambican
case where both sides settled when they did run out of money. ) One way to change the payoffs would have been to74
contribute (or deny) superior military intelligence and arms to one side, thus changing the balance of force. Assuming
a benevolent intervener, this kind of third-party intervention would have changed the structure of the conflict so that side
A would have been forced to offer negotiation. If side B then did not reciprocate in a fair-minded fashion, the intervener
could have withdrawn to reimpose the cost of fighting on both parties.  (In practice the third-party will not always be75
neutral; see section 5.3.)
THE PRINCIPLE OF CREATING VESTED INTERESTS AND LEADERSHIP. If two players themselves are unable to change
the relevant payoffs, an external force (a leader) may need to intervene. A leader is an external actor able to organize
changes in the payoff structure and/or the rules of the game. But the intervention of a potential leader needs to be
rewarded with its own positive payoffs, for why else should a leader intervene?  This can be illustrated with the case76
of Rwanda in 1994 where little was done until after several hundred thousands people had been killed. There was no
sufficient vested interest to prevent the budding crisis—the war had been going on since 1990. A contrary example is
that of Haiti in the early 1990s. When large numbers of refugee arrived on Florida’s shores, the U.S. government was
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prompted to intervene because it had a vested interest in keeping people out of the United States. Similarly, in the Balkan
wars of the 1990s, the initial vested interest was to contain the slaughter within the Balkans. It was only when large
numbers of refugees did spill into the richer, western European nations, and when there was a danger of the conflicts
spreading throughout the neighborhood, that the EU—and ultimately NATO—intervened. Therefore, one way to foster
peace is to deliberately engineer or trigger preventive rather than curative vested interests.
THE PRINCIPLE OF GRADUATED RECIPROCITY AND CLARITY . Research has shown that a strategy called tit-for-tat can
be a highly successful and stable. It works as follows. Suppose there are two players, A and B. In the first interaction with
B, A will cooperate. Thereafter, A will always do what B did in the prior round of play. If B cooperates, so will A in the
next round. If B defects, so will A in the next round. For example, if party B to a conflict makes a concession, so will
A. If party B fails to make a follow-on concession, neither will A. One advantage of this strategy is its unmistakable
clarity and automaticity. This builds reputation effects and, consequently, credible commitments to cooperate, but also
credible threats to defect. There is no second-guessing about what A will do conditional on what B has done. Moreover,
the tit-for-tat strategy holds no grudge and forgives a past defection (non-cooperation) by B: party A readily resumes
cooperation once party B cooperates again. Although tit-for-tat is a forgiving strategy, if B misunderstands or mistrusts
A, there can be set in motion a series of rounds of mutual defection. Therefore, scholars recommend that A assume a
graduated response strategy and show limited provocability. This means that if B defects, so will A but by something
less than full defection. For example, if B fails to make a follow-on concession, A offers only a minor follow-on
concession. But if B continues to defect, then A will gradually move toward full defection also. Thus B loses all the
benefits to be had from cooperation.
THE PRINCIPLE OF REPEATED , SMALL STEPS. Breaking a problem into smaller parcels allows parties to interact with
one another repeatedly. Instead of a single, big peace negotiation, one may have to have many little ones. This increases
the frequency of meetings and lengthens the duration of the overall interaction. If any one small round can be driven to
a cooperative outcome, both sides risk losing gains already obtained and risk forfeiting future gains to be had if they fail
to continue to cooperate in subsequent rounds. The more the parties can be brought to see the ultimate goal by taking
small steps instead of giant leaps, the more likely it is that they will succeed. Contrast the lack of progress in the all-or-
nothing approach to the Israeli-Arab conflict with the formation and gradual expansion of what eventually became the
European Union. An intervener would need to be able convince or compel conflicting parties to engage in small talks.
THE PRINCIPLE OF COMM ON VALUE-FORM ATION . In a 1978 book of essays, Thomas Schelling reports on a game he
played with his children. Take a checker board, populate it with a random but thorough mix of black-colored and white-
colored play pieces, and leave a few squares empty so that the pieces can be moved. Then stipulate a rule, for example
that pieces like to be surrounded by some minimum percentage of same-colored pieces. That is, each piece has a
preference for some neighborhood mixing, just not to the extent that the neighborhood becomes nearly homogenous with
opposite-colored pieces. The percentage degree of unacceptable opposite-color homogeneity is determined by the rule.
Then let the pieces move to meet this condition. For each of a number of varying homogeneity-degrees, Schelling found
that after a series of moves to meet the rule, distinctly black and white neighborhoods develop. What appears to be forced
segregation may be the outcome of voluntary aggregation. Like and like attract each other but then also opposes the two
resulting groups.
If one can change the pieces’ preferences, say so that each piece thinks of itself as gray-colored, then any degree
of mixing is perfectly acceptable and any moves that do take place do so for reasons other than color (or identity). The
lesson is that one needs to find and foster that which binds conflicting parties rather than that which divides them.77
Formation of common preferences produce voluntary aggregations of like-minded actors who thus are more likely to
cooperate for mutual benefit. This applies to individuals, groups, and states, and can account for the proclamations of
former enemies who during negotiations learn that they share values such as leadership, political savvy, and care for their
respective citizens, and end up with personal respect for each other. This principle also explains why culturally similar
nations tend to cooperate well, disagreements notwithstanding. Similarities in political and economic systems, religious
beliefs, language, and cultural heritage do not guarantee but tend to forge reliable bonds across nation-states to form
clusters of cooperative behavior. Large group size (large numbers of conflicting parties) by itself will not necessarily
make collective action on common value-formation impossible; neither will small group size always promote it.
Examples of attempts at common value-formation are, in Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and, in Asia, ASEAN.
THE PRINCIPLE OF AUTHENTIC AUTHORITY . Those affected by collective action—negotiating a peace agreement
involves multiple people, and is therefore a collective rather private action—must have a voice in shaping the decision.
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This raises issues of authentic representation that vests authority in peace negotiators—and this form of representation
may or may not be western-style democracy—and includes items such as people’s right to organize and assemble, to
address and solve their own problems, and to search for and find indigenous solutions to what may be unique problems.78
In the absence of voice (authentic representation), peace may not be stable. Disaffected groups may continue to fight if
they believe that their concerns have not been heard, let alone addressed. To prevent disaffection and violent conflict,
majorities may need to grant minimum rights to others such as freedom to exercise one’s religion. Because of its focus
on representation, this principle allows for continuous self-transformation of institutions as old problems dissipate and
new problems arise that the affected communities need to address. All voices need to be heard, and satisfactory solutions
can be surprisingly varied.79
THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY . Global institutions can be inimical to achieving desired outcomes.  The principle80
of subsidiarity addresses this point. Subsidiarity means that problems be addressed at the minimum level necessary, and
that higher-level, external involvement not be the automatic first-response to a lower-level problem. Kick solutions “up,”
not “down.” Many conflicts are best resolved at the local level without involving an outside intervener. In case of internal
dissension, one would expect that the nation-state would have a vested interest in its own continued coherence and
viability as the nation-state. For example, in the case of the conflagration that followed the introduction of Islamic law
in some Nigerian provinces one can argue that Nigeria as a nation-state has the obligation to intervene in the provinces
before the conflict grows out of hand and leads to civil war. Only if and as a conflict in one province affects a community
beyond that province, should the next-larger level of the overall community become involved.
THE PRINCIPLE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION M ECHANISMS. Peacemaking and peacekeeping rest on agreements, but
disagreements over the agreements frequently arise and can lead to war-resumption. To keep disagreements from
escalating, the parties must have recourse to conflict resolution mechanisms such as mediation, arbitration, and a system
of courts. The absence of such mechanisms leads to weak peacekeeping and increases the likelihood of failure. Any peace
treaty would need to provide for speedy, low-cost access to dispute resolution venues. External interveners can help to
provide such mechanisms. One example is given by the legally binding treaty documents that make up the World Trade
Organization (see chapter 4). Explicit mention is made of its dispute-resolution mechanism as providing a forum to air
and settle differences when otherwise they might have resulted in recourse to harmful measures. The continuing exclusion
of Turkey from the EU and its institutions serve as a counter-example. Tensions between Greece and Turkey thus have
one less avenue of redress, moreover one that could be handled with the principles of common-value formation if Turkey
were to be an EU member.
THE PRINCIPLE OF INFORM ATION AND M ONITORING. Information reduces uncertainty, can help create shared values;
it leads to better forecasts of expected benefits and costs and therefore of behavioral choices. By the same token,
misinformation can create uncertainty, false certainty, division of values, and worse forecasts. Indeed, players may have
a vested interest in creating misinformation. The news industry can be of assistance to peacemaking and peacekeeping,
and maintenance of a diverse, free press is of great importance. Monitoring refers to the ability to collect, process, and
verify information. It is the ability to effectively monitor the actions of the other player. This requires funds and skills.
For example, on occasion, advanced, industrialized countries have shared results of their satellite monitoring with other
states. Such government monitoring is excludable. In contrast, commercial satellite networks could monitor and publicize
troop and equipment movements. It is in the commercial companies’ own interest to create a pricing structure that is
inclusive, so that relevant information can easily be bought and sold. This would encourage negotiation, given that wars
are more difficult to win when information about the sides’ strengths and movements is readily available. The objection
that this would help entrench repressive governments or help guerilla movements overthrow legitimate governments does
not hold when this principle is combined with other principles such as those of creating vested interests, authentic
authority, and accountability.
THE PRINCIPLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY . Information has the advantage of naming individuals responsible for war actions
and war crimes. Today, it is virtually impossible for leaders to remain anonymous in making war. W ith that comes
accountability before world opinion. But mere knowledge of who did what is not sufficient. Accountability implies
enforcement. A permanent International Criminal Court is better than the uncertainty involved in whether or not the U.N.
might create a special tribunal as violent conflicts erupt. A court involves the principles of information, reciprocity, and
clarity: any future war-maker knows ahead of time that he can be called to account for his actions.
Accountability has another aspect to it, one that links it to the authentic authority principle. One way to frustrate
peace negotiations and to prolong violence or war is to send junior officials (or to frequently change the negotiators) who
are not authorized to make credible, binding commitments. There must be insistence on continuity in representation
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precisely so that a small set of persons can be held accountable even for their actions in negotiations.
THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-POLICING ENFORCEM ENT. There are two types of enforcement, external policing and
self-policing. External policing suffers from various problems. For example, U.N. peacekeeping forces are financed on
a mission-by-mission basis and are often too late and too feeble to effectively intervene in conflicts as one U.N. member
waits on another member to commit troops or funds to the mission at hand. For these reasons, a self-policing enforcement
is preferable. Self-policing is linked to the monitoring and reciprocity principles. If monitoring shows that player B
defects, a self-policing agreement may induce player A to also defect and thereby withhold future gains from B. In this
regard, it is generally more efficient and effective to supply parties with the ability to monitor each other than to rely on
external monitoring. Exceptions occur when economies of scale (the nesting principle) make it worthwhile to outsource
at least part of the monitoring function.
THE PRINCIPLE OF NESTING. Economies of scale, of learning, and of scope may favor the nesting of institutions which
foster coordination and complementarities. The current U.N. system serves as an example of economies of scope as a
large variety of specialized functions are (generally loosely) organized under the auspices of a joint umbrella
organization. Peace negotiations are unlikely to show economies of scale—each case is different—but peacekeeping
likely would (common equipment, basing, lift capacity, emergency supply depots, etc., all are fixed costs). This suggests
the development of a standing global peacekeeping force utilizing, for example, private military companies that already
protect humanitarian aid workers. This might be combined with an automaticity principle that requires automatic
action—which may be an external intervention—when pre-specified trigger points are reached. For example, the
constitution of the African Union (AU) mandates that a non-democratic replacement of government of any of its member
states results in automatic membership suspension, and this mandate has in fact been applied.81
* * * * *
Rather than guaranteeing peace success, this list of twelve design principles helps prevent peace failure. No order of
priority has been proposed or found yet; indeed, the order of priority may be case specific. Several of the principles apply
to macroeconomics in conflict-affected states. For example, a fiscal policy that rewards constructive participation in
societal rebuilding rather than withholds benefits changes the payoffs for society’s members and also links to the common
value-formation principle; long-term rather than short-term aid creates external vested interests in successful peace
outcomes; separating functions of policy setting, fiscal disbursement, and service delivery goes with the principle of
subsidiarity (devolution of decisionmaking to the local level) and that of self-policing enforcement (through service
customers’ ability to complain to the disbursement agency which can then select an alternative supplier). It is important
for peace negotiators and aides to recognize that not only is the mere presence of references to (macro)economics in
peace treaties important but that these references themselves obey a higher-order set of principles based on economics.
As the UNDP (2008) study points out, some states experience relatively strong economic growth after the end of war,
but others do not. Much of the difference has to do with the quality of the decisionmaking and decision-implementing




Third-party intervention (e.g., via diplomatic, military, or foreign aid channels) is no straightforward thing. The ongoing
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (since 2001 and 2003, respectively) show that intervention, even if well-intentioned, can
make life worse for conflict-affected populations. Diplomatic involvement in the peace process can be vital. In some
cases military support is necessary just to bring the parties to the negotiating table and keep them there. In Sierra Leone,
the involvement of British armed forces was important in forcing rebel leaders to negotiate. As discussed, aid can also
be important, as may aid conditionality.83
Third parties are never just benevolent, however. They have interests and will bring these interest to bear: Cuba
intervened in Angola; the United States in Vietnam. They may be more supportive of one side than the other, may push
their own agenda in the negotiations, and may tie aid to their own interests. Forced negotiation can legitimize the ruling
positions of those who may have started armed conflict in the first place and marginalize civil society.  The quantitative84
academic literature on third-party intervention—theoretical and empirical—is only now beginning to flourish. A useful
distinction is that between unilateral third-party intervention and multilateral third-party intervention.
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A key insight here is that multilateral intervention requires solving its own collective action problem. The likelihood
is that only minimum levels of intervention will be agreed, perhaps too weak to assist the parties (and populations) in
conflict. In contrast, unilateral intervention does not require collective decisionmaking.  What, then, are its85
determinants? One author suggests eight relevant factors. First, there must be information that something is amiss, and
there are two aspects to this: ignorance and apathy. Without information (ignorance) about a neighbor in conflict, non-
conflict neighbors cannot do anything at all, and any humanitarian instinct that might exist cannot be activated. But even
with information, nothing might be done on account of incapacity (or apathy). Second, bothersome (i.e., costly) noise
that spills over to non-conflict neighbors is a form of information. For example, refugees moving from one state to
another impose costs on the recipient state (Afghans in Pakistan, for instance). The more noise, the more one might
expect neighbors to be willing to intervene in some fashion to help stop the refugee flow (as Pakistan does, at least in
the Afghan-Pakistani border regions). Third, one would expect that the less the distance, the more informed and caring
the neighbors are. Conversely, the more distant, the less informed or caring they are. Fourth, distance is mediated when
relations exist. Colonial ties or immigrant groups whose national origin lies in conflict countries will make the former
colonial power or the immigrant-host country more receptive to aid the conflict country (e.g., France regularly intervenes
in its now sovereign former West and Central African colonies). Fifth, the more the din from several neighbors, the more
one is distracted from any one of them and the less one is inclined or able to come to the assistance of any one of them.
Sixth, what would motivate one to come to a neighbor’s aid also depends on the noise at home. The more in number or
intensity are the domestic problems, the less one is willing or able to come to one’s neighbor’s rescue. Seventh, there
is economic and strategic self-interest such as the protection of trade routes or of obtaining international stature (e.g.,
being seen as engaging in peacekeeping actions). And eighth, for a small number of countries, a motivation for
intervention appears to be the opportunity for military (peacekeeping) training in real-time conditions.
Note that items like humanitarian good will are not among the determining factors; neither is cost. Peacekeeping
tends to be done for rather more hard-edged reasons. Take Canada as an example. It first burst onto the peacekeeping
scene in 1956, but it was to help the splintering NATO alliance that had been undermined when Washington told Paris
and London to get out of the Suez region. Likewise, in 1960, when Belgium threatened to pull out of NATO over the
unrest in Congo, Canada sent peacekeepers to that troubled African nation. The peacekeeping in Cyprus, to which
Canada contributed, was related to keeping NATO members Greece and Turkey at bay.  As to the cost of peacekeeping,86
despite protestations to the contrary, it is trivial—at least in relation to the cost of maintaining standing, national armies.
If nothing else, this list can serve as a rapid assessment checklist to evaluate the likelihood of whether third-party
state/s will or will not intervene to help create and guarantee the stability of peace, and to gauge the sincerity, and
therefore desirability, of accepting or not accepting offers of help.
5.4 Institutions and policies
In section 2.4, we suggested that any community consists of three societies; that commercial, civil, and political society
(or economics, culture, and politics) form a three-legged stool. Commercial society allocates resources via markets; civil
society allocates resources via moral suasion; and political society allocates resources via power. The 3-legged stool,
we wrote, should be well-balanced. This applies to peacemaking and peacekeeping as well. The peacekeeping-related
apparatus of political society includes institutions such as the United Nations (U.N.), the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, ASEAN, and ECOWAS and SADC (in western and south-central Africa) and
other institutions hiding behind other acronyms as well. The European and African Unions—respectively, the EU and
the AU—likewise are animals of political society: there are agreements among equal sovereigns to constrain each other
from doing overmuch harm.
Policies of these supranational institutions are constrained by the charters or founding articles members agree to.
The primary purpose of the United Nations as an international body is to prevent war from breaking out between states.
Even so, the United Nations in particular is constrained by the veto powers of the five permanent members of its Security
Council. As for internal armed conflict, U.N. action is mostly post-violence as there are no standing peacekeeping forces
and each mission is debated on a case-by-case basis and, if approved, time-limited in nature. Forces and funds for each
mission need to be separately found. Headquartered in Vienna, the OSCE (www.osce.org) is a regional security
organization under Article VIII of the U.N. Charter, with 56 member states (as of December 2009). It works on early
warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and postconflict rehabilitation. It is organized at the heads of state level,
convened for occasional summits, but hosts an annual meeting of foreign ministers. It comprises over 3,000 staff
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members and has 19 field offices, mostly in Southeast and Central Europe and Central Asia. A weekly Forum for Security
Cooperation is held, a talking shop for  issues pertaining to arms control and confidence- and security-building measures.
SADC is the Southern African Development Community (www.sadc.int) and has 15 members, as does ECOWAS,
the Economic Community of West African States (www.ecowas.int). Ostensibly economic development organizations
organized at the political level—in contrast say to the African Development Bank which is a regional development
finance body—SADC and ECOWAS both have peace and security-related functions and organs. For instance, SADC,
whose origins go back to 1980 and is headquartered in Gaborane, Botswana, has an Organ on Politics, Defence and
Security that comprises Political and Diplomatic Affairs; Defence; Security; and a Regional Peacekeeping Training
Center. ECOWAS, with roots going back to 1975, has a peace and security function as well, and is institutionally run
through a Commission, a Community Parliament, a Court of Justice, and an investment and development bank.
In Asia, ASEAN is the primary regional body of interest (www.aseansec.org). Headquartered in Jakarta, Indonesia,
it now has ten members and sees itself as a political security, economic, and cultural development organization. Formed
by five members in 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, it has recently been reorganized and is based on a new Charter, entered
into force on 15 December 2008. The new charter provides for the first time legal status and an institutional framework
for ASEAN and its work. A related organization is the ASEAN Regional Forum (www.aseanregionalforum.org) which
includes regional, non-ASEAN states. Its two-fold purpose is “to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on
political and security issues of common interest and concern; and to make significant contributions to efforts towards
confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region” (quoted from the web site).
Note that all these organizations recognize that economics, politics (peace and security), and culture are related and
linked. But as inter-state organizations they usually do not and cannot do much about civil strife within member states.
This limitation does not apply to civil society organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
and numerous other nongovernmental organizations such as International Alert, International Business Leaders Forum,
Global Witness, or Amnesty International or even to individual negotiators such as Martti Ahtisaari (Nobel Peace Prize
laureate, 2008). Nonetheless, the ICRC for instance has struggled to shift its orientation from the “old” to the “new” wars
and threats (Kaldor, 2006). Founded by a businessman in the 1850s, it was astonishingly successful to convene states
to agree what became the Geneva Conventions. These laid down rules to guide behavior in inter-state war, for example,
rules regarding the treatment of the wounded and of prisoners of war. But as security threats and wars shifted toward civil
war, terrorism, nacro- and human trafficking, the Geneva Conventions do not apply. Into the breech sprang groups such
as Médecins Sans Frontières, or MSF (Nobel Peace Prize recipient, 1999). While their humanitarian emergency
assistance functions are far removed from economics, it is in part the economics that makes their existence necessary.
Global Witness has played an important whistle-blower function when, in the 1990s, it single-handedly created the topic
of conflict diamonds. By sullying producers’, distributors’, and retailers’ carefully cultivated image of diamonds and
romantic bliss with a counter-image of having “blood on your hands (or finger),” it put pressure on the entire supply
chain such that all parties involved—companies, states, and NGOs—eventually agreed to the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme (KPSC), a voluntary organization that certifies the supposedly conflict-free origin of diamonds
consumers can purchase.
In terms of the principles of success and failure outlined in section 5.2, the existence of Global Witness points to
the principles of information, monitoring, and accountability and, in lesser degree, to that of self-policing enforcement.87
In contrast, MSF’s work does not appear to related to any of the principles. Its existence—important as it is on its own
terms—does not drive conflicting parties toward peace, nor does it increase the chances for peace being stable once
reached. The ICRC started out, in a way, as an agency that helped states foster common values (on how to fight) and
functions mainly in terms of the information, monitoring, and accountability principles although, like Global Witness,
it is a form of media-driven accountability in the court of world opinion, that is, a moral accountability rather than one
with consequential bite for war-criminals. At present, only sovereign states can provide that, for example, through the
U.N.’s International Criminal Court in The Hague. The political society organizations also are the ones that far more
often are able to address the principles of changing payoffs, of creating vested interests and leadership, of graduated
reciprocity and clarity, of fostering and engaging in repeated, small steps, and so on. But they often do so only after civil
society organizations have put an issue or misdeed on the table in the first place. It bears repeating that there is no
necessary order of priority or magnitude of importance between and among these principles. They form a package. All
are important; the more of these principles are explicitly recognized in the negotiation and design of peace agreements,
the higher the likely probability of stable peace—and vice versa.
As for commercial society, the stakes and incentives are very different. Businesses like revenue and dislike cost.
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Unfortunately for them, the cost of complying with rules and regulations across some 200 political entities, and tens of
thousands of political entities at subnational and supranational levels is very costly. So is the cost of war, civil war, and
crime as suppliers, employees, customers, and markets suffer. Whereas in the past, business and war were associated with
terms such as merchants of death, increasingly global companies recognize that their self-interest lies in fostering peace,
not war. For example, PepsiCo’s CEO Indra Nooyi has been outspoken in this regard: the absence of peace is not a useful
business proposition. No markets, no money.
As business and economic globalization continues to be driven by reductions in transport and communications costs,
it is likely that business leaders will take an increasing interest in peace and security, if only to protect and grow markets.
Thus, peace negotiators should not overlook the constructive role that consultation with business leaders whose
businesses operate or might operate in postwar zones. In this regard, it is of interest that the International Organization
for Standardization (www.iso.org)—whose motto is “International Standards for Business, Government and Society”—is
increasingly involved in standard-setting outside of the narrow technical product specification arena in which it started
(e.g., ISO film speed standards). For example, ISO9000 sets quality management standards, ISO14000 sets
environmental management standards, and security standards in regard to biometrics, cyber security, and societal security
in cases of industrial accidents, and similar security issues pertaining to company operations are in active discussion. It
is not inconceivable that, some years into the future, a family of standards may emerge on company behavior in regard
to human rights, complicity issues, relations to security forces, and the like that, for now, are restricted to the political
and civil society legs of the 3-legged stool. One remarkable thing about ISO is that it is a commercial society
organization. It consists of standards-setting national institutes but these, in turn, in many states are private-sector
organizations. Standardization lowers costs, improves product and service quality, and thereby attracts customers that
provide revenue. As local, national, and global companies are hurt by violence, ISO may well develop an ISO Security
Standard—say, ISO50000— that specifies how companies engage in and deal with public policy issues such as peace
and (in)security. In terms of our principles, that of creating vested (commercial) interests beyond the nation-state toward
a boundary-free world would apply, as would that of common value-formation (among global business leaders who are
becoming ever more divorced from the quaintness of nationality and national identity), and that of creating conflict
resolution mechanisms. The International Chamber of Commerce—not a Chamber of Chambers, but an organization of
global corporations—for instance sports its own conflict mediation, arbitration, and court system whose rulings are
accepted as binding by many nation-state judicial systems. Thus, the global commercial sector sometimes can and does
transcend state boundaries as if it, itself, were a sovereign, rule-setting and rule-enforcing player.
We conclude by quoting the leaders of three world standards organizations—the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU)—on the occasion of the year 2000 World Standards Day:
“Without agreement, there can be no peace. And without peace, there can be no lasting prosperity. International
Standards are an essential tool in mankind’s continuing efforts to achieve more of both.”88
That the commercial sector has largely been left out of considerations in peace negotiations is a mistake. Fortunately,
it is one that can easily be rectified.
5.5 Policy lessons and tips
Lesson 5.1: We do not have principles of peace that guarantee success. But we have some general principles that,
if not followed, might spell failure. They are: the principle of changing payoffs; the principle of
creating vested interests and leadership; the principle of graduated reciprocity and clarity; the principle
of engaging in repeated small steps; the principle of value-formation; the principle of authentic
authority; the principle of subsidiarity; the principle of conflict resolution mechanisms; the principle
of information and monitoring; the principle of accountability; the principle of self-policing
enforcement; and the principle of nesting.
Lesson 5.2: Likely factors determining unilateral third-party intervention include information, noise, distance,
relations, din, noise at home, self-interest, and opportunity. This can serve as a rapid assessment list
to gauge the sincerity, and desirability, of accepting or not accepting offers of help.
Lesson 5.3: Political, civil, and commercial society all need to be engaged in peacemaking and peacekeeping. To
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restrict peace treaty negotiations to political players alone without consultation with civil and
commercial is short-sighted and addresses only the short-term immediacy of silencing guns rather than
the long-term necessity of rebuilding social foundations for civic and commercial (re)engagement.
5.6 Failure and success: two case studies
Failure: Nepal
Nepal has a convoluted post-World War II history, entangled in
part with China’s incorporation of Tibet and India’s consequent
reaction to counteract this by seeking influence in and through
Nepal. King Mahendra (r. 1955-1972) abandoned an incipient
experiment with multiparty democracy in 1959. The data series
in Figure 5.1 starts in 1960. King Bihendra (r. 1972-2001) was
compelled in 1989 to agree to constitutional changes that led to
the seating of a multiparty parliament in 1991. In 1996, a
Maoist insurgency movement began a ten-year period of armed
violence, attempting to replace the royal parliamentary system
with a socialist republic. Following the murder of Bihendra,
apparently stemming from an intra-family squabble, King
Gyanendra inherited the throne (r. 2001-2006). In 2005, he
dismissed government and parliament, took executive power,
and declared rule under martial law. But by this time, a
stalemate had developed between the Maoist forces and government troops. Also, the king’s moves inspired broad
opposition. Parliamentary leaders fled to India, formed a seven-party alliance (SPA), and signed a 12-point understanding
with the Maoist party whereby all agreed to unseat the king and form a democracy with contested elections in which all
could compete for votes. Reinstated in 2006, parliament voted to abolish the monarchy. This obtained in May 2008, after
an election the prior month resulted in the Maoists obtained the largest number of seats in a Constituent Assembly. Under
Maoist leadership, the assembly voted to end monarchy and declare the country a federal republic. The Maoists formed
the new government. This new government, however, was toppled in May 2009 and a Marxist-Leninist party took power.
It is evident that the initial political transition and peace negotiations were insufficiently inclusive and left various
interests disaffected enough to restart violence.
Economically, the country’s real per capita growth rate in production was a mere 0.3 percent between 1960 and
1980. Thereafter, Figure 5.1 shows a marked change in the slope but still amounts to an annual average of only 1.9
percent, with a decline to only 1.1 percent starting in 2001. The economy is propped up in large part by hundreds of
thousands of Nepalis working abroad and remitting funds back home and also by Nepal’s foreign-exchange earnings for
U.N. peacekeeping services.
Success: South Africa
South Africa’s regime of racial segregation and discrimination
collapsed with the end of the Cold War. By April 1994, a
wholesale political change—mostly peaceful—had taken place
in the country. The African National Congress (ANC) won the
elections that year and Nelson Mandela became the country’s
President.
As may be seen in Figure 5.2, from 1950 to 1980, South
Africa experienced steady economic growth along a linear trend
line. Undoubtedly, the trend line would have had a steeper slope
if the country’s nonwhite population had not been suppressed
and excluded from accumulating human capital and contribute
productively to the economy. Following the Soweto uprising
and 1976 and the murder of Steve Biko, an anti-apartheid
Figure 5.1: Population-, inflation-, and purchasing
power-adjusted GDP, Nepal, 1960-2007 (base year =
2005).
Source: Raw data from Penn World Table, v6.3.
Figure 5.2: Population-, inflation-, and purchasing
power-adjusted GDP, South Africa, 1950-2007 (base
year = 2005).
Source: Raw data from Penn World Table, v6.3.
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activist, in 1977, black South African labor unions became more active and restive, and the international political
community sharpened economic sanctions on South Africa. By 1980, GDP growth stalled. For the remainder of the
apartheid years, inflation-adjusted per capita GDP saw no advancement at all.
The domestic business community played an important, and ill-recognized and under-reported, role in the political
transition. According to International Alert, a global nongovernmental organization, already in 1985 a delegation of
business and media representatives met with ANC leaders in Zambia. This meeting, and follow-ups, had a dual effect.
White business acknowledged the ANC’s political legitimacy long, long before white politics did, and it also introduced
the ANC—which had embraced a “socialist” economy ideology—to “capitalist,” free-market economics. A bargain was
struck which both parties adhered to: business pushed for political change, and in time the ANC reciprocated with
pursuing economic policies that, while aimed at improving the lot of the poor, nonetheless recognized that private
business interests can generate employment, income, and tax revenue. Figure 5.2 shows that following the 1994
transition, the country is moving back toward the growth trend line it left in 1994.
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1. See http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/mozambique_1991-92.pdf [accessed 20
July 2009]. A 2006 “World Bank/UNDP-commissioned survey found that provisions related to macroeconomic policies,
financial, business, investment and labour-regulatory frameworks and regional wealth allocation increased significantly
between the periods 1990-1998 and 1999-2006, as have references to social welfare, education, health, and employment
policy” (UNDP, 2008, p. 8).
2. Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2009).
3. On different classifications of violence, see Appendix A.
4. The war periods are: Cambodia, 1970-1991; El Salvador, 1979-1991; Guatemala, 1965-1995; Nicaragua, 1978-1990;
Mozambique, 1976-1992; Rwanda, 1990-1994; Uganda, 1979-1991.
5. Stohl, Schroeder, Smith (2007, p. 56).
6. For a review of selected literature and scientific issues and criteria to be used in computing the cost of violence, see
Bozzoli, Brück, and Sottsas (forthcoming) and DIW (2008).
7. IMF (2009, p. 4).
8. See, e.g., Polacheck (2007) and literature cited there.
9. This needs to be qualified somewhat. Parents, for instance, might expect to be supported in their old age by their
children so that an intergenerational “trade” might be said to take place over time. And, at least in the past and present
and probably so in the future, states rendering assistance might expect some reciprocal “trade” from recipient states for
example in the form of certain voting behaviors in international organizations. Political pronouncements notwithstanding,
third-party state aid should not be presumed to be made selflessly. Instead, it is safer to assume that third parties have
their own interests at stake.
10. Self-love: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from
their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them
of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chuses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of
his fellow-citizens” [Smith (1776), book I, chapter 2, paragraph I.2.2]. In contrast, Kenneth Boulding (1973) writes about
the economics of love and fear. He speaks of three systems: the exchange system, the threat system, and the integrative
system. Reactions to threats can take the forms of submission, defiance, counter-threats, fight, or integration of the
threatener with the threatened as when, for example, commonalities between them are established that supersede the
threat. To him, grants are one-way transfers whether made out of love or out of fear. In contrast, we view grants as one-
way “positive” transfers and appropriation as one-way “negative” transfers.
Notes
* Jurgen Brauer is Professor of Economics at the James M. Hull School of Business, Augusta State University, Augusta,
GA, USA. This manual was researched and written while he held visiting professorships at the economics departments
of Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, and at the Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá, Colombia. J. Paul Dunne
is Professor of Economics at the Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK. His
contribution to this manual was made, in part, during visiting professorships at the economics department of
Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, the Faculty of Business Administration, Economics, and Political Science
at the British University in Egypt, Cairo, and the economics department, University of Cape Town, South Africa. The
United States Institute of Peace (USIP) is a congressionally chartered organization located in Washington, D.C. The
views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of USIP or of its staff. The research was facilitated by Economists
for Peace and Security (www.epsusa.org).
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11. The figures are taken from Anderson and Carter (2009, p. 22). The tradeoff can also be drawn for instance as that
between (tangible) goods on one axis and (intangible) services on the other. Given limited resources of time, capital, and
labor, the more one produces of one type, the more one must give up the opportunity to produce the other type. Just how
one groups all goods and services into two classes—to be represented by the vertical and horizontal axes,
respectively—depends on the purpose of the analysis. In our case, we are interested in singling out military or violence
goods and services from nonmilitary (civilian, or nonviolence) goods and services.
12. Boulding (1945, p. v).
13. To say that war is “good” for an economy is like saying that cigarette addiction is “good” for the addicted person.
Smoking may make one momentarily feel good, but over time it destroys the underlying asset, the smoker. By analogy,
people in the United States in World War II sacrificed leisure for work and production of consumption items was
sacrificed for production of war items. That this activity led to higher levels of gross domestic product is not equivalent
to saying that this improved livelihoods and the average standard of living or quality of life.
14. Boulding (1945, p. 4).
15. E.F. Schumacher in his classic 1973 book Small is Beautiful speaks of sufficiency or Buddhist economics, the notion
that life-satisfaction may well be had from pleasures requiring immaterial inputs rather than material consumption. (Also
see Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi, 2009.) In a similar vein, Kenneth Boulding (1981) is a forerunner of ecological economics
which views Earth as a closed physical system in which material production absorbs limited natural resources (input)
and converts them into waste streams (output). In this view, the part of GDP that measures the monetary value of material
production and consumption is nothing more than throughput. To continuously increase material throughput requires a
continuous increase in material inputs and consequently a continuous increase in material waste streams, something that
in a closed system is a physical impossibility. It follows that economic growth as measured by increases in GDP must
be made consistent with raw material use and disposal so that the integrity of the physical system of Earth as a whole can
be maintained. In a word, economic growth must be conflict-sensitive in terms of human systems but also resource-
sensitive in terms of ecological systems.
16. On macroeconomics and human rights, see, e.g., Balakrishnan, Elson, Patel (2009).
17. UN A/Res/55/2 of 18 September 2000. Or see http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf [accessed 1
January 2010].
18. “Making Societies more Resilient to Violence: A Conceptual Framework for the Conflict, Crime and Violence
Agenda.” Undated. Word Bank, Social Development Department, Conflict, Crime & Violence. Washington, DC: World
Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTCPR/Resources/CCV_Framework_Note.pdf [accessed 1 January 2010].
19. Schumpeter (1942).
20. An important paper by Cerra and Saxena (2007), however, shows that developing economies do converge on
developed economies so long as they can avoid “wars, [financial] crises, and other negative shocks ... [that] lead to
absolute divergence and lower long-run growth ... The output costs of political and financial crises are permanent on
average, and long-term growth is negatively linked to volatility” (quoted from the abstract). Nonetheless, even if the
failure of convergence can be linked to repetitive, severe crises, it still would be useful to identify the endogenous drivers
of positive economic growth.
21. On the mismeasure of GDP and the measurement of well-being, see for example, Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2009).
22. Imagine a society consisting of four people, a farmer, a thief, a policeman, and a soldier. In this economy, the farmer
feeds all four people. If the thief converted and became a farmer as well, the policeman’s services would become
unnecessary and he (or she), too, could start farming. And if there were no longer any need for external security, the
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soldier also could farm. GDP might remain the same—because the expenditure and income streams still involve but four
people—but clearly everyone would eat better.
23. To see that this is correct, multiply USD9,091 times EUR1.1 per U.S. dollar. The (rounded) result is USD10,000.
24. UNODC (2007, pp. 83-84); UNDP (2008, pp. 77-78).
25. To reverse the cumulative losses, country 2 would have to continue to grow each year 40 percent faster than country
1 until the year 2034, nearly 50 years after its five-year war period began.
26. See Brauer and Haywood (2009). An overlap might occur for instance in commercial diplomacy, i.e., joint trade
missions by diplomats and business people.
27. Regional non-U.N. bodies related to economic policy include, e.g., the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the
African Development Bank (AfDB).
28. For the 22 OECD-DAC members (Development Assistance Committee members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development). See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/10/40108245.pdf [accessed 9 October 2009].
29. UNDP (2008, p. 86).
30. See http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=5037&lang=1[accessed 9 October 2009].
31. For details, see section 4.2.
32. See www.imf.org and www.worldbank.org, respectively [accessed 21 August 2009].
33. For example, the many hundreds of billions of dollars spent by governments to rein in the world economic crisis of
2009 amount to tax obligations for future taxpayers. Early recognition, intervention, and prevention would have been
cheaper for the taxpayers and for the affected populations.
34. No agreement exists in the economics literature on what is or is not a “sustainable” debt burden. In principle—if not
in practice—if 99 percent of a government’s budget go to finance interest payments on debt that is fine so long as the
remaining 1 percent fully suffices to serve society’s other public sector needs.
35. The main international financial institutions, the OECD, the G20, and bi-lateral donors all have either programmatic
or one-time debt-relief facilities. Many global institutions have special borrowing facilities for postwar states.
36. Alternatively, government can raise tax rates or cut spending to throttle the economy when it is growing too fast but
a fast-growing economy, so long as output price inflation is kept in check, can hardly be viewed as a problem.
37. World Bank (1998, p. 3).
38. See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPEAM/Resources/pem98.pdf [accessed 25 August 2009]. The World
Bank has many useful public finance management handbooks and manuals available online.
39. “Democratic Republic of the Congo: Lessons from the Ashes of Conflict.” IMF Survey [7 March 2005], 34(4), pp.
60-62; quote from p. 61.
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40. Demekas, McHugh, and Kosma (2002, p. 1). The “Dutch disease” refers to the influx of large amounts of foreign
aid that can lead to the appreciation of the local currency and make the aid recipient country’s exports uncompetitively
expensive on foreign markets (see chapter 4).
41. “Democratic Republic of the Congo: Lessons from the Ashes of Conflict.” IMF Survey [7 March 2005], 34(4), pp.
60-62; quote from pp. 61-62.
42. See, e.g., Murdoch and Sandler (2002); Saleyhan and Gleditsch (2006); and literature cited there.
43. Statistically speaking, an upward-bending polynominal projection fits the data better, so that the text understates the
case for aid for Costa Rica.
44. In the equation, the symbol “/” means “identically equal,” that is, something that must be true by definition.
45. There is one other option: (4) M* / (P x Q) / V* | Example: 5* / (1 x 10*) / 2 | Change: 5* / (2 x 5*) / 2. Here,
money and velocity are assumed unchanged (M*; V*) so that a doubling in prices must come at the expense of a halving
of production (or vice versa).
46. IMF (2009a).
47. Del Castillo (2008, p. 281); UNDP (2008, p. xxiii).
48. See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prgf.htm, an IMF July 2009 factsheet [accessed 23 August 2009].
49. For the case of a dollarized economy like El Salvador, the U.S. dollars can likewise flow into the United States. We
abstract from that possibility here.
50. WTO (2007, pp. 2-3).
51. The UNDP’s list is somewhat shorter: “... risk factors include low per capita income, weak economic growth, the
presence of socioeconomic horizontal inequalities and abundant high-value natural resources. These risk factors are even
more acute in the presence of high unemployment, especially among youth” (UNDP, 2008, p. 17).
52. See Anderton and Carter (2009) on the cost of trade-interruption in war; see Polacheck (2007) on the peace-and-trade
hypothesis and evidence.
53. Cooper (2006).
54. Cooper (2010). On non-diamond jewelry, especially gold, see Tepper-Marlin (2006).
55. For the 22 OECD-DAC members (Development Assistance Committee members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development). See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/10/40108245.pdf [accessed 9 October 2009].
56. UNDP (2008, p. 86).
57. See http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=5037&lang=1[accessed 9 October 2009].
58. 1.5 percent: WTO (2006, p. 113, Table 7); PSEs: p. 123; United States: p. 128, Table 11; EU-15: p. 131, Table 12.
59. Probability of war-renewal: UNDP (2008, p. 16).
60. Currency appreciation that starves a state of export opportunities is often referred to as a Dutch disease effect.
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61. Alternatively, the exchange rate can be set by law. This amounts to an explicit price control and encourages the
development of a black market in which currency is privately traded, albeit illegally.
62. Over the years, a number of other states have joined, left, or rejoined the CFA currency areas. As of 2009, in addition
to the former French colonies—Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the Congo, and Gabon
in Central Africa and Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo in West Africa—the CFA is
also used by the former Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau (Central CFA) and the former Spanish colony of Equatorial
Guinea (West CFA). Although the exchange value is fixed, the Central and West African CFA’s are not mutually
recognized.
63. Despite the availability of ample case material, the relation between currency, explicit or implicit (through fixed
exchange rates) currency unions, and violence is not well-investigated in the economics literature. The post-World War
II Bretton Woods system created a system of fixed exchange rates. The political, cultural, and economic development
of today’s European Union is strongly tied to currency regimes, including the creation of the euro. Under apartheid, the
southern African customs union also included a currency union in which states such as Lesotho and Swaziland handed
control over monetary policy and over export and import regimes to South Africa.
64. On the value of the U.S. dollar and U.S. wars through history, see Warburton (2009).
65. See, e.g., Ferguson (2008).
66. “The result [of WTO’s existence] is ... a more prosperous, peaceful and accountable economic world. Virtually all
decisions in the WTO are taken by consensus among all member countries and they are ratified by members’ parliaments.
Trade friction is channelled into the W TO’s dispute settlement process where the focus is on interpreting agreements
and commitments, and how to ensure that countries’ trade policies conform with them. That way, the risk of disputes
spilling over into political or military conflict is reduced. By lowering trade barriers, the WTO’s system also breaks down
other barriers between peoples and nations.” See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm
[accessed 5 December 2009].
67. Cerra and Saxena (2007).
68. The two quotes in this passage are from UNDP (2008, pp. 17, 20).
69. Recent Nobel Prize awards in economics have recognized this, e.g., to Schelling in 2005, Hurwicz, Maskin, and
Myerson in 2007, and to Ostrom and Williamson in 2009.
70. McFadden (2006); also see Thaler and Sunstein (2008).
71. See, e.g., Binmore (2005) on the evolution of fairness norms, moral codes, and notions of justice.
72. There is no presumption that a unique and uniform structure exists. That would be to deny the diversity of cultures.
More likely, multiple kinds of structures (solutions) can result in satisfactory outcomes.
73. This section is based on Brauer (2004; 2006), based, in turn, on Alexrod (1984), Ostrom (1990), Sandler (1997), and
others.
74. “With the relative lack of easily extractable natural assets in Mozambique (compared to say Angola or Liberia) the
end of war was endogenously determined. Neither the government nor RENAMO were able to sustain the fighting
financially and the drought of 1991-93 finally forced a settlement” Brück (2006, p. 31).
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75. A real-world example: “In October 1996, one year after the Dayton peace negotiations, Carl Bildt, the international
community's high representative in Bosnia, faced a crisis. Momcilo Krajisnik, a close associate of indicted war criminal
Radovan Karadzic, had just been elected to Bosnia's three-person collective presidency, but in a gesture of continuing
Bosnian Serb defiance toward Dayton's goal of a united Bosnia, he now refused to attend the presidential swearing-in
ceremony in Sarajevo. His refusal threatened to undermine the fragile new Bosnian state from its inception. Bildt
responded by dispatching his senior deputy for economic reconstruction to the Bosnian Serb headquarters in Pale,
accompanied by the resident representatives of the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, and the European Union, and President Clinton's special envoy for reconstruction. Together they delivered
a stern warning: not one penny of reconstruction aid would flow to the Serb Republic if Krajisnik failed to appear. Four
days later, Krajisnik was in Sarajevo for the ceremony.” (Quoted from Boyce and Pastor, 1998, p. 1.)
76. Only very recently has the literature formally recognized that third-party intervention need not be with the intention
of creating peace. For recent literature, see the reviews by Chang, Sanders, and Walia and by Potter and Scott in The
Economics of Peace and Security Journal, vol. 5, no. 1 (2010).
77. Schelling (1978). In the essay, he backs this up mathematically. Also see many of Amartya Sen’s works, e.g., 2006.
78. Representation requires recognition that those who become part of the negotiation team are chosen by a process that
itself is a collective action. We cannot simply assume that party A and party B are unitary actors. Instead, we must often
assume that within-party interests play out as well which may make it impossible for the official party A and party B
negotiators to actually negotiate anything at all. See, e.g, Anderton and Carter (2009) and literature cited there.
79. Hirschman (1970); Ostrom (1990).
80. Sandler (1999, pp. 38-40).
81. The idea of automaticity was proposed by Brauer (2000), esp. pp. 313-314.
82. This section is based on Brauer (2006), especially pp. 19-20.
83. Boyce (2003).
84. Kaldor (2006).
85. That is, other than within the state of the unilateral intervener. But in the case of the United States, and most other
sovereign states, decisionmaking is effectively delegated to the head of state. Thus, Mr. Bush for instance, by avoiding
calling his presidential decisions a war, could send armed forces to Afghanistan and Iraq without a formal war vote in
U.S. Congress that otherwise would have been required by the U.S. constitution.
86. Historian D. Morton (2003, p. 17) comments:“Peacekeeping might be idealistic, but it also fitted Cold War needs.”
87. For a critique of KPCS, see Cooper (2010).
88. See http://www.iso.org/iso/pressrelease.htm?refid=Ref780 [accessed 23 December 2009].
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Glossary
[to be done, possibly by USIP rather than by Brauer/Dunne]
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Appendices
Appendix A: Examples of classifications of violence and armed actors
The World Health Organization
(WHO, 2002) groups violence into
the rubrics of self-harm  (including
suicide), interpersonal violence
(e.g., violence between intimate
partners and other forms of family
violence, rape and sexual assault by
strangers, violence committed in
institutional settings such as
schools, prisons, and work places),
and collective violence (e.g., armed
conflict within and between states,
violent political repression and
genocide, violent acts of terror, and
organized crime) and speaks of an ecology of violence that progresses from individual to personal relationship-related
violence, and on to communal and broad collective levels of violence.
The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (GD, for short) notes that violence comes in many
forms. Violence against women for instance includes intimate partner violence, sexual violence, honor killing, dowry-
related violence, acid attacks, female infanticide and sex-selective abortions (GD, 2008). Organized crime, armed gangs
as well as extrajudicial killings, and “disappearances” are forms of violence associated with crime and the miscarriage
of justice by officers of law and order institutions. Politically-motivated violence includes mob-violence, lynchings,
rebellions, insurrections, and civil war.
Another typology lists the following forms of violence (with violence indicators in parentheses) [Chaudhary and
Suhrke (2008) as cited in GD (2008, p. 65)]:
< Political violence (assassinations, bomb attacks, kidnappings, torture, genocide, mass displacements, riots);
< Routine state violence (violent law enforcement activities, encounter killings, social cleansing operations,
routine torture);
< Economic and crime-related violence (armed robbery, extortions, kidnappings for ransom, control of markets
through violence);
< Community and informal justice and policing (lynching, vigilante action, mob justice); and
< Postwar displacements and disputes (clashes over land, revenge killings, small-scale “ethnic cleansing”).
Finally, a typology of armed actors rather than of the violence they may engage (see Figure A.1), is based on a
forthcoming paper by Muggah and Jüttersonke. It overlays types of armed actors on a vertical grid of organized versus
spontaneous violence with a horizontal grid of state versus nonstate actors.
Figure A.1: A typology of armed groups and related actors.
Source: GD (2008, p. 127, Figure 7.1).
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Appendix B: The United Nations System organizational chart
[http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart_en.pdf; accessed 19 July 2009]
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Appendix C: The cases
The ten illustrative mini-cases that accompany the five chapters are structured such that we (1) cover both historical and
contemporary cases; (2) war, civil war (grievance-based and greed-based); and postwar criminalization of an economy;
and (3) cover all geographic regions: Europe, Africa, the Americas, and Asia and the South Pacific. Of course, not every
failure is a failure in every respect, and not every success is a success in every respect. Many countries can easily be
placed in either category, depending on what aspect one wishes to emphasize. For example, Timor-Leste (East Timor)
saw a massively violent upheaval in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Political independence came in 2002 and violence
recurred in 2006. After protracted negotiations, the country now enjoys high revenue flows from offshore oil- and gas-
deposits but it suffers from utterly inadequate infrastructure, especially roads to connect markets, and very high poverty
rates. As regards Nepal, its first peace agreement was flawed (the aspect we highlight) but the second attempt rectified
the shortcomings. South Africa saw a peaceful transition from apartheid but its current violence rates are among the very
highest in the world.
Geographic distribution of the cases
Continent Failure Success
Africa Zimbabwe South Africa
Asia Nepal Vietnam
Americas El Salvador Chile
Europe Germany I Germany II
Asia-Pacific Fiji Timor-Leste
Chapter distribution of the cases
Ch 1 Violence and economic development
- F: El Salvador
- S: Timor-Leste
Ch 2 The long-run goal: economic growth
- F: Germany post-WW I
- S: Germany post-WW II [Northern Ireland?]
Ch 3 Dealing with turbulence: macroeconomic stabilization
- F: Zimbabwe
- S: Chile
Ch 4 The global economy: international trade and finance
- F: Fiji
- S: Vietnam
Ch 5 Designing and promoting peace
- F: Nepal
- S: South Africa
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